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1 DIVIDEND POLICY AND THE EX-DIVIDEND EFFECT
1.1 Introduction
Many corporations pay dividends to their shareholders. Basically, these consist of cash
payments out of current or past earnings which is made available to the shareholders. The
level at which a company should aim its dividend payout through time continues to be the
focus of dispute in financial economic literature, although some more or less clear picture
seems to emerge from it. The actual subject of the present study may be regarded as
'contingent' on the dividend decision by corporations. Given that they have decided to
payout a dividend, it may be interesting to examine what procedure is usually followed in
order to actually transfer the dividend to the shareholders. An important aspect of this
procedure is the so-called 'ex-dividend day', i.e. the day at which the dividend right is
'segregated' from the stock. In what will be defined as the 'cum-ex interval', a stock price
movement may be expected due to this dividend segregation, and this study examines more
closely what factors determine the extent to which the stock price is affected by its ex-
dividend listing.
The remainder of this chapter is intended as a global introduction to the entire study.
The second section briefly discusses some theories developed in financial economic
literature which try to explain the way corporations set their dividend policies. The third
section introduces two specific empirical issues associated with dividend policy: the
announcement effect and the ex-dividend effect. The latter is the focus of the fourth section,
which describes the procedure usually maintained in order to effectively distribute the
dividend to shareholders, and it emphasizes the role of the ex-dividend day in this
procedure. The final section of this first chapter details important aspects of the research
methodology followed in the remainder of this study.
1.2 Theories of dividend policy
Although there is much to be said about the procedure by which dividends are declared
by the company and disMbuted to its shareholders, we will first spend a few comments to
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the underlying yuestion of why corporations do distribute dividends in the first place.
Brealey and Myers (1991) state that dividend payments' should be regarded as cash outflows
for which funds must be available. If the corporation does not have such funds at hand, it
must raise additional external capital to pay the dividend. On the other hand, it may be true
that the company has interesting investment opportunities which compete with the dividend
payment in order to be financed. If these opportunities are really interesting, it may as well
be argued that the company does better to skip the dividend entirely. Considerations like
these are illustrative of the so-called 'dividend puzzle', which tries to explain why
companies pay out positive cash amounts to shareholders as dividends. Stated differently,
there must be some argument explaining why a corporation decides to follow a specific
dii~idend polic~~. Brealey and Myers (1991, p. 371) define the dividend problem as the effect
a change in cash dividends has on the market value of the corporation, gii~en its capital
budgeting and borrowing decisions. The dividend policy therefore involves a trade-off
between retaining eamings on the one hand and paying out cash and issuing new shares on
the other. There appear to be some more or less conflicting theoretical views in the
literature, and we will give a brief description of them.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that in frictionless capital markets where rational
investors have eyual information', dividend policy does not matter. When the corporation's
capital budgeting and borrowing policies are given, they demonstrate that any cash amount
can only be paid out as dividends provided it is matched by a share issue of equal
magnitude. Otherwise, there would not be enough funds available to finance all investment
projects. The share issue, on the other hand, should be no problem since every investor
knows the fair value of the corporation's shares of stock. Thus, investors in the capital
market are indifferent to any particular dividend policy chosen by the corporation.
' For the purpose of the discussion in the present chapter, we restrict dividend payments to be cash amounts.
In later chapters, we will explicitly consider stock dividends and various combinations of cash and stock dividends.
which appear to be extremely popular in the Netherlands. Although we will not elaborate on it. it should also be
mentioned that a stock repurchase is, at least in an economic sense, an altemative for a cash dividend. The extent
to which stock can be repurchased is, however, subject to restrictions in many countries. In the Netherlands, for
example, only 10 percent of nominal share capital may be repurchased.
~ The tertns 'frictionless', 'rational' and 'eyual information' have precise meanings in the study of Miller and
Modigliani (19611. In order to understand their arguments. however, the following loose interpretation of these
terms may be sufficient. Capital markets are said to be frictionless when there are no barriers like taxes.
transactions costs, lack of competitiveness. etc.. Rational investors are utility maximizing investors in the Von
Neumann-Morgenstem sense who always prefer more wealth over less. If the market is informationally efficient.
all participants have equal (and costless) access to any piece of information relevant in asset pricing. We will come
back on these tenns in later chapters.
Diridend Policy~ and the E.r-Dividend Effect 3
Reactions to the indifference theory of dividend policy have focused on the set of
assumptions chosen by Miller and Modigliani (1991)', especially on the extent to which the
capital market may be regarded as ( I) frictionless, (2) informationally efficient, and (3)
whether investors are indeed rational. For example, some studies introduce the existence of
taxation and~or transaction costs as frictions'. When there are costs involved in external
financing, it can easily be understood that there is a natural incentive to retain earnings
instead of paying out cash and issue new equity. Furthermore, if cash dividends and capital
gains income are differently treated for income tax purposes, investors may actually dislike
dividend payments. These theories collectively call for moderate or even zero payout
policies by corporations. Some studies such as Miller and Scholes (1978) have, however,
demonstrated that the tax disadvantage of cash income may be mitigated at the personal
investor level by exploiting facilities embedded in virtually all income tax systems5.
The informational content of unexpected dividend changes has been recognized in a
number of theoretical models which have been developed in the recent IS years~. All thesc
models presume that the management of the corporation has superior information with
respect to the future profitability, and it is willing to convey this information to its
shareholders. The problem is that it should do this in a credible way, since words are easily
mimicked. Increased dividend payments seem to provide a mechanism by which
management can unambiguously siqnal its profitability to the market. More precisely, a
dividend signal can be employed such that the corporation distinguishes itself from less
profitable firms which 'look' the same to outsiders. The essence of the argument is that only
the better firms can afford to sustain a policy of increased dividend payments, since this
must be backed by sufficient future earnings levels. Less profitable firms trying to mimic
this signal face the problem that increased dividend levels cannot be based on increased
future earnings levels, which means that either some of their assets must be liquidated or
additional external funds must be acquired. This makes that, eventually, investors will learn
i Although the pioneering model of Miller and Modigliani assumes a world of certainty, their results readily
carry over to a world with uncertainty.
~ See e.g. the articles of Farrar and Selwyn (1967) and Brennan (1970).
s An example of this occurs when interest payments are deductible for income tax purposes. Miller and
Scholes (1978) describe investment plans by which this interest deduction feature can be employed in order to
shelter dividend cash amounts from being too heavily taxed.
~ Examples include Ross (1977). Bhattacharya (1979), Kalay (1980), Miller and Rock (1985). John and
Williams (1986), and Ambarish, John and Williams (1987).
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about the true financial strength of the corporation'.
Much of financial economic theory assumes that investors are maximizing rationally
expected utility of wealth, and the pioneering dividend policy theory of Miller and
Modigliani (1961) is no exception to that. Directed to the dividend policy question, it
implies that investors are indifferent to (1) some certain cash dividend amount D to be paid
now, and (2) the alternative amount D being the certainty equivalent wealth provided by
expected capital gains. A small number of studies exist which challenge this view by relying
on behavioral assumptions. Very famous is the study of Shefrin and Statman (1984), which
demonstrates that dividends and capital gains (from immediately selling stock) may not be
regarded as perfect substitutes to investors once behavioral assumptions like (i) the desire
for self-control", (ii) the wish to segregate gains from losses~, and (iii) the level of personal
regret aversion"' are included in the theory. They argue that investors may prefer cash
dividends over capital gains, even despite possible tax disadvantages, because dividends
either serve as a'silver lining' producing spendable income, or provide coverage against
possible losses. The Shefrin and Statman analysis therefore suggests that investors would
be willing to pay a premium in order to receive dividends. This view is, however, heavily
debated by Miller (1986). He argues that behavioral and~or cognitive elements in decisions
~ Rating agencies may play an important role in this process. It is quite common, especially in the US, that
the financial strength of corporations is evaluated from time to time. An updated rating may be a restriction
imposed by Exchange authorities when a stock or bond issue is proposed. On the other hand, many firms have their
rating updated voluntarily and are willing to pay for that. Of course, they only do so when management is afraid
that investors mix up the firm with worse firms and. consequently. investors reyuire a higher cost of capital
compared to the case in which they would be fully informed about the corporation's financial strength.
x See Thaler and Shefrin 119R I). Self-control refers to a situation in which the individual's 'internal planner'
expresses long-tertn preferences, but the actions are taken by the individual's 'doer' which is supposed to
overwhelmingly favor current consumption. The principal-agent conflict arising in this situation may be reduced
by using self-control techniques in order to influence the doers actions. Examples of these are (1) exercise of will
at the cost of utility, and (2) constraining the doer's opportunities. The latter techniyue could include a'rule' like
'consume out of cash income, not by selling financial assets'.
" See Thaler 1 1980). Kahneman and Tversky (1979. 19R2) and Tversky and Kahneman (19R6). These theories
emphasize the distinction between 'form' and 'substance'. Thís implies that income (form) is not equivalent to
either dividend or capital gains (substance). This is largely due to the behavioral assumption that losses loom larger
than (eyual) gains for earh individual. One of the implications of this theory is that investors would rather have
the corporation pay out cash dividends and issuing new shares instead of simply retaining profits.
~" See Kahneman and Tversky (19R2) and Thaler (19R0). These studies emphasize that regret may generate
stronger emotions than pride, and decisions involving responsibility will tend to be avoided. Moreover. the
anticipation of regret is likely to favor inaction over action and routine behavior over innovative behavior. This
may, again, take the fomi of 'rules' like 'use dividends for consumption, not capital gains'.
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involving dividends may be relevant for (small) individuals, but are unlikely to be the
central factors on which the larger professional and~or institutional investors base their
decisions. Miller suggests that market forces should be our principal concern, not cognitive
side effects.
The discussion in this section may be summarized as follows. Current state-of-the-art
financial economic theory of dividend policy suggests that especially differential income
taxation and signaling effects are important factors in determining the dividend level from
period to period. If differential taxation exists, firms might be expected to choose either a
high or a low dividend yield, depending on the tax status of the majority of their
shareholders. In addition, the dividend may be related to earnings prospects, but such that
the payout is changed (whether increased or decreased) only when management is convinced
that the new payout scheme is supported by the earnings level in the next few years.
1.3 Empirical dividend policy issues: announcement effects, yield premiums, and ex-
dividend dav effects
Long before the theory of dividend policy as brietly discussed above was developed,
Lintner (1956) provided a piece of important evidence about 'real-world' dividend decisions.
He conducted 28 interviews with corporate managers in the US about the way they made
the dividend payout decision from period to period. His conclusions may be summarized as
follows":
- Firms have long-run target dividend payout ratios;
- Dividend changes are more important than absolute dividend levels;
- Dividend changes follow shifts in long-run, sustainable earnings; also, firms appear
to smooth dividend payments, which means that transitory earnings changes are
unlikely to affect dividend payouts;
- There appears to be a substantíal reluctance among managers to make dividend
changes that míght have to be reversed: especially, managers are worried about
having to reduce the dividend after an increase.
~~ This summary is taken from Brealey and Myers ( I991, p. i74).
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It is very clear from this evidence that, given the target payout level, firms appear to
care primarily about possible changes in the actual payout level. The relationship with long-
term earnings potential strongly confirms the implications of the signaling theory of
dividend policy, in which both a nonzero level of payout and the changes in the payout level
have an important information content. Also, the target payout level may (or may not) be
chosen in accordance with the tax preferences of shareholders. This might result in target
payout policies such as 'conservative', 'moderate' or 'high' dividend yields, indicating the
actual dividend payout level relative to the current stock price. This is usually described as
a'dividend yield clientele effect' in finance literature'~. It may be interesting for the present
research that the study of Dorsman (1988), which thoroughly investigates the dividend
policies followed by Dutch corporations, finds very similar results as Lintner does. Dorsman
concludes that the majority of Dutch firrns appear to follow a policy of 'dividend
stabilization', i.e. they try to match the dividend payout to long-term earnings prospects,
while stepping over earnings changes which are regarded as temporary.
Both the informational and tax aspects of dividends have been empirically investigated,
especially for the US case. Typical research within this context include (1) announcement
effect studies and (2) yield premium studies. We will briefly comment on the results of both
types. Announcement effect studies examine stock price reactions to public disclosure of
earnings and~or dividend changes. Of course, such research should be directed only to the
part of the dividend change which may be regarded as unexpected by the market. Another
important aspect is that the announcement of the change is 'news' in the very literal sense,
i.e. it should not have leaked out before. Moreover, announcement effect studies also assume
that the news is quickly absorbed by the capital market so that the stock price readily
adjusts to the new information. The results of the relatively large number of announcement
effect studies" overwhelmingly confirm the informational content of unexpected dividend
and~or earnings changes. More precisely, these studies find (sometimes very) substantial
abnormal stock price behavior, in the direction suggested by the signaling theory of dividend
policy, directly following public announcement of positive and negative dividend changes,
positive or negative earnings changes, and when dividend payment is suspended, resumed,
or first initiated. The effect is predominantly visible in the first two trading days
~~ See e.g. Copeland and Weston (1988, pp. 578-582).
~; We will not state a complete list of all relevant studies, but restrict ourselves to the most cited papers which
include Fama. Fisher. Jensen and Roll (1968), Pettit (1972), Watts (1973), Charest (1978), Aharony and Swary
(1980). Kwan (1981), Asquith and Mullins (1983). Brickley (1983). Woolridge (1983), Handjiinicolaou and Kalay
(1984), Eades, Hess and Kim (19851 and Healy and Palepu (1988). Dorsman (1988) presents similar evidence for
the Dutch case.
Diridend Poliei~ and the Ex-Di~~idend Efj~ect 7
immediately following the announcement.
If differential taxation of income exists such that investors have tax reasons to dislike
dividends, then it might be hypothesized that the rate of return reyuired on the corporation's
stock includes a'tax premium' which is related to the magnitude of the dividend yield. The
stock rate of return net of the differential taxation effect would then be equal across stocks.
This notion inspired researchers to examine whether such a yield premium can be detected
in the rates of return of especially US stocks". The technique used in virtually all of these
studies is to test, via regression analysis or related methods, whether stock rates of return
over some large interval may be explained by a theoretical model which includes a dividend
yield term". The results of these studies are mixed. Some (e.g. Litzenberger and
Ramaswamy (1979, 1982)) find evidence supporting the idea that shareholders express their
displeasure with corporate dividend payments by requiring a higher risk-adjusted rate of
return for those stocks that have higher dividend yields, implying that high-dividend stocks
tend to sell at lower prices than low-dividend stocks. Other studies, especially Black and
Scholes (1974) and Miller and Scholes (1982), are unable to uncover any dividend yield
effect. They explain this by stressing a so-called 'supply effect' stating that, if corporations
could increase shareholder wealth by choosing some other dividend policy, they would have
already done so. Therefore, there would be no incentive, both for investors and corporations,
to switch by either choosing other stocks or choosing another dividend policy.
Yet another problem is very much related to the determination of the dividend yield.
The usual way is to define it by relating the dividend paid over some interval, say one year,
to an indicator of the market price of the stock in the same interval. The hypothesis that
higher-yield stocks have higher dividend yield premiums due to the existence of differential
taxation essentially assumes that the dividend yield exerts an influence on the stock rate of
return in every sub-interval of the year, i.e. in every yuarter, month, or day. However, if
investors dislike dividends for tax reasons, it might also be true that the dividend matters
only to them when it is actually paid out, e.g. in a relatively small sub-interval around the
ex-dividend day. Furthermore, high-tax investors could avoid the receipt of the dividend and
the adverse tax treatment by selling their stock before the ex-dividend day and repurchasing
~~ Relevant papers include Friend and Puckett (1964), Black and Scholes (1974). Long f 1978), Litzenberger
and Ramaswamy (1979. 19821. Bradford and Gordon (1980), Blume ( I980), Miller and Scholes (1982) and Morgan
(1982).
~ 5 These empirical studies investigate dividend-related effects from stock rates of retum over a relatively large
period, say one year. Our study will rypically be engaged with dividend-related rate of return effects in a very
narrow intervaL the so-called cum-e.~ interral. This interval will be carefully defined in the next section.
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them afterwards. By doing so, they would substitute cash dividend income for capital gains.
We can go even further to hypothesize that the sub-interval around the ex-dividend day is
the only sub-interval in which the stock rate of return may or may not contain a dividend-
yield term due to tax aspects.
In sum, our view with respect to the role of the dividend (yield) level in the
determination of the stock rate of retum might be expressed as follows. Based on the current
state-of-the-art financial economic literature outlined above, there seems to be a good reason
to expect that there are only two relatively small time intervals in which the dividend level
set by the corporation affects the rate of return on the stock. The first occurs upon the
moment of first public announcement of unexpected dividend changes, and this should
primarily - if not entirely - be interpreted as a signaling effect. The second occurs around
the ex-dividend day of the stock and it will most likely reflect the incentives among
investors to avoid or redress potentially existing adverse tax conseyuences associated with
the dividend payment. Besides these two intervals, we do not expect the dividend to affect
the rate of return on the stock.
The present study will be entirely preoccupied with the factors explaining the stock rate
of return in the second interval mentioned just before, i.e. the interval around the ex-
dividend date. The general structure of our analysis will be outlined in the remainder of this
chapter. We will start in the next section with a more detailed description of the so-called
'ex-dividend period' and the 'cum-ex interval', which include moments in time relevant in
the procedure of paying out the dividend.
1.4 The ex-dividend period and the cum-ex interval1ó
Consider the situation that some corporation, whose shares of stock are traded in the
stock market, has just decided to pay a cash dividend" to its stockholders, i.e. it has just
declared a dividend. This means that each shareholder has a right to receive a cash amount,
which can be collected following the pavment clate, usually some number of weeks after the
dividend has been declared. The exact occurrence of both the declaration date and the
~~ It is not our intention to discuss every relevant juridical and institutional detail associated with the dividend
payment. Instead, the discussion in this section should provide a basic insight into some relevant steps in the
procedure, commonly used in many countries including the US and the Netherlands, by which dividends are being
distributed to shareholders.
~- Recall that, for illustrative purposes, we have restricted dividend payments in this introducing analysis to
be cash dis[ributions.
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payment date is not subject to strong prescriptions. First, a company is not obliged to pay
a dividend at all, and it will not do so if this does not fit into the company's financial policy
as was discussed in the previous sections. Second, if it decides to declare a dividend, there
are usually no regulations restricting the company in choosing the appropriate declaration
date, provided the information is released by public announcement. Frequently, the dividend
proposal is included in the company's annual report, which is officially disclosed by a press
report or press conference. There may, however, be (legal) restrictions with respect to the
proposed cash dividend amount. This may occur, for example, when creditors include
covenants in bond indentures restricting the magnitude of the dividend and~or requiring that
the dividend may only be paid out of current or past earnings'X. Also, the dividend proposal
usually has to be approved by shareholders'`'. For many dividend payments, this approval
is requested in the Annual Meeting of Shareholders which is generally scheduled at some
weeks following the official disclosure of the annual report. In turn, the payment date is
nonnally scheduled some weeks aftcr thc annual meeting.
Before the payment date, there should be perfect knowledge about the names of the
stockholders'" who will actually be entitled to collect the dividend. The date at which these
stockholders are registered is known as the recnrd date. A problem might arise when an
investor buys stock from a current stockholder before the record date. Since the dividend
right should be part of the sale, the new stockholder might worry whether his name will be
'x The purpose of such restrictions may be to avoid the adverse consequences arising from potential conFlicts
of interests between shareholders and creditors. For more details, see e.g. Brealey and Myers (1991, p. 442) or
Duffhues (1991, pp. 370-371).
'y The dividend proposal over the book year is normally approved in the Annual Meeting of Shareholders.
However, many corporations have adopted the policy of distributing one (or sometímes more than one) interim
dividends and a final dividend. Usually, the corporation has been authorized to do so by the shareholders (in the
preceding annual meeting). The annual dividend, which includes the sum of the previous interim payments in the
book year and the final dividend proposal, is then subject to the approval of the shareholders in the annual meeting
at the end of the book yeac This procedure is also adopted by Dutch corporations, as may be verified from the
more detailed discussion of the Dutch setting which follows in chapter 4.
~t' It may be noted that thís kind of registration of stockholders refers to a situation in which stockholders
actually possess the shares of stock. As will be discussed in chapter 4, it has become standard pructice in the Dutch
capital market to have the shares of stock registered with a special institution (Necigef) operating a transfer system
which keeps track of the names of investors being entitled to some number of shares at some dates. The 'shares'
held through this system are usually referred to as 'CF-stukken'). It is. however, still possible for a number of
stocks to obtain the original shares themselves (the so-called 'K-stukken'), although this involves substantial
additional costs. Since the discussion in this chapter serves illustrative purposes only, it is assumed that all shares
of stock are original shares possessed by investors.
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registered in time, such that he or she will indeed be entitled to the dividend. In order to
avoid misinterpretations, it is customary that some days before the record date the ex-
di~~idend day is announced (by the stock market authorities) to occur, which day clearly
demarcates whether stocks are traded including or excluding the dividend right''. Stocks are
said to be traded e.i--dividend from the opening on the ex-dividend day, whereas they are
listed as cum-dii~idend in the days before the ex-dividend day.
Figure 1.1 The ex-dividend period
Declaration Ex-dividend Record Payment
(announcement) day date date
I ----- . . . --t -- . . . -----4 ----- . . . -----t
(Time )
To summarize, the ex-dividend period can be defined as the period of time ranging
from the declaration or public announcement of the dividend to the payment date, such that
it contains the ex-dividend day and the record date as relevant points in time. This is
illustrated in figure 1.1. Detailed descriptions and examples of the ex-dividend period for
a few Dutch companies will be provided in chapter 4. The procedure by which (final)
dividends are distributed by Dutch companies appears to fit well in the ex-dividend period
sketched in the figure above. It starts at the date the dividend is declared by the company.
This resolves the uncertainty about the actual dividend distribution'`'. It is standard practice
to refer to the dividend paying stock as 'trading cum-dividend' from the declaration date.
~~ In the Netherlands, the ex-dividend day (for final dividends) is typically the first trading day following the
annual meeting of the company's shareholders (see Dorsman (1988)). After confirmation of the dividend proposal,
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange immediately decides to list the stock as ex-dividend starting at the next trading
day. At the same time, this is disclosed in its official daily publication, 'De Officiële Prijscourant'. This will be
further detailed in chapter 4.
`z Not all uncertainty about the dividend payment may be resolved at this stage. It will be made clear in
chapter 4 that stock dividends as altematives for cash dividends (so-called 'choice dividends') are standard practice
in the Dutch setting. This usually means that Dutch companies at the declaration date officially disclose the total
dividend over the previous fiscal year, adding a statement such that 'some part of it, which will be fixed later, will
be available as stock dividend'.
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It should be noted that, since investors' expectations about the dividend distribution are
already included in the stock's price, the only 'new' element in the cum-dividend stock price
retlects the resolved uncertainty. The last day at which Dutch stocks are traded cum-
dividend is, for final dividends, the day at which the Annual Meeting of Shareholders is
held. The next trading day is the ex-dividend day. Those investors who hold the shares at
the closing of the last cum-dividend day are entided to the dividend and are recorded as
such. Finally, the actual payment of the dividend occurs at the payment date.
In the remainder of this text, we will be interested in an important subperiod within
this ex-dividend period, referred to as the cum-ex inter-val. This interval runs from the last
cum-dividend to the first ex-dividend listing. Occasionally, the interval is extended to
include the entire first ex-dividend day. The behavior of stock and options prices and trading
volumes within this interval is the subject of special interest in this study. The general
metho~alogy followed in the remaining chapters will be briefly set out in the next section.
1.5 Overview of the present study: aim, scope, general methodology and structure
This study is intended to provide a thorough and detailed analysis of the pricing of
stocks and options on stock in the cum-ex interval and in the trading days directly
surrounding this interval. It addresses both the theoretical and empirical aspects involved in
this topic. The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to a brief overview of the key
aspects and the organization of the study.
It is clear from the preceding section that the cum-ex interval, as opposed to other
intervals, is characterized by the fact that the dividend payment is segregated from the stock
price at the first ex-dividend listing. The simplest model might state that the cum-dividend
stock price will be expected to fall in the cum-ex interval by an amount equal to the
dividend payment. The latter is equivalent to the following two statements which will
frequently be referred to in the present study, i.e. (i) the (risk-adjusted) cum-ex stock price
decline relative to the dividend is expected to be equal to one, or ( ii) the (risk-adjusted)
abnotmal" cum-ex interval stock rate of return is zero. There may, however, be aspects
which have a certain influence on the magnitude of the expected cum-ex stock price decline.
Two such aspects that will receive much interest in this study include ( 1) the existence of
income taxation for investors, in particular the existence of differential taxation of cash
" We will define the terms ' normal' and ' abnormal' rate of retum in later chapters.
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income and capital gains. and ( 2) increased or decreased risk bearing at the individual level
due to portfolio rebalancing in the cum-ex interval. These phenomena may affect the
equilibrium pricing of the stock in such a way that the expected relative stock price decline
may be different from one in equilibrium, or the expected cum-ex stock abnormal rate of
return is different from zero. We will refer to such situations as the existence of an e.r-
drridend eff'ecr.
In order to investigate the ex-dividend effect, we will start our theoretical analysis in
chapter 2 by examining the situation in which both aspects are ruled out. Specifically, under
the assumptions of a perfect capital market, where taxation is absent, risk neutral investors
choose optimal portfolios of a riskless asset and a number of risky assets ( stocks), one (and
only one) of which is the dividend paying stock. The capital market eyuilibrium resulting
in this simple setting serves two purposes: ( i) to provide 'benchmark' results, and (ii) to
introduce the eyuilibrium approach used throughout this study. This basic settinQ is
subseyuently ( also in chapter 2) extended to include differential taxation of income, at the
individual investor level and~or across investors. The model obtained at that stage will be
referred to as the 'tax model under risk neutrality', and it appears to be very suitable in
evaluating virtually all existing theories with respect to ('equilibrium) stock pricing in the
cum-ex intervaL Chapter 3 discusses some essential features of existing empirical research
which has tested the implications of the tax model under risk neutrality. The outcomes of
existing empirical studies are very relevant for our study because they are almost all applied
to data of US stocks. As will be detailed in chapter 4, it is very interesting to compare these
US results with those of the Netherlands. This is based on two observations, i.e. (1) the
similarity of the income tax systems employed in both countries ( i.e. both countries have
the so-called ' classical' double-taxation system), and (2) that ( currently) capital gains are
generally untaxed in the Netherlands, whereas they are fully taxed in the US. Chapter 4
therefore discusses a number of institutional features relevant in the Dutch setting.
Chapter 5 provides a rigorous extension of the tax model to include mean-variance
type risk considerations. This is brought into the model by requiring all investors to be risk
averse with possibly differing degrees of risk aversion among investors. Our 'risk-tax
model' ( as the extended model will be called) incorporates two unique features
distinguishing it from current state-of-the-art models of stock pricing in the cum-ex interval.
The first is that our model allows for a positive interest rate, such that interest cash income
is a non-trivial alternative for dividend cash income. Second, our model considers
equilibrium pricing in a world where investors choose portfolios of many risky assets
(stocks), one of which is the dividend paying stock. This allows us to investigate whether
optimal diversification is traded off against tax incentives by investors.
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Our theoretical stock market equilibrium model in the cum-ex interval entails important
implications for the pricing of call and~or put options contingent on the dividend paying
stock. Rather than treating the stock price dynamics and the ex-dividend effect as purely
exogenous. as is standard practice in option pricing models, chapter 6 incorporates the ex-
ante expected cum-ex interval rate of return expression from the risk-tax model in order to
derive a pricing model for European-style and American-style call and put options. This is
another theoretical novelty produced by our research. Chapter 6 also investigates whether
call and put options may be used to redress the adverse consequences of differential taxation
at the individual investor level. This is an important issue since it might explain the
enormous stock and option trading volume due to 'dividend-avoiding' strategies, which are
frequently reported by the US and Dutch financial press when, for example, the large Dutch
stock Royal Dutch goes ex-dividend.
Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to an empirical investigation of Dutch stock and
(call~put) options prices with respect to the existence of an ex-dividend effect such as
predicted by the risk-tax model''. Whereas cum-ex studies of ,rtock prices have been
conducted for several countries, there appear to be only two studies'S investigating the ex-
dividend stock price effect using options prices. However, these studies consider only call
options. Our study is the first to examine the ex-dividend stock price effect from both
(American-style) call and put options. It will be demonstrated that this is very important
since observing call options in isolation may provide biased results. Moreover, the options
study allows us to re-examine the ex-dividend stock price effect (i) separately from the stock
price study, and (ii) using a more general test methodology. All of our theoretical and
empirical work is summarized and evaluated in chapter 10, which also provides some
implications of our results for potential policy measures by Dutch tax authorities.
A final remark may be devoted to the way in which we incorporate market
imperfections such as (differential) taxation and transactions costs into our analysis. It is
important to note that this study is set up from an economic perspective. It therefore
emphasizes the economic content of the ex-dividend effect from introducing institutional
aspects such as differential income taxation. The latter implies that we will focus on the
~; We should wam the reader not to misinterpret the ex-dividend effect in terms of an 'anomaly'. As will
become cleaz later on, we will identify the abnormal part of the cum-ex interval stock rate of retum as the premium
or discount associated with the dividend payment in a world with differential taxation. risk, and positive interest
rates. Furthennore. our empirical results appear to be consistent with the predictions of our risk-tax model.
~' The author of this dissenation was involved in one of these two.
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global structure of the Dutch income tax code and relevant features such as the untaxed
status of capital gains for individuals. A typical example illustrating the way in which this
study distinguishes itself from fiscal studies may be that we treat income taxation in terms
of 'effective tax rates' for investors, stepping over special issues such as excluded amounts
and special regulations. In a similar way, we will treat transactions costs as a percentage,
possibly different for each investor, of the trade amount rather than employing a
differentiated tariff structure as is common in the Dutch practice.
2 THE TAX MODEL
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss a number of existing theoretical models of
stock pricing in the cum-ex interval. We will do so by introducing a capital market
equilibrium model in which investors choose optimal portfolios. It appears that the
equilibrium result of our model contains the results of existing ex-dividend theories as
special cases.
2.2 Basic assumptions
The analysis of the ex-dividend effect in this study will almost entirely focus on the
rate of return on the stock in the ex-dividend period. It was argued in the preceding chapter
that it seems to be sensible to presume that the dividend payment can only affect the stock
rate of return in a small time interval around the ex-dividend day. Based on this notion, we
will split up the ex-dividend period into three subsequent time intervals, the middle of which
is the cum-ex interval. Our theoretical and empirical analysis is intended to provide insight
into the way the market determines the rate of return on dividend paying stocks before,
during, and after the interval.
Suppose that the entire ex-dividend period with respect to some stock going ex-
dividend is referred to as the interval from time 0 to time l. Also, suppose that this interval
is split up into three distinct intervals, i.e. the before-interval (from time 0 to t-c), the cum-
e.r interval (from time c to time x), and the after--interval (from time x to time 1)'e. The
capital market is considered to provide for trading in one riskless asset and a total of J risky
assets, one of which is the stock that pays out a known cash dividend D in the cum-ex
'fi Although we do not make particular assumptions about the length of each interval, it may be useful to state
that the cum-ex interval will be typically small compared with the other two intervals. In our empirical analysis,
the length of the cum-ex interval is hypothesized to be one night, or even less than that, whereas the other two
intervals each contain a number of trading days.
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interval. All other risky assets will, for ease of analysis, be restricted to be (other) stocks
upon which no cash distribution is made in the interval [0,1]. The capital market is assumed
to be perfect in the sense that the following is supposed to hold'':
A 1: (Informational efficiency) All investors have equal and costless access to all
relevant information;
A2: (Frictionless markets) There are no market frictions, such as transactions costs
and restrictions on short sales; furthermore, assets are perfectly divisible and
marketable;
A3: (Nn tuxes) No taxation of corporate or individual income, from whatever
source, takes place;
A4: (Perfect competitinn) Many buyers and sellers are present in the market, neither
of which is able to affect stock prices by single actions.
Although many of these assumptions may not totally reflect actual market conditions,
we might at least use the concept of the perfect capital market as a starting point for
detailed analysis, as is quite common in financial economic theory.
In addition, it is assumed that a given number of investors (denoted by I) is present
in the market, each of which is endowed with a given amount of wealth to be invested in
the capital market at the start of any interval so that it generates a return at the end of this
interval. Investor preferences and opportunities are summarized in the following
assumptions:
A5: (Utilit}' maximi~ers) All individual investors maximize the expected utility of
their wealth at the end of the interval; moreover, all investors are assumed to
be risk neutral;
A6: (Homoger~eous e.xpectations and serially uncor-related rates of return) Investors
have homogeneous expectations about stock rates of return in the interval; stock
rates of return are uncorrelated between any two intervals;
A7: (Oppor~troiities) The quantities of each stock are fixed; the riskless asset,
however, may be bought or sold in unlimited amounts at the market-determined
cost of this asset, which is uniform and given to all investors;
~' A similar set of assumptions can be found e.g. in Copeland and Weston (1988, pp. 330-331).
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The returns'~ of all stocks in all relevant intervals will, by construction, consist entirely
of capital gains, except for the dividend paying stock (indexed by j-1) in the cum-ex
interval, for which the total return is equal to the dividend payment and the capital gain in
the cum-ex interval'9. The assumption of serially uncorrelated rates of return simplifies the
analysis. More precisely, since the only relevant distinction'o between the three intervals in
the ex-dividend period stems from the fact that stock 1 pays out a dividend in the cum-ex
interval, the equilibrium results for the other intervals will be similar to that for the cum-ex
interval without a dividend for stock 1. Consequently, we may construct a general model
for the equilibrium expected rate of return on the stock with or without the dividend. Since
our primary interest is the cum-ex interval, we will direct the analysis to this interval, unless
otherwise stated.
The assumption of homogeneous expectations essentially implies that investors agree
upon the form and parameters of the (joint) probability distribution from which stock rates
of return are drawn. Although this may appear somewhat unrealistic, we might argue that
the dividend effect is the special point to consider. Although certainly present, we will give
market-related uncertainty less importance by requiring all investors to agree upon its
possible impact (i.e. on the probability distribution).
All investors are assumed to maximize expected utility of end-of-period wealth, which
is common in financial economic theory. The utility function expresses each investor's
preferences, and it is specified such that all relevant characteristics of assets and asset
portfolios are incorporated. For the purpose of this chapter, we explicitly require all
investors to be risk neutral. This is done because virtually all existing studies with respect
to the ex-dividend effect use such an assumption. Risk aversion will be introduced into the
analysis later on when the risk-tax model is discussed. The consequence of assuming risk
neutrality among investors is that all investment decisions are entirely based upon individual
expected wealth at the end of the interval. Risk, which measures the extent to which the
actual end-of-period wealth may deviate from expected wealth, is supposed to be an
~R Note that we maintain the habit of using 'retum' for the proceeds of an investment, whereas the term 'rate
of retum' is used for the proceeds relative to the investment.
'~ Since the cum-ex interval will normally be a relatively small time ínterval, it is reasonable to assume that
only a very Iimited number of stocks pay dividend in any such interval. For simplicity, we have restricted this
number to one.
"" Apart from issues such as total wealth and its distribution over investors, different rate of return
distributions, etc., which are assumed exogenously given in each interval.
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irrelevant factor in the decision process of investors. Thus, every investor simply ranks each
investment opportunity according to the level of expected wealth obtained from it. As a
result, no single investor will make ~ny difference between (1) the utility of some expected
wealth level, and (2) the expected utility from the same wealth level with certainty".
The next section discusses the capital market equilibrium resulting in the cum-ex
interval in this basic perfect market setting under risk neutrality''.
2.3 Equilibrium in a perfect capital market with risk neutral investors
In this section, we will derive an expression for the expected rate of return on the
dividend paying stock in the cum-ex interval. This is done by setting up a capital market
equilibrium model, in which investors choose optimal portfolios of stocks (including the
dividend paying stock indexed by j- I) and the riskless asset. The equilibrium expected rate
of retum expression for stock 1 will indicate whether there is an ex-dividend effect due to
the dividend payment. Although the problem in the perfect capital market with risk neutral
investors is very basic, it gives us the opportunity to produce some 'benchmark' results.
Also, we are able to unfold the equilibrium approach used throughout the theoretical part
of this study, which will be extended to other situations in later sections and~or chapters.
The portfolio problem of investor i can be described as seeking the optimal
combination of stocks and~or the riskless asset, given his initial wealth, such that individual
utility is maximized. We have discussed before that in the case of risk neutrality maximum
utility closely corresponds to maximum expected wealth. Define W' as the total current
wealth of investor i(i-1,2,...,I) which is invested in the capital market such that W' is his
uncertain wealth at the end of the cum-ex interval. These two wealth levels are related by
I~Y~'- W'(]f R') , (1)
where R' is the uncertain rate of return of investor i from investing wealth in the cum-ex
interval. For every stock j in the market, the rate of return is defined as
;~ Stated differently, if U(W) denotes the utility function over wealth W. then risk neutrality implies that
U[E(W)I-E[U(W)I.
;'̀ Unless otherwise stated, straightforward assumptions such as stock prices being strictly positive,
nonnegative dívidends and interest rates are used throughout this study. Some of these may be recalled in the text
when explicit treatment is considered worthwhile.
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P-P DR- ~ ~~ ~, ~-1.2....,.1
' P P~
(2)
where P~ is the uncertain market price of stock j at the end of the cum-ex interval, P~ is the
market price of the stock at the beginning of the interval, and D~ is the dividend payment,
which is nonzero only for j-1. Therefore, the stock's rate of return consists of a capital gain
component, and, if j-1, there is also a nonzero dividend yield component. The expected rate
of return on stock j offered by the market, denoted by E(R~), can be obtained from (2) by
substituting the expected end-of-period stock price, i.e.
E(P ) - P D.
E(R;)- ' , } ~ , .1-1,2,....J .P P~
(3)
A more compact way of describing stock rates of return can be obtained by
introducing" the (Jxl) vector R. Similarly, the vector E(R) indicates the vector of expected
rates of return on stocks in the cum-ex interval. Furthermore, let d be the (Jx I) dividend
yield vector, which is known to all investors at the start of the cum-ex interval. Since stock
1 is the only dividend paying stock in the cum-ex interval, it follows that only the first
element of d is nonzero and equals D,~P,. The stock rate of return vector may therefore be
decomposed into a capital gain vector (R-d) and the dividend yield vector d. The rate of
return on the riskless asset in the cum-ex interval is denoted by R,, the level of which is
given to investors.
Now suppose investor i endowed with wealth W' chooses some portfolio characterized
such that w~ and w~ denote the fraction of initial wealth invested in stock j and the riskless
asset respectively. The expected wealth for this investor from holding this portfolio in the
cum-ex interval is given by
E(W~)- W' 1 t E(R~) ,
where E(R') is obtained as
(4)
;~ Vectors and matrices are included in the text in bold typeface, and transposed vectors are indicated with
a prime symbol. Random variables are denoted by tildes, and the E(.) operator refers to the expected value of a
random variable.
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E(R')- w' E(Rl-d~} w'~dt xf'R1 . (5)
Since all initial wealth is invested, we may define the individual's bud,~et constraint as
follows:
l w~t (6)
where 1 is a unit vector with all elements equal to one. It is clear from no-arbitrage
arguments that equilibrium in a perfect capital market with risk neutral investors requires
that there is no difference between the expected rate of retum on any stock and the riskless
rate of return, i.e.
E(R ) - R~ , b' j . (7)
Thus, the market does not require (nor provide) a risk premium over the riskless
interest rate when all investors are risk neutraL Since the rate of return in the cum-ex
interval is identical for every stock, it is easy to see that there is no particular ex-dividend
effect in this case, i.e. there appears to be no specific dividend-related tenn in the
equilibrium expression of the expected stock rate of return. The basic equilibrium rate of
return relationship may also readily be extended to intervals other than the cum-ex interval,
given the assumption that stock rates of retum are uncorrelated between intervals. The rate
of return expected for every stock j is simply equal to the riskless rate of retum prevailing
in that interval.
2.4 Equilibrium with differential income taxation: the tax model
This section will introduce the existence of differential income taxation into the basic
analysis detailed in the previous section. This means that assumption A3 in the previous
section is changed into A3' such that:
A3': (Diff'erential ii~come taration) Income from the riskless asset and the risky
assets is taxed at a flat rate; also, there may be different tax rates for cash
income and capital gains income at the individual investor level, and tax rates
may vary from investor to investor.
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Income taxation at the level of individual investor income is among the most apparent
market imperfections that have traditionally been advanced in finance theory. Generally,
these taxes are charged against the tarable income of the investor, i.e. the income reported
by the investor to fiscal authorities over the calendar year which serves as the basis for
determining the amount to be paid in the form of tax. Income from holding securities is
regarded as subject to income taxation in most tax systems`~. It is, however, no exception
that income from different sources is taxed at different tax rates. For the case of holding
stock, which is the primary subject of this study, we may restrict investor income to only
two basic sources: cash dividends'S and capital gains~losses. In many countries, including
the US (until 1986) and the Netherlands, cash dividends are generally taxed as 'ordinary'
income, while capital gains are viewed as a different source of income and taxed at a
different (i.e. usually lower) rate for large groups of investors"'. We will discuss the impact
of introducing this kind of (possible) differential income taxation on the capital market
equilibrium in the remainder of this section. All other assumptions, including risk neutrality
among investors, are unaltered.
Suppose a tax code exists such that cash dividends, as part of ordinary investor
income, are taxed" at the individual rate ~~ and net capital gains are taxable at the rate tt,.
Also, assume that the tax on net capital losses can be fully and instantly reclaimed, so that
;`t The most elementary tax system is the so-called 'classical system' of double taxation, which is currently
used in countries as the US and the Netherlands. Other. especially European, countries have more or less recently
switched to some form of an 'imputation sysrem' which tries to remove the double taxation aspect by combining
the corporate and personal taxation (see e.g. Brealey and Myers (1991, pp. 389-390)). Unless otherwise stated, we
will assume a classical system of income taxation to exist in the economy.
;5 We wíll discuss the tax treatment of stock dividends and other dividend forms in chapter 4.
;~ Until 1986, the US tax code permitted capital gains to be taxed at a rate which was substantially less than
the ordinary tax rate. After the Tax Reform Act 1986 came ioto effect, the difference in tiscal treatment was
eliminated. Up to the present moment, the Dutch tax code usually permits to ignore capital gains (and losses)
altogether from determining taxable income for individual (i.e. non-incorporated) investors. More details about this
will be given la[er on in this study.
;~ All tax rates are, for obvious reasons, assumed to be nonnegative and less than one. For simplicity. we
restrict tax rates to be 'flat' (i.e. proportional to taxable income) at the individual level. Stated differently, we
assume that the entire inres~ment income of a given investor falls in the same 'tax bracket'. On the other hand,
different investors mav have different income tax rates for the same source of income, and so they may fall in
different tax brackets. Furthermore, it is assumed throughout this study that every investor has perfect information
about his personal 'tax status' li.e. the tax rates applied to his income), and also about the tax status of any other
investor in the market.
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there is a perfect symmetry with respect to the fiscal treatment of net capital gains and net
capital losses. In order to investigate the equilibrium expected stock rate of retum in the
cum-ex interval. it is important to note the difference between the hefore-ta.~ and the after-
tax rate of return. Since the before-tax rate of return excludes taxation by nature, its
definition for stock j duplicates that given in (2) and (3). It is recalled that the before-tax
stock rate of return consists of two components, i.e. (i) the capital gains relative to the initial
stock price, and (ii) the dividend yield. Since the tax system may employ different tax rates
for both types of income, we define E(R~'), the individual expected after-tax;x rate of retum
per unit of investment, by subtracting the expected tax claim from the numerator, i.e.
~(Rt;) ~ E(P ~) - Pi f D ~- t ~~E(P ~) - P~- i~D.
; P
E(P ) - P D- 1 ~(I-T~)t P~(I-t~~~) .
P; ,
(S)
The individual expected after-tax rate of return per unit is therefore equal to the
expected after-tax capital gains yield plus the after-tax dividend yield. The expected before-
and after-tax rates of return are related by
E(R~~~) - (l - tié)E(R~) - (i~- (9)
Cash income obtained from the riskless asset (i.e. interest) is supposed to be
homogeneously treated as cash dividend income for tax purposes. This implies that R;', the
individual after-tax riskless rate of return per unit of investment, is given as
k~2,- (1-T;,)Rr, , (10)
where Rt is equal to the given before-tax riskless interest rate in the capital market.
Obviously, the existence of (differential) income taxation affects the individual rate of
return achieved by selecting portfolios of stocks and~or the riskless asset. Given initial
wealth W', individual expected end-of-period wealth after taxes, E(WT'), is obtained as
;R We distinguish between the before- and after-tax rate of return by including a't' superscript in the rate
of retum symbol R.
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E(W~') - W~ 1 t E(R`~)~ ,
where E(R") is the after-tax portfolio rnte of return expected by the investor in the interval,
given by'y
E(R~~)- (1-~;Jw' E(R~)- (z,~,-T;.)W'~dt ( I-T,`~)(I-w'~1)R~ . (12)
This can be rewritten as





The parameter t' measures the individual's tax-induced preference for cash income
relative to capital gains income. [t can easily be understood that the value of one serves as
a natural benchmark for i', in which case income from both types of income is eyually
taxed at the individual level. Thus, each investor may be characterized by one of the
following three situations:
(i) Z'~l investor with tax-induced preference for capital gains over cash:
cash income is more heavily taxed than capital gains income:
(ii) i'-1 tax-neutral investor: both types of income are equally taxed"';
(iii) T'~1 investor with tax-induced preference for cash over capital gains:
capital gains income is more heavily taxed than cash income:
;y Note that the bold R-vector in this eyuation refers to stock,. The i-superscript is included in the expected
before-tax stock rate of retum vector to indicate the eyuilibrium vector demanded by investor i. It is not ~,uaranteed,
at least at this staee of the derivation, that individual demand is supported in the eyuilibrium.
~" The class of neutrally taxed investors obviously includes tax exempt investors rereiving income w'ithout
being taxed at all.
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The term between squared brackets in the right hand side of ( 13) is essential for the
portfolio choice of each investor. This term can be interpreted as the marginal rate of return
vector from investing in risky assets. Since aspects such as risk differences between assets
and diversification are irrelevant for optimal portfolio decisions in a risk neutral world, each
investor will simply invest as much wealth as possible in the asset offering the highest after-
tax rate of return. The extent to which individual investment in risky asset j occurs is, given
the dividend yield d~ and the riskless interest rate Rf, crucially depending on the individual
tax status ( represented by T') relative to the tax status reflected in the equilibrium rate of
return E(R~). In other words, conditional on the equilibrium rate of return, the marginal rate
of return on stock j for investor i will either be positive or negative. implying that the
investor will hold infinite long or infinite short positions in the stock. In order to obtain a
meaningful interior equilibrium solution for the rate of return vector, it is reasonable to
impose restrictions on the extent to which investors are able to maintain long and~or short
positions in the risky assets. One such restriction can be brought into the model by revising
the frictionless markets assumption A2 and~or the opportunities assumption A7 in such a
way that investors can hold long or short positions in each risky asset up to some fraction
of initial wealth. For simplicity, we assume this fraction to be equal to one~'.
The equilibrium rate of return on each stock in the current setting will be determined
by two factors: ( i) the extent to which income tax rate heterogeneity occurs ( i.e. the
distribution of T'-values across investors), and (ii) the individual amount of wealth W'
available for investment. Suppose that the market parameter i~ reflects both factors. The
equilibrium for each risky asset j is obtained when the marginal rate of return for the market
as a whole is just equal to zero, i.e.
E(R~)- i-Rft (1-i.)d. . (15)
Now substitute this E(R~)-expression for every risky asset in the term in squared brackets
in the individual expected after-tax rate of return expression (13). The j'h element of the
resulting vector is then equal to (T'-T~)(d~-R,). Using the plausible assumption that the
dividend yield d, is higher than the interest rate over the (relatively short) cum-ex interval,
this implies that, conditional on the value of the market parameter ti~ and the restrictions on
individual portfolio weights, tax-induced incentives for investors can be characterized as
fcillows:
41 Note that we maintain this kind of restrictions on portfolio weights only for the tax model in this chapter.
The risk-tax model which will be presented in chapter 5 dces not use this restriction.
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investors with i'~t~ hold maximum long positions in the dividend paying stock 1
(w;-1), and short positions in other stocks (w~--1, j~l);
investors with T'~T~ hold maximum short positions in the dividend paying stock
1(w;--1), and long positions in other stocks (w~-1, j~l);
investors with Z'-~~ are the marginal investors, being indifferent between each of
the risky assets and the riskless asset.
Given these tax-induced incentives, we can deterniine the value of the market tax
factor T~ from the market clearing condition for asset j. This implies that the sum of
expected individual end-of-period wealth obtained from investment in asset j must be equal
to the expected market value of asset j. More precisely, this implies
~
,-' W ~~l t E(R~)~ - [i ~l t E(R )~ , y j , (16)
where Vi denotes the current market value of asset j, which is by definition equal to the sum
of current investment in this asset, i.e. V~E;w~W'. Substituting the individual marginal
indifference conditions E(R~)-(1-ti')d~tTR~ into the market clearing condition and rewriting,
we obtain
' x~ ~ W '
E(R.)- T~Rjt ( 1-T )d- ; T - ~ t'~'ti' ; ~'~~ - ~~ b' j . (17)
;-~ ,
The parameter i~ may be described as the market average of individual tax-induced cash
preferences weighted by each individual's market share~`' with respect to stock j. It is
important to understand that market share and tax-induced cash preference collectively
determine the value of the market aggregate ~~-parameter. For example, it implies that when
tax neutral investors have a large market share, this market tax-induced cash preference
measure will likely be around one, so that the market as a whole is relatively tax neutral.
The equilibrium relationship (17) resulting from the tax model will be further discussed in
the next section.
~~ Note that all v~values of individuals sum to one if the market is in equilibrium.
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2.5 'Che ex-dividend effect in the tas model
The equilibrium expected rate of return relationship produced by the tax model under
risk neutrality provides some interesting insights with respect to the ex-dividend effect. [t
may first be noted that the tax model equilibrium relationship (17) reduces to the nontax
equilibrium given in (7) when all tax rates are set equal to zero and, consequently, t~ is
equal to one for each stock j. A similar equilibrium expression results when there is no
differential taxation for every investor, such that T' is equal to one for all investors.
Examples in which this occurs include settings (1) with no taxation at all (see above), (2)
with one single tax rate for all types of income and all investors, and (3) when the tax rate
is equal for all types of income at the individual level, but the tax rate is possibly different
from investor to investor.
Matters become different when at least some investors are confronted with differential
taxation of cash and capital gains income. As can be verified from (17), the equilibrium
expected rate of return on any stock appears to be very much depending on the relative
'magnitude' or 'dominance' of these investor groups~', as expressed by the value of the
market parameter T~. If these investors are less dominant, it is clear that the resulting
equilibrium should not deviate very much from the basic (i.e. nontax) equilibrium. If they
are dominant, however, then there will be a substantial tax effect in the rate of return.
Besides having an impact on the rates of retum expected on the non-dividend paying stocks
j-2,3,...,J, there will also be an ex-dividend effect for the dividend paying stock j-1. The
next sub-sections will discuss the results obtained from pioneering ex-dividend theories
advanced by Kalay (1982) and Elton and Gruber (1970), which can be easily derived from
the tax model under risk neutrality.
2.5.1 The Kalav model
Kalay (1982) presents a model of ex-dividend stock price behavior which is consistent
with our tax model. His analysis assumes a risk neutral world with only one risky asset (the
~i Note that the term ' dominance' may generate an inconsistency with the competitivity assumption .A4,
reyuiring that no single investor is able to affect security prices by single actions. This is not what we mean by
dominance. Rather. we use dominance in the sense of sereral investors with the same tax status. None of them.
however, is assumed ' large' enough to be dominant by himself.
The Ta.r Model ~~
dividend paying stock). The riskless interest rate over the cum-ex interval is set equal to
zero, which implies that investors can borrow or lend capital at zero cost. More important
is that Kalay assumes that tax neutral investors with 2'-1, such as security dealers, are
predominantly present in the market. We can obtain Kalay's results directly from the tax
model with risk neutrality by confining the analysis to stock 1 and setting the riskless
interest rate equal to zero. The equilibrium rate of return expressíon for stock 1 in the Kalay
setting follows from (17) as
E(R~)- (1-i~)d~ . (l~)
Kalay's analysis concentrates on E(á), defined as the expected relative ex-dividend stock
price decline (only defined for stock 1), i.e.
P~ - E(P~)
E(á) - ~ . (19)
The definitions of the expected rate of return (see (3)) and the expected relative stock price
decline (19) are related by~`'
E(R )
E(R~) - ~1- E(á)~d~ ; E(á) - 1 - d ' . (~~)
Substituting the expression for E(R,) in the Kalay setting (equation (18)) and recalling that
tax neutral investors dominate in terms of market share yields
E(á)- T~- 1 . (21)
This suggests that the expected relative price decline is equal to the market tax-induced
cash preference relevant for the dividend paying stock. In tum, the latter is equal to one by
assumption since the tax neutral investors are supposed to dominate. This also implies, for
example, that the relatively small group of investors (if any) with ~' less than one will sell
any shares held at the start of the cum-ex interval, which will be repurchased at the end of
the interval. Investors with ~'?1 will hold the stock in the cum-ex interval, such that the
~ It is straightforward to see that this relationship also holds in terms of the random variables R, and à
themselves.
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market equilibrium reflects the tax status of the tax neutral investors.
Two comments may be made with respect to the equilibrium result obtained by Kalay.
First of all, it is noted by Kalay (1982), Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986) that the adjustment of the relative decline to one involves more or less
intense so-called 'short-term trading'. Obviously, such market activity will be more
prominent when the dividend yield on the stock is higher, since tax-induced incentives to
avoid or receive the dividend play a larger role. On the other hand, these trading activities
may involve substantial transactions cost. The tax model explicitly abstracts from these costs
(see assumption A2). The effect of their existence on the Kalay model may be sketched by
supposing that transactions costs are proportional to the trading amount. Investors should
then trade off their tax incentives to trade the dividend paying stock in the cum-ex interval
against the costs associated with this tax-induced trading. Given the dividend yield, there
will be a range for the expected relative decline E(á) around one for which trading is not
profitable. Outside this range, trading is protïtable and will be undertaken. The influence of
transactions costs will therefore generally be such that the equilibrium value of the relative
decline is in a range around one, which will be narrower and tax-induced trading will be
more intense when (i 1 the dividend yield is higher, and (ii) transactions costs are lower.
The second comment refers to the assumption of a zero interest rate in the cum-ex
interval, which appears to be rather undebated in the literature. In contrast, our tax model
may be used to reveal a more or less important drawback of existing ex-dividend theories
under risk neutrality. The íntuition underlying this is that the riskless asset retum is a
substitute for the cash dividend and, therefore, may be relevant for tax-induced trading. To
see this, suppose every investor chooses portfolios of stock 1 and the riskless asset.
Substituting the market equilibrium given by (17) for stock 1 into the individual after-tax
portfolio rate of return (121 and rewriting produces the following expression for the after-tax
rate of return expected by investor i
E(RT')- (1-~~) (22)'-i,)(~,-Rf) t (1-i~,)R ,
where w; is the fraction of individual wealth invested in stock 1, so that (1-w;) is invested
in the riskless asset. Given plausible assumptions about investor tax rates, the signs of two
factors in the first term of the right hand side are important. The first factor is (t''-t), which
describes the individual's cash preference relative to that of the market as a whole. The
second is (d,-R~), i.e. the dividend yield relative to the riskless rate of retum. When R, is
set eyual to zero and i, equals one, as is done by Kalay, individual portfolio choice is
simple: either invest all wealth in the stock (i.e. w;-1) when T'~1, or go short in the stock
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(w;--1) when ti'~l. Tax neutral investors with i'-1 are indifferent between the two
alternatives. However, when the interest rate is positive, its magnitude relative to the
dividend yield becomes important in the sense that portfolio choices may be reversed when
d,~R, holds". It is therefore not straightforward at all to assume a zero interest rate in ex-
dividend effect literature, and we will not do so in the remainder of this study. In addition,
it will be argued in later chapters that the common assumption of risk neutral investors in
the tax model may also be inappropriate since it neglects the effects of risk bearing and
diversification effect.
2,5,2 The Elton and Gruber model
Another variant of the tax model under risk neutrality was originally suggested by
Elton and Gruber (1970), and it is based on similar assumptions as the Kalay model, i.e.
they also focus on risk neutral investors investing in the dividend paying stock using a zero
interest rate, and they also analyze the relative stock price decline instead of the rate of
return in the cum-ex interval. However, the Elton and Gruber model differs from the Kalay
model in the sense that the hypothesized dominating investor group is radically different.
Elton and Gruber explicitly assume that the dividend paying stock was purchased by
investors before the cum-ex ínterval, say at the beginning of what we have defined earlier
as the before-interval. Moreover, investors did so because they want to receive the dividend:
they intend to be the stockholders during the cum-ex interval. The reason investors stick to
their shares despite the possible adverse effects of differential taxation of dividends and
capital gains are not very clear from in Elton and Gruber model. An argument for this might
be that transactions costs incurred by investors when engaging in tax-induced trading in the
cum-ex interval are so high that they always outweigh the potential gains~~. As a
consequence, Elton and Gruber assert that investors naturally sort themselves into 'dividend
y5 Although it seems reasonable to assume, as was done in the development of the tax model, that the
dividend yield will be typically large compared to the interest rate over the relatively short cum-ex interval, there
may be situations in which such an assumption is not appropriate. First, many stocks have low dividend yields.
It may also be true, as is the case in the US, that tax-induced trading with respect to the dividend is only allowed
by tax authorities when the cum-ex interval applied in the transaction has some minimum length, which can be as
much as 40 trading days. The latter is further discussed in chapter 3.
;~ This argument can be inferred from the debate started by the Kalay (1982) study, commented by Elton.
Gruber and Rentzler (1984), and to which Kafay (1984) replied.
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yield clienteles' according to their tax status, such that heavily taxed investors with T~ being
substantially higher than t~ will hold the stocks with lower dividend yields and vice versa.
In terms of the tax model, the Elton and Gruber model implies that the investors
belonging to the particular clientele relevant for the dividend paying stock are by assumption
the dominating investors, so that the equilibrium expected stock rate of return reflects their
tax status, i.e.
E(R~)- (1-i;~)d~ . (23)
where t;' is equal to the tax status i' of the investor clientele. The expected relative stock
price decline is
E(á) - i;~` . (24)
The implications of the Elton and Gruber model differ very much from those of the
Kalay modeL Whereas Kalay argues that tax neutral investors with ample funds will always
set the relative decline equal to one, Elton and Gruber state that the equilibrium expected
relative~ stock price decline will reflect the tax status of the investor clientele, which may
be substantially different from one. The assumption that, the higher the tax bracket of the
investor clientele (i.e. for which the i;'-value is much less than one), the lower the dividend
yield of the stock held by the clientele, suggests (i) an inverse relationship between the
relative decline of the stock price and the investor clientele tax bracket, and (ii) a positive
relationship between the relative decline and the dividend yield. It may be noted that the
latter implication is also (weakly) present in the Kalay model with transactions costs
although the causality is different, i.e. higher dividend yields will induce more tax-related
trading, making the range (around one) for the equilibrium relative decline narrower.
2.6 Summary
This chapter introduces the equilibrium analysis of the expected rate of return in the
cum-ex interval in two stages. The basic model uses the assumptions of a perfect capital
market in which investors are risk neutral. They are supposed to choose portfolios from a
riskless asset and a number of stocks including the dividend paying stock. The capital
market equilibrium in this basic model suggests that the expected rate of retum on any
security in the cum-ex interval is equal to the riskless interest rate. Consequently, there is
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no specific ex-dividend effect in the sense that the expected rate of return on the dividend
paying stock does not differ from that on other stocks due to a dividend-related term.
Next, we allow for the existence of differential income taxation among investors. This
implies that there may be investors for which cash dividends are more heavily taxed than
capital gains or vice versa. On the other hand, there may also be tax neutral investors who
receive equal tax treatment of all types of income, including tax exempt investors. The
resulting equilibrium model of cum-ex interval stock pricing is referred to as the tax model
under risk neutrality. The main conclusion resulting from this model is that the expected rate
of return of the dividend paying stock includes an ex-dividend effect which is directly
related to the distribution of tax rates among investors and their individual wealth levels.
This is reflected in the market parameter T, which measures the aggregate wealth-weighted
tax-induced cash preference. When there are many investors with a tax preference for capital
gains income. the value of T may be less than one and, consequently, the expected rate of
return of the dividend paying stock includes a dividend-related premium which is
proportional to the dividend yield.
The tax model appears to be suitable to investigate two special cases which have
received very much attention in existing ex-dividend effect studies, i.e. the Kalay and Elton
and Gruber models. The Kalay-model predicts that investors with a tax incentive to avoid
or capture the dividend will undertake tax-induced trading in the cum-ex intervaL However,
Kalay asserts that tax neutral investors will always be the dominant investor group such that
the equilibrium reflects ~-1, implying the absence of an ex-dividend effect. Elton and
Gruber, on the other hand, assume that stocks are held by investors because they want to
receive the dividend. Consequently, the expected rate of return on the dividend paying stock
will very likely include an ex-dividend effect, which is directly associated with the tax status
of the investor clientele holding the dividend paying stock both before and in the cum-ex
interval. The two rather extreme conclusions from the Kalay and Elton and Gruber models
have been the motive for many (especially US) empirical studies which will be summariaed
in the next chapter.
Finally, we demonstrated that neglecting the interest rate, as is done in the Kalay and
Elton and Gruber models, may be nontrivial in the equilibrium analysis of the ex-dividend
effect. Indeed, when the riskless asset offers a positive rate of return it can be argued that
cash preferring risk neutral investors have an alternative source of cash income. Optimal
individual portfolio choice will therefore include two relevant aspects, i.e. (i) the individual
tax status relative to the market's aggregate status, and (ii) the level of the dividend yield
in relation to the riskless interest rate. A third important factor, which is nonexistent by
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assumption in the tax model of this chapter, is the risk aspect. This will be incorporated into
the tax model when we detail the risk-tax model in chapter 5.
3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE US EX-DIVIDEND
EFFECT
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the tax model under risk neutrality and its application
to stock pricing in the cum-ex interval. The rather divergent implications of two variants of
this model, i.e. the Elton and Gruber and Kalay models, appear to have stimulated a number
of empirical studies with respect to the ex-dividend effect in the US capital market.
The present chapter will first discuss some aspects relevant for empirical tests of the
ex-dividend effect, including the specification of hypotheses, the use of regression models,
the definition of the cum-ex interval, and the estimation of the ex-dividend effect. Next, we
will provide a review of existing literature with respect to the US ex-dividend effect. One
reason for focusing on US studies is that quite a substantial number of US studies exists to
begin with. Another reason is related to the institutional tax setting. It has been noted before
that both the United States and the Netherlands are among the few countries which have up
to the present moment employed the classical system of income taxation~', whereas virtually
all other developed countries have more or less recently switched to some tax system which
avoids the double taxation of distributed profits'~. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to
compare the results from US studies with those concerning Dutch dividends which will be
derived in chapters 8 and 9 of this study.
~' We will discuss the tax sening in both countries in more detail in chapter 4.
as Currendy, many countries have adopted tax systems avoiding this hind of double taxation. Examples of
these include (i) the 'imputation' tax system, an 'integrated' system of taxation of distributed and undistributed
profits, and (ii) the 'split rate' system, with unequal tax rates on distributed and undistributed profits but also
substantial tax credits at the individual investor level. Brealey and Myers (1991, p. 389-390) provide an overview
of the tax systems used in several countries. It appears from their exposition that the classical system continues
to be employed only in the US, the Netherlands and Belgium.
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3.2 Examining the ex-dividend effect
It was argued in the previous chapter that the existence of differential income taxation
among investors may imply an ex-dividend effect. We used the latter term to refer to the
case that the eyuilibrium expected rate of return of the dividend paying stock in the cum-ex
interval includes a nonzero dividend-related premium or discount. The ex-dividend effect
has been investigated in a number of empirical studies. Virtually all of these have been
carried out using the Kalay version of the tax model under risk neutrality. The results of
some important empirical studies will be discussed in the next section. Before this, it is
useful to detail a number of aspects relevant in conducting an empirical study of the ex-
dividend effect, and this is done in the remainder of the current section.
3.2.1 "fheoretical implications
The tax model derived in the previous chapter provides an eyuilibrium relationship for
the expected rate of return on the dividend paying srock in the cum-ex interval. The
derivation assumed risk neutral investors and a capital market which is perfect except for
the existence of (possible) differential income taxation. Virtually all existing empirical
studies are based on this tax model, using the additional assumption that the riskless interest
rate over the cum-ex interval is zero. The equilibrium result for the expected stock rate of
return in the cum-ex interval can be recalled from (1 R) as'"
E(R)- (1-i)d ,
or, in terms of the expected relative stock price decline
E(á)- i . (26)
As was argued in the preceding chapter, the Kalay model suggests that the
overwhelming presence of tax neutral investors will cause the market tax preference
parameter t to be equal to one in equilibrium. It is straightforward from the equations
above that this implies that the rate of return on the dividend paying stock is expected to
;~~ For simplicity. we will drop the ~l'-subscript indicating that stock I is the only stoch payine a di~~idend
in the cum-ex interval.
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be equal to zero in the Kalay model, where investors are risk neutral and where a zero
riskless interest rate prevails. Consequently, the expected relative stock price decline in the
cum-ex interval will be equal to one. It therefore follows from the Kalay equilibrium that
the 'special event' in the cum-ex interval, i.e. the dividend being paid on the stock, does not
affect the equilibrium rate of return in the sense that some dividend-related term appears.
Now let us define the e.r-dii~idend effect as the influence of the known dividend payment on
the expected stock rate of retum in the cum-ex interval. The determination of the ex-
dividend effect requires a decomposition of the expected cum-ex interval stock rate of return
into ( I) the rate of return when there was no dividend at all, and (2) the part that may be
attributed to the fact that the stock pays a dividend"'. It is straightforward from the Kalay
model that the ex-dividend effect is expected to be zero for every stock goino ex-dividend.
Thus, when the Kalay model is valid, we have the tollowing prediction for any stock k
going ex-dividend:
E(RA)- 0 , b' k . (27)
The related prediction is that the expected relative decline is equal to one, i.e.
E(á~)- 1 , b' ~ . (28)
All empirical studies documented in the remainder of this chapter evaluate the power
of these predictions using a large number of previous ex-dividend observations. The test
methodology will be briefly discussed in the next sub-section.
3.2.2 Testing the ex-dividend effect using regression analysis
In order to test the ex-dividend effect from a sample of K ex-dividend observations,
we propose the following simple regression model:
5e Later on, we will also use the term 'normal' rate of retum for the non-dividend related part of the stock
rate of retum in the cum-ex intervaL Consequently, the ex-dividend effect will be referred to as the 'abnormal' rate
of retum. The interpretation of the terms 'normal' and 'abnormal' in the present study should not be confused with
their content in event studies, where their usage typically refers to (more or less) anomalous phenomena. The ex-
dívidend effect may not at all be anomalous, if our models are adeyuate.
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R~- y } éA ,
~~- R~,- E(~AJ , k- 1,2,....K .
The Kalay model suggests the null hypothesis that the intercept be zero, i.e.
(29)
H~ : y - 0 . (30)
The regression parameter y can be estimated from a sample of ex-dividend observations.
However, the appropriate estimation method and test statistic to be used depends on the
specific assumptions concerning the error term (ék) in the regression. A number of suitable
assumption sets have been suggested by econometric theory51, and we will briefly discuss
some of these 'settings~ for the error term of the rate of return regression model.
A very basic settinQ is the one in which all error terms Ék are assumed to be
independent and identically normally distributed with zero mean and known variance 6'.
Under the null hypothesis given above, it should therefore hold that each cum-ex interval
stock rate of return has the same distributional characteristics as its associated error term.
The appropriate estimation method for this setting is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
method, and the OLS-estimator of y can be tested (for any sample size K) using a standard
normally distributed test statistic. If, on the other hand, the poputation variance 6' is
assumed equal across observations but unknown, then the test of the OLS-estimator of y
involves an estimator of the population variance and a t-distributed test statistic (for any
sample size K).
A different setting occurs when the error terms are still assumed to be independently
normal, but the variance may differ for different observations. In such cases, it is
appropriate to determine Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimators. When precise
knowledge is available about the way in which ak varies across observations, the associated
test statistic is normal for any sample size. If we lack such information, we have to estimate
the observation variances and the relevant test statistic is only normal in large samples.
It may sometimes not be clear whether the error terms are normally distributed and~or
independent to begin with. IVevertheless, if it is appropriate to assume that the error terms
are unco~-rela~ed, it is still possible to obtain estimators with desirable large sample
5j See e.g. Fogler and Ganapathy 1 I9R2).
Empirical US E.r-Diridend Studies 37
properties". More precisely, when the observation variances can be estimated, then the GLS-
estimators will be normally distributed in large samples. Even if we do not have information
about the way in which the variances vary across observations (or are not willing to make
assumptions about it), then we can still obtain OLS-estimators and large sample normal test
statistics, provided that the 'original' OLS standard error is replaced by the so-called 'White
standard error' in determining the test statistic~;.
A more or less troublesome setting occurs when the error terms cannot easily be
assumed uncorrelated, e.g. when the cum-ex intervals of two or more stocks overlap. In that
case, the OLS- or GLS-estimators are unbiased in large samples, but their standard errors
may be inaccurate. As a result, we should be cautious in evaluating confidence intervals for
these estimators since they may either be too wide or too small. One way out of this
problem may be to 'translate' a number of (assumed) correlated observations into a single
observation5;. This might result in a(large) sample of uncorrelated new observations, so that
one of the above settings will apply to this new sample.
Summarizing these settings, it appears that the ex-dividend effect, represented by the
parameter y in the regression model, can reasonably be estimated under a fairly general
assumption set with respect to the regression error term. Three important conditions with
respect to the sample of observations seem to be that (1) the sample is large, (2) the
observation error terms are uncorrelated, and (3) the error variances can be accurately
estimated. The GLS estimation method will then produce estimators which are known to be
consistent and asymptotically efficient.
It has been noted earlier that many of the existing empirical studies of the ex-dividend
effect focus on the relative stock price decline a rather than on the cum-ex interval rate of
return. It is fairly simple to obtain the regression model for the relative decline associated
with the rate of return regression model (29) using the 'parity' relationship (20). For any
observation k, we may then write
s~ For example, these estimators are consistent and asymptotically efficient.
s; This methodology is described in White (1980). It should be noted that in regression models involvino onty
an intercept term (as is the case in the rate of return regression model) the White standard errors coincide with the
OLS standard errors.
'~ Studies like Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) were among the first to
recognize that correlation may not be absent for cum-ex interval rate of return observations of stocks going ex-
dividend on the same trading day. They propose an altemative method which clusters all observations on the same






The associated regression model would be
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(31)
(32)
where uk-~~~dk. The null hypothesis corresponding with (30) is
H~ : ~ ~ - 1 ~ ~, - 0 . (33)
It is immediately clear that the stochastic nature of the regression model for the relative
decline is directly related to the assumption setting for the rate of return error terms Éw. The
presence of the dividend yield term in the relative decline error terms means that,
conditional upon plausible assumptions about the rate of return error terms, the relative
decline error variances will vary across observations, even when the rate of return error
variance are assumed to be drawn from identical normal populations, unless the dividend
yield dk is equal for all observations. This implies that the regression parameters ~, and ~z
can be more efficiently estimated using the GLS-method in the relevant settings discussed
above~~. It should be repeated, however, that estimating the relative decline model is not
better than estimating the rate of return model: it is only slightly more cumbersome.
Therefore, our empirical research will concentrate on the rate of return model. Many
existing empirical studies which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, however,
do focus on the relative decline.
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In a number of ex-dividend effect studies, including Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982),
assumptions are made about the variances of the relative decline error terms U~, without explicit recognition of
the potential heteroskedasticity problem generated by the dividend yield. Later studies of the relative decline, such
as Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Michaely (1991), correct for this problem by using GLS estimation
techniques along the lines suggested in the main text.
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3.2.3 Determining cum-ex inter~al rate of return observations
Having discussed some theoretical and statistical aspects of empirical tests with respect
to the ex-dividend effect, we will now turn to the issue of how sample rate of return
observations should be obtained'fi. Two relevant issues in this respect are (i) a more precise
understanding of the period of time involved in the cum-ex interval, and (ii) the rate of
return detennination over this interval. We will discuss both issues right now.
The definition of the cum-ex interval has been subject to discussion in subsequent
empirical studies of the ex-dividend effect. For example, Elton and Gruber (1970)
investigate the realized relative decline by considering the cum-closing and ex-closing stock
prices. However, they inuiiediately add to this that, by measuring the relative decline over
the entire ex-dividend day, questions of bias may be raised since part of the price movement
attributed to ex-dividend effects might actually be due to a systematic shift in market
prices~'. In order to check for this, they dcvelop an alternative definition of the relative
decline in which the ex-close stock price is adjusted by the rate of return on a market index
in the corresponding cum-ex interval. Kalay (1982) makes the correct comment that the
relative decline must be determined using cum-closing and ex-opening prices. Intuitively,
it is clear that measuring the ex-dividend effect over a longer interval adds more noise to
the estimator of this effect. Only if for some reason (unknown to us) the ex-opening stock
price cannot be expected to fully ret7ect the ex-dividend effect, then it may be interesting
to use a'later' stock price. Studies such as Eades. Hess and Kim (1984), Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986), Barclay (1987), Grammatikos (1989), and Michaely (1991) investigate
this problem and all conclude that (in the US) the ex-dividend effect occurs overnight,
which implies that a more appropriate definition of the cum-ex interval is the 'close-to-open'
interval, rather than the 'close-to-close' interval. Therefore, unless otherwise stated we will
assume throughout the remainder of this study that the cum-ex interval is eyuivalent to the
close-to-open interval.
Determining the rate of return should now only be a matter of collecting data with
respect to the stock prices cum-closing and ex-opening, and the dividend payment. However,
virtually all existing studies of the ex-dividend effect do not include the opening price, either
5fi In the remainder of this section, we witl direct our discussion to the measurement of the cum-ex interval
stock rate of retum, noting that the relative decline can easily be obtained from that.
'' The reason for this is that the expected rate of return over a discrete time interval is not zero. althou~zh it
will tx close to zero for small time intervals such as one trading day.
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purposely or because it was not avaílable. Instead, these studies determine the ex-dividend
effect using the closing price, but adjusted for the stock price movement which can be
attributed to the ex-dividend day, i.e. after the stock has gone ex-dividend. There appear to
be two such adjustment methods. The first method suggests that the ex-closing stock price
should be divided by one plus the ex-dividend day rate of return on the stock, and the
resulting estimated ex-opening price is used in determining the ex-dividend effect`~. The
second method~~ determines the ex-dividend effect as the 'abnormal' rate of return in the
cum-ex interval by subtracting the estimated 'normal' rate of retum from the close-to-close
rate of return~"~'. It will be immediately clear that these adjustment methods, in comparison
with simply using the ex-opening price, introduce more noise in the estimator of the ex-
dividend effect. Therefore, we will primarily use opening stock price data in detetmining
the cum-ex interval rate of return.
3.3 Empirical results for US studies of the ex-dividend effect
The preceding section discussed some methodological and statistical aspects with
respect to empirically examining the ex-dividend effect. In this section, we will give a
structured review of existing empirical studies of the US ex-dividend effect. It is useful to
Sx This method is typically used in 'earlier' studies such as Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982). The
ex-dividend day rate of retum on the stock is estimated in these studies by the market rate of retum or,
altematively, using the market model.
Sy Examples of studies using this method include Eades. Hess and Kim (1984), Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1986), Karpoff and Walkling (1988, 1990), Robin (1991) and Shaw (1991). Both methods are employed in Barclay
(1987), Grammatikos (1989) and Michaely (1991).
~' Details about the way in which 'normal' and 'abnormal' rates of retum are determined will be given in
chapter 8 when we discuss our own empirical study.
~~ [n chapter 5, we will discuss the so-called 'risk-tax model', which incorporates both the tax and the risk
aspect in the eyuilibrium analysis of the cum-ex interval rate of retum. This model suggests an expression for the
abnormal rate of retum in the cum-ex interval (i.e. the ex-dividend effect), in which the 'gross' rate of retum is
reduced by the non-dividend related term. The abnotmal rate of retum obtaíned using the second adjustment
method discussed in the main text appears to resemble this theoretical expression to a great extent. It must be
noted, however, that the rate of retum adjustment employed in existing empirical studies and hinted at in the main
text, is purely ad hoc. In contrast, we will present a theoretical framework from which the precise adjustment
follows. Furthermore, the risk-tax model is able to explain the ex-dividend effect along rno dimensions, i.e. both
tax incentives and (increased) risk bearing.
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summarize the existing US empirical literature along a number of relevant aspects to which
separate sub-sections will be devoted. The tïrst sub-section will discuss the results of two
pioneering studies which appear to have been the departure point for the comprehensive
study of the US ex-dividend effect, i.e. the Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982)
studies. Extensions of this basic research will be detailed subsequently, which includes (i)
the possible correlation of the ex-dividend effect with the dividend yield and transactions
costs, (ii) the examination of abnormal rate of return behavior and trading volume around
the cum-ex interval, and (iii) the influence of some important institutional aspects on the US
ex-dividend effect.
3.3.1 Pioneering studies of the US ex-dividend effect in the cum-ex interval
Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982) were among the first to investigate the ex-
dividend effect in the US for a large sample of dividends~'. Because both studies generate
quite diverging results, they appear to have given the upshot to a more elaborate
investigation of the ex-dividend effect, both in the US and in other countries. Let us
therefore briefly summarize the findings of both studies.
Elton and Gruber (1970) examine dividends of US corporations in the period from
April 1966 to March 1967, and test the average relative decline in the sample. The relative
decline is determined using both the (i) close-to-close, and (ii) close-to-adjusted-close
methods discussed at the end of the preceding section. The average decline in the sample
of Elton and Gruber appears to be equal to 0.78 and 0.79 respectively, both being
statistically different from one at the lolo IeveL These figures made Elton and Gruber
conclude that an ex-dividend effect is present in the US capital market, and they attribute
this to the existence of differential income taxation favoring capital gains over cash income.
These findings are challenged by Kalay (1982), who re-examines all cash dividends
out of the sample investigated by Elton and Gruber, and recalculated the relative decline.
Kalay's suggestion is that, if the US capital market were to exhibit a tax-related ex-dividend
effect. then we may expect it to be afortiori present in the cash dividend sample for which
,̀ Earlier studies of the US ex-dividend effect include Campbell and Beranek (1955) who study the ex-
dividend stock price decline of 20 US stocks, and Durand and May (I960) who investigate the ex-dividend
behavior of ATBcT stocks. Finnerty (1981) investigates the pricing of 50 US electric utility stocks between
subsequent quarterly dividend payments.
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the discriminatory tax treatment is yuite clearb;. His findings are the following: the average
relative decline in his sample eyuals 0.73 for the close-to-close method, and 0.88 for the
close-to-adjusted-close method, where only the first is significantly different from one (at
the S~Io level`~). This empirical result makes Kalay conclude that the existence of differential
taxation induces tax-related trading in the cum-ex interval, such that the relative decline is
adjusted to one, as has been discussed in the previous chapter.
These two rather opposite pieces of empirical evidence have initiated more elaborate
studies of several additional features by which the existence and, if so, the nature of an ex-
dividend effect may be evaluated. These features include (i) the relationship of the ex-
dividend effect with the dividend yield and~or the level of transactions costs, (ii) the
presence of abnormal behavior around the cum-ex interval, and (iii) the evidence from
specially designed samples. We detail these features in the next sub-sections.
3.3.2 Dividend yield clienteles and transactions costs
The discussion of the theoretical aspects of the Elton and Gruber and Kalay variants
of the tax model in the preceding chapter made clear that both variants have a different view
of which investor class, in terms of tax status, determines the equilibrium price of the stock
in the cum-ex interval. For a stock with a given dividend yield, Elton and Gruber suggest
that shares are primarily held by investors that can collectively be characterized by a
common tax status, and the resulting eyuilibrium relative decline will reflect the tax status
of investors in this dividend yield clientele. Therefore, Elton and Gruber's model suggests
the presence of a positive correlation between the relative decline and the dividend yield,
since higher yielding stocks are assumed to be held by investors in lower tax brackets (i.e.
for which cash income is less unfavorably treated). These investors are characterized by a
higher value of the 'clientele-parameter' ti`~, so that the equilibrium relative decline E(á)
will be higher for these stocks.
~i Information in Elton and Gruber (1970. Table 1, note b) shows that capital gains realized in the sample
period where taxed at half the ordinary tax rate, with a maximum of 25~Jc.
~ It seems to be strange that, despite the somewhat lower value of the mean relative close-to-close decline
statistic found by Kalay, the significance level of this statistic is less in comparison with Elton and Grubec The
reason for this is the higher standard error of the mean in the Kalay study (0.1574 vs. 0.0990).
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The dividend yield also plays a role in the Kalay model with transactiom costs, i.e.
that tax-induced trading in the cum-ex interval will be more intense when the dividend yield
is higher. This causes the equilibrium relative decline to be more close to one for such
stocks. The Kalay model therefore also suggests the presence of a positive relationship
between the relative decline and the dividend yield. although the relationship would be
somewhat weaker in the Kalay model.
Both Elton and Gruber ( 1970) and Kalay ( 1982) investigate the relationship with the
dividend yield. In order to do so, they ranked their observations into dividend yield deciles
and detern~ined Spearman's rank correlation coefficient as a measure of the relationship
between the dividend yield and the relative decline. The Elton and Gruber statistic for the
unadjusted sampleh~ is statistically significant at the 1~Ic level and implies a positive
correlation. Kalay's statistic for the unadjusted sample is also significant, but the adjusted
sample exhibits only a weakly significant coefficient ( at the Sc~o level).
An unambiguous interpretation of the dividend yield correlation results does not seem
to be possible, however. First, it must be stressed that finding such a correlation provides
evidence consistent with both models, so we should be very careful in interpreting it as
favoring one model over the other. On the other hand, if the relative decline really reflects
the tax status of the investor group as suggested by Elton and Gruber, then the highest two
dividend yield deciles in the Elton and Gruber study imply investor cliente~les having a
preference of cash income over capital gains income. Elton and Gruber explain this
phenomenon by the existence of tax-exempt institutions and US corporate investors in the
market. Especially the latter group typically prefers dividends for tax reasons, since US tax
authorities allow US corporations ro leave out a very substantial part of intercorporate
dividends in determining taxable income~`', whereas capital gains should be fully included.
This tax feature would make corporate investors the 'natural' clientele of high-yielding
stocks. On the other hand, it might also be true that these corporations are natural 'buyers'
of the dividends in other yield deciles.
In sum, although the dividend yield correlation tests of Elton and Gruber do not seem
to provide conclusive evidence about the existence and the nature of the ex-dividend effect
in the US, it appears to be somewhat more consistent with the Kalay model, based on a
~5 Le. the close-to-close sample. Elton and Gruber do not appty a correlation analysis for the adjusted sample.
fi~ Specific provisions in the US tax code allow corporations to declare only a small percentage of received
intercorporate dividends as taxable income. The exclusion percentage has long been equal to 85`Ic. As part of the
1986 US tax reform, this percentage was lowered to 70~k in 1988.
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potentially large role played by corporate and~or institutional investors who will, according
to Kalay, be actively involved in tax-induced dividend trading in the cum-ex interval. If, on
the other hand, the Kalay model is true, then the resulting equilibrium relative decline
should be associated with an 'imputed' minimum transactions cost level`'' being very low.
Kalay's figures suggest that the imputed (round trip) transactions cost levels are in the order
of 0.25~Io of the trading amountfi~. Since this is a level that typically applies to 'large
trading' investors. Kalay considers this finding as evidence supporting his model of the ex-
dividend effect, in which the equilibrium relative decline reflects the minimum transactions
cost rate of the dominant group, rather than the tax status of some investor clientele as
suggested by Elton and Gruber. However, this conclusion is debated by Elton, Gruber and
Rentzler (1984) who argue that Kalay severely underestimates the marginal transactions
costs of large investors by setting them equal to the minimum commission rates. Elton,
Gruber and Rentzler suggest that the cost of a transaction, especially for security dealers,
should also include (i) transfer taxes and registration fees, (ii) bid-ask spreads, and (iii)
clearance costs. They estimate that round trip effective transactions costs will normally be
well over 1~7c of the trading amount even for large investors. This would be more than
sufficient to exclude these investors from being the marginal traders in eyuilibrium. Kalay
(1984) reacts to this by admitting the underestimation of transactions costs, but sticks to his
conclusion that even the inereased cost level is not sufficient to outweigh the benefits from
tax-induced trading for many investors.
Overviewing this sub-section, the dividend yield and transactions costs relationships
do not seem to provide conclusive evidence with respect to either the Elton and Gruber
investor tax rate clientele view of the ex-dividend effect, or the Kalay tax-induced dividend
trading view. Many other researchers have tried to gain more insight into this matter by
examining other features more closely. One of these is the behavior of stock prices in a
wider period around the cum-ex interval, which is the focus of the next sub-section.
67 More precisely. Kalay first transfbrms the relative decline into the cum-ex interval rate of retum employing
a relationship similar to our equation (ZO). His hypothesis is that only transactions costs may hinder the arbitrage
pn~cess which should otherwise make the cum-ex interval rate of return equal to zero in equilibrium. The
'remaining' rate of retum may therefore be used as an estimator of the minimum transactions cost level in the
market.
68 See Kalay (1982. Table [II).
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3.3.3 Abnormal behavior of stock prices and volumes in a wider period around the
cum-ex interval
The preceding discussion of the empirical results obtained by Elton and Gruber and
by Kalay does not provide a clear answer to the question whether, and if so, how the
existence of differential income taxation among investors affects the ex-dividend pricing of
stocks. In order to gain more insight into this problem, some studies have examined the rate
of return on dividend paying stocks on a number of trading days arnnnd the cum-ex
interval. The intuition of such research is the following. The investor tax clientele model
suggests that tax factors are important to investors for their portfolio decisions. Therefore,
investors in high tax brackets tend to hold stocks with low dividend yields and vice versa.
If this model is correct and stocks are 'distributed' over investor tax clienteles, there would
not be a special reason why stocks are more heavily traded in the cum-ex interval or in a
neighboring intervaL Tax factors are also important in the tax-induced dividend trading
model. However, this model suggests that investor tax clienteles, if they exist to begin with,
might be substantially altered in and~or around the cum-ex interval. If this model holds, then
investors are actively involved in employing tax-induced dividend avoiding or dividend
capturing activities. It appears that the two models provide different predictions for the rate
of return and trading volume of the stock in and around the cum-ex interval (i.e. in the cum-
ex per-ioc~. The investor tax clientele model predicts that no abnormal volume behavior
occurs in the cum-ex period. Also, the rate of return on the stock in this cum-ex period will
not be affected by the dividend payment and by tax rate heterogeneity among investors. The
only exception to this is the rate of return in the cum-ex interval itself, which reflects the
tax status of the clientele. The tax-induced dividend trading model, on the other hand,
predicts substantially higher trading volume than normal. It may also be true that the timing
of dividend-related transactions is such that the stock rate of return is affected by the
dividend not only in the cum-ex interval, but also in daily intervals immediately before
and~or after this intervaL As a consequence, the presence of substantial abnormal volume
and~or rate of return behavior in the cum-ex period would be evidence supporting the tax-
induced dividend trading explanation of the ex-dividend effect.
Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) have conducted
such cum-ex period studies. They examined large samples of cash dividends in partially
parallelling research periods, i.e. from July 1962 to December 1980 and from January 1970
to December 1981, respectively. Both studies define a so-called erent period, denoted as
(-5,...,0....,t5), i.e. the interval of 11 trading days centered around the ex-dividend day (day
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0). Abnormal rates of return and trading volumes are obtained for all trading days in the
event period and for all ex-dividend events, by subtracting the estimated normal volume or
rate of return from the realized figure`'`'. Observations associated with some event period day
are averaged in order to obtain average abnormal figures for all days included in the event
period. The null hypothesis to be tested is that the expected abnormal volume or rate of
retum on any event-day is zero.
The results of Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986)
reveal a statistically significant positive abnom~al rate of return on the ex-dividend day (at
the 1~Io level)"'. More important, however, is the result that significant abnormal rates of
return are not restricted to the cum-ex interval, but occur dv-oughout the event period.
Abnotmal rates of return appear to be significantly positil~e on some days before the ex-
dividend day, and on day -1 (the last cum-day) it is even larger than on the ex-day itself.
After day 0, abnormal rates of return are almost always significantly r~egatire, but less
pronounced so that the cumulative abnormal rate of return over the event period is positive.
Lakonishok and Vermaelen also test for the existence of abnormal trading volume in
the event period, which appear to be significantly higher than normal (at the 1~Io level) in
the days before and on the ex-dividend day, in particular in the days -3 through -1, i.e.
immediately prior to the cum-ex interval". Afterwards, trading volumes seem to revert to
their normal levels. Lakonishok and Vermaelen also suggest that the existence of tax-
induced trading would typically imply that abnormal volume is higher for higher yielding
stocks, and lower when 'effective' transactions costs are higher. In order to test for this,
they ranked the average individual abnormal volume observations of days -3 through -1, first
into four dividend yield groups, and subsequently into four trading size groups based on
nonnal trading volume, where the latter factor is used as a proxy for effective transactions
costs associated with trading the particular stock''. Although this categorization cannot be
expected to yield robust conclusions, it nevertheless provides interesting preliminary
evidence. Abnormal volumes prior to the cum-ex interval appear to be positively related
w The determination of abnormal trading volumes and rates of retum will be extensively discussed in chapter
R.
"' Recall from equation (20) that this corresponds to a relative decline less than one.
~~ In each of these days, trading volume was about 7 percent higher than normal.
,
- Karpoff and Walkling (198R) argue that trading activity may indeed be used as a proxy for the effective
transactions costs level, in the sen,e that more intensely traded stocks (i.e. more liquid stocks) are assumed to be
associated with Iou~er effective tran~actions costs.
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with the dividend yield and normal trading activity. Furthermore, when employing a similar
ranking procedure for the average abnormal rate of return figures over days -3 through -l,
there does nc~t seem to be a relationship with normal trading activity. Therefore, it is not
plausible to explain the abnormal rate of return behavior prior to the cum-ex interval by
price pressure on thinly traded stocks.
ln sum, it can be concluded that the results of Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) reveal substantial abnormal rate of return and trading
volume behavior in the cum-ex period, especially in the days before the cum-ex interval
when both rates of return and trading volumes appear to be higher than normal.
Furtherrnore, abnormal behavior seems to be positively related to the cíivicíend yield of the
stock, and is not likely to be the result of price pressure due to thin trading. Together with
the revelation of abnormal volume, all these findings provide strong evidence in support of
the tax-induced dividend trading model ot the ex-dividend effect in the US, as suggested by
Kalay ( I 9R? ).
3,3.4 The US ex-dividend effect and institutional aspects
The empirical US evidence discussed thus far seems to be consistent with the idea that
many investors in the US capital market are involved in dividend-related trading in and
around the cum-ex interval. This is concluded from positive abnormal stock rates of return
and higher than nonnal trading volumes, especially in the days immediately before the cum-
ex interval. Furthermore, this behavior tends to be more intense for higher yielding stocks
which are associated which lower effective transactions costs. If this idea is indeed correct.
then it is also reasonable to expect that institutional changes such as tax reforms and
transactions costs decreases have a significant effect on the magnitude of abnormal rate of
return and volume behavior in and around the cum-ex interval. A number of studies examine
a variety of such institutional aspects, including (i) negotiable transactions costs, (ii) market
microstructure effects, (iii) tax reforms, and (iv) non-taxable dividends. We will discuss each
category in the remainder of this sub-section.
First of all, the fact that brokerage commissions in the US became negotiable in May
1975 may provide an interesting case to investigate the tax-induced trading model of the US
ex-dividend effect. Since from that time effective transaction costs were generally
substantially lower, especially for large investors, it is expected that abnormal behavior has
been more intense after this event, associated with higher abnormal volumes and lower
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abnorrnal rates of return. Both the research periods of Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and
Lakonishok and Vetmaelen (1986) outlined in the previous sub-section contain this
demarcation point. This has been used by them to split the overall sample into two
subsamples, characterized as 'pre-1975' and 'post-1975' respectively. The two studies reveal
that the average abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex period for the post-1975 subsample
is about one fourth of the corresponding figure for the pre-1975 subsample (but still
significantly higher than zero at the 1 ~Ic leve]). Abnormal rates of return in the days
surrounding the ex-dividend day are also lower in the post-1975 subsample, with the
exception of day -I. In addition, the volume tests of Lakonishok and Vermaelen show that
abnormal trading volume is much more pronounced in the post-1975 subsample. These
results strongly suggest that short-term trading has indeed become more intense and more
well-timed due to the introduction of negotiable commissions, causing higher trading
volumes and lower abnormal rates of return in the cum-ex period. This result has been
confirmed by Karpoff and Walkling (1988). Their study is, however, able to detect a
number of other interesting aspects. They thoroughly examine the relationship between
abnormal rates of return in the cum-ex interval and a number of transactions cost proxies".
They fínd no specific correlation prior to 1975, while there is some correlation afterwards.
However, when forming dividend yield yuintiles, it is revealed that the strongest (negative)
correlation is found for high-yield stocks after transaction costs became negotiable. In
addition, there proves to be virtually no correlation for low-yield stocks, both before and
after 1975. These outcomes support the preliminary findings of Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1986) mentioned in the previous subsection, in the sense that dividend-related trading has
been more intense due to lowered transactions costs, but the effect appears to be
concentrated in the higher yielding stocks which are obviously the first candidates for tax-
induced dividend trading.
According to the empirical US evidence presented thus far, a picture emerges that
dividends from high-yield and actively traded stocks are the main target for tax-induced
short-term trading dividend capturing'~ activities, whereas low-yield and thinly traded stocks
" We will discuss these proxies in more detail in chapter S.
~~ It might be noted that abnormal rate of return behavior is the result of tax-induced transactions involving
either dividend capturing (i.e. buying the dividend) or dividend avoidance (í.e. selling the dividend). Depending
on which type of transaction is initiated, there will be either upward or downward pressure on the stock price prior
to the cum-ex interval. However, since cumulative abnormal rates of return appear to be positive before the ex-
dividend day in the US setting, the most plausible conclusion is that upwazd price pressure is generated by dividend
capturing incentives among various investors in the US capital market.
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are dominated by long-tetm investors. This picture is indeed verified in three other studies
focusing on institutional aspects, i.e. Choe and Masulis (1991), Karpoff and Walkling
(1990), and Grammatikos (1989). Choe and Masulis conduct a market microstructure
analysis with respect to the cum-ex period and conclude that initiating dividend capturing
strategies is very prominent among high-yield stocks. Furthermore, many such strategies
appear to be employed by foreign investors, especially Japanese life insurance companies75.
The last conclusion is strengthened by the finding that abnormally large and frequent
purchase orders before the ex-day seem to be matched by similar sell orders on the ex-day.
Moreover, US corporations are also believed to be actively involved in dividend capturing
since, as was noted earlier, the US income tax regime allows corporations to exclude a
substantial percentage of intercompany dividends received from taxable income, which
makes them effectively prefer dividends over capital gains for tax reasons'~. Karpoff and
Walkling (1990) test a sample of ex-dividend events of NASDAQ stocks and confirm that
the cum-ex interval rate of retum is most abnormal for high-yielding stocks and~or for which
the bid-ask spread, as a proxy for transactions costs, is relatively small". Their conclusion
is that dividend capturing is substantial for but virtually limited to high-yielding stocks with
low associated effective transactions costs. The supposition that actively traded stocks are
better candidates for dividend capturing is also confirmed by Grammatikos (1989). He notes
that a dividend capturing strategy involves an open position in the stock which extends over
a more or less considerable time interval'x. Since many investors will prefer to hedge the
associated risk, Grammatikos hypothesizes that, other things being equal, stocks upon which
options are being traded (which are being referred to by him as 'optionnable' stocks) should
be more involved in tax-induced dividend trading than 'nonoptionnable' stocks. His study
's Japanese life insurance companies are known to be eager for receiving dividends because they are obligated
to pay their policyholders dividends of 6~~c to 7~10, from which capital gains, traditionally the larger part of rates
of return on Japanese stocks, were precluded. From 1989, when these restrictions were largely impaired, Choe and
Masulis ( 1991) conclude that Japanese dividend capturing activity on US stock exchanges has substantially
decreased. For more details about dividend capturing activities by Japanese investors and the changed Japanese
legislation see Choe and Masulis (1991, footnote 8) and the paper of Bolster. Bremer and Kato (1991).
'~ Eades. Hess and Kim ( 1984) and Stickel ( 1991) also present evidence consistent with large dividend
capturing activity with respect to preferred stocks, which are normally characterized by high dividend yields. Ex-
dividend day rates of return on high-yielding US stocks are also investigated in the recent paper of Shankar (1993).
" The ex-dividend day bid-ask spread is also investigated in the recent paper by Kiely and Dubofsky (1993).
'~ For example, in order to qualify for the dividend exclusion corporations need to hold the stock for at least
46 days around the cum-ex interval. according to the currently effective US corporate income tax code.
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indeed reveals that such trading is most prominent in high-yield optionnable stocks.
Another piece of interesting evidence with respect to tax considerations and cum-ex
behavior may arise from studies investieating the consequences of changes in the tax regime
for the ex-dividend day behavior of stocks. Barclay (1987), for example, examines two US
dividend samples, i.e. a'pre-tax' sample of observations from the first decade of this
century, when income taxation was none.~istent in the US'`', and a'post-tax' sample of
observations from July 1962 to December 1985. His study reveals no significant effect in
the pre-tax sample: no abnormal cum-ex rate of retum and no detectable correlation between
group averages in dividend yield quintiles. On the other hand, the post-tax sample shows
both a statistically significant positive average abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex
interval, and the con-elation with dividend yield is consistent with that found in studies of
contemporaneous time periods. Barcluy concludes from this that his results strongly support
the investor tax clientele model, since the introduction of income taxation appears to have
made investors sort themselves into tax-induced dividend clienteles. A problem with this
conclusion, as Michaely (1991) notes, is that in the 60 years between the two sample
periods not only the tax code changed, but possibly many other variables affecting asset
rates of return and behavior of individuals has also changed. Thus, the comparison made by
Barclay is likely to provide mixed results which cannot easily be disentangled. More
powerful results, on the other hand, may be expected from studies examining the
consequences of the enactment of the recent US tax reforms of 1984 and 1986, which both
generally involved a reduced attractiveness of engaging in either dividend capturing or
dividend avoiding strategies~t'. The studies of Grammatikos (1989) for the 1984 refotm and
Michaely (1991) and Robin (1991) for the 1986 reform present evidence that tax-induced
dividend trading was significantly reduced after these tax reforms were installed. In line with
results discussed earlier, the reduced trading activity appears to be restricted to high-yielding
and actively traded stocks. Moreover, the magnitude of abnormal rates of return in the cum-
ex period also appeared to be generally lower after the reforms.
~y In Appendix B of Barclay (1987), the US tax climate at the beginning of this century is described in more
detail. Eventually, federal income taxatian was established in the US in October 1913.
sa The 1984 tax reform increased the minimum holding period required for corporations to qualify for the
dividend exclusion from 16 to 46 days. thus making dividend capturing, although still interesting, more riskier. The
1986 tax reform elrmiriated the preferential treatment of long term capital gains for individual investors, reducing
overall incentives for dividend avoidance. Furthermore, the income tax rate for corporations was lowered from 46~~c
to 34`I~ (in 1988), while the dividend exclusion percenrage was also decreased from 85~Ir to 70~70 (in 1988), thereby
continuing the tax preference for dividends among US corpoiations.
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One of the most direct tests of whether the existence of differential taxation is an
adeyuate explanation for the US ex-dividend effect has been carried out by Eades, Hess and
Kim (1984), Lakonishok and Vermaelen ( 1986) and Shaw (1991). The logic underlying all
three studies is very simple: if the ex-dividend effect is essentially a tax effect, then no such
effect should be observed when a sample of i~c~ntu.ruhlc~ dividends, such as stock
dividends~splits and nontaxable cash distributions, is examined. Eades, Hess and Kim (19R4)
and Lakonishok and Vermaelen ( 1986) investigate samples of stock dividends and stock
splits and report large jiositire abnormal rates of return for trading days ( -S.t2) of the cum-
ex period. Furthermore, Lakonishok and Vermaefen find large ne,~~utirc~ cumulative abnorrnal
rrading volume for these stock dividends and stock splits before the ex-day which does not
recover afterwards. This evidence is found for both the pre- and post-1975 subsumples, so
they are not intluenced by the reduced level of transactions costs. Both the positive
abnormal rates of return upon split announcementsx' and at ex-split dates las indicated just
before) are still anomalous issues for which nobody has offered a convincin~ explanation.
Although the tax status of nontaxable cash distributions is totally clear to investors, there
appear to be large ne,t,~utirc abnormal rates of return in the post-1975 subsample of Eades,
Hess and Kim and the overall sample of Shawx'. Since the stocks distributing these
dividends are typically high-yielding stocks, there is a parallel with the results for tu-ruble
distributions on high-yieldin~~ stocks that are found in virtually every study of the US ex-
diviciend etl~cct.
3.-1 Summarv
This chapter concentrated on existing empirical research with respect to the US ex-
dividend day effect. The results for the US setting are especially relevant for the remainder
of this study, since the tax systems in both the US and the Netherlands have very much in
common. First of all, we discussed a number of inethodological aspects involved in testing
for ex-dividend effects. These include a theoretical prediction about the effect, from which
hypotheses can be derived. It was argued that the Elton and Gruber investor tax clientele
x' See Fama. Fisher. Jensen and Roll (19691 and Grinblatt. Masulis and Titman (198~3) for an empirical
examination of the announcement effect of stock splits and stork dividends.
"' Shaw examines a special type of security. i.e. units of so-called 'master limited partnerships~. Dividends
paid to unitholders are untaxed under the US tax code. For more details see Shaw f 19911.
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model and the Kalay tax-induced dividend trading model, as variants of the tax model
discussed in the previous chapter, are commonly used in empirical studies of the US ex-
dividend effect. Other relevant aspects include the cum-ex interval itself, which appears to
be more adequately defined as the close-to-open interval, and the detetmination of the
abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex interval.
Next, we presented a structured overview of the existing empirical literature with
respect to the ex-dividend effect in the US capital market";. Summarizing the results of the
various studies, there appears to be an overwhelming body of empirical evidence suggesting
that dividend capturing trading activity is present in the days immediately before the cum-ex
interval of high-yielding, actively traded and optionnable stocks. Among the major
candidates to initiate this kind of trading are US corporate investors, who have a tax
preference for dividends, and large Japanese insurance companies who, at least until 1989,
have an extremely strong incentive to capture cash dividends in order to meet policy holder
requirements. As a consequence, it follows that the pricing of such stocks in and around the
cum-ex interval will very likely be dominated by these investor classes, whether the
dividend payments themselves are taxable or non-taxable. Existing studies also show that
the dividend capturing effect quickly vanishes when stocks have lower dividend yields, are
less actively traded, and~or which are nonoptionnable, and it is difficult to reveal the exact
nature of the ex-dividend effect. A few researchers, such as Karpoff and Walkling (1990)
suggest that it may well be true that these stocks are held by investors with a more long-
term horizon. Among the factors that determine their portfolio choices might typically be
the tax status of the investor clientele. Therefore, the implications of both the investor tax
clientele model and the tax-induced dividend trading model may prove to be valid for
relevant sub-classes of stocks in the US capital market.
"' Since our focus is on the comparison of the US ex-divídend effect with the effect in the Dutch capital
market, we do not discuss the results of a few papers examining the setting in countries other than the US. These
include Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Booth and Johnston (1984) for Canada. Davidson (1989) and
Davidson and Mallin (1989) for the United Kingdom. Sorjonen (19R8) and Hietala (1990) for Finland, Michaely
and Murgia (1992) for Italy, Dhatt. Kim and Mukherji (1993) for Korea. Existing empirical results for the Dutch
setting, such as Dorsman (1988) and Dorsman and Verboven 11990). will be discussed further in chapter 8.
4 THE DUTCH SETTING
41 Introduction
Having discussed some theoretical and empirical issues in the existing literature about
the ex-dividend effect, we will now tum to the main theme of the present study, which is
an analysis of the ex-dividend effect in the Netherlands. This requires information about the
organization of the Dutch capital market and some typical Dutch institutional aspects. Some
or all of this may prove to be useful in building and understanding a theoretical model of
the ex-dividend effect and the empirical testing of the model later on in this study.
In order to do so, we start with an investigation of the specific investor classes which
can be explicitly recognized in the Dutch capital market. Next, we will discuss the
prevailing Dutch corporate and income tax codes, since tax factors were already seen to play
a potentially large role in explaining the ex-dividend effect. Serxion 4 of this chapter will
discuss the rather unique variety of dividend forms which are actually employed by Dutch
corporations and the procedure by which dividends are distributed. Important for
understanding the ex-dividend effect, the fifth section examines what kind of tax-induced
trading incentives can be recognized for Dutch investors around the cum-ex interval. The
last section contains a summary of this chapter.
4.2 Typical investors in the Dutch capital market
It is commonly agreed upon that the US capital market may be characterized as a large
market with numerous buyers and sellers. As a consequence, no single investor will
normally be large enough to affect security prices by his own actions. This market may
therefore be regarded as a competitive market. It is unclear whether or not this
characterization carries over to the Dutch capital market. On the one hand, it is true that
since the beginning of this century and even more so since the end of the Second World
War the Dutch economy has been structured in such a way that institutional investors, i.e.
pension funds, insurance companies and investment funds, have become by far the largest
capital suppliers in the Dutch capital market. On the other hand, the larger part of the huge
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amounts of capital, especially that of pension funds and insurance companies, appears to be
invested in Dutch govemment bonds, whereas a minor part is invested in stock. Moreover,
institutional investors can typically be characterized as long term investors, so it may be
assumed that the larger part of their capital is not subject to frequent portfolio rebalancing.
Therefore, we tend to believe that, although institutional investors are very large in terms
of invested capital, they are infrequent traders, and they seem to have a natural aversion to
short tetm trading strategies involving open positions in risky assets such as stocks and
currenciesH~. This may be an important feature in our study of the Dutch ex-dividend effect,
as will become clear later on in this study. However, let us first briefly sketch some major
developments in the Dutch capital market over the last 50 years.
Traditionally, the Dutch government has been actively involved in encouraging and~or
forcing companies, labor uníons or individual employees to make collective industry-wide
agreements about labor compensations. A parallelling governmental policy has been to
stimulate employees to provide for retirement funding while they are still actively working.
The result of all this is, among other things, that nearly every employee in the Netherlands
is directly or indirectly forced to participate in some pension fund, for which some premium
is withdrawn from his or her monthly income. Due to these mandatory savings, a
considerable number of pension funds have emerged in the Netherlands, which are either
associated with a single company or organized for some group of companies or industrys~.
An obvious implication is that these funds collectively hold an enormous amotmt of
capital"`', which has to be invested in the capital market in order to assure that every
participant's future claim will be properly maintainedx'. Among the largest Dutch pension
funds are the ABP (civil servants), the PGGM (medicare), the pension funds associated with
"~ We will provide some argumentation Ibr this belief later on in this chapter.
s5 In order to protect the individual employee's pension savings, the Dutch law reyuires that the pension fund
is Iegally separated from the company or companies for which employees actually work. Among other things. this
includes that the company has no decision right with respect to the capital of the company pension fund.
s~ Another implication is that a very large part of total savings in the Netherlands consists of mandatory
savings.
s~ After having contributed for a siven number of years (normally 40), participants in pension funds are
entitled to a monthly payment upon retirement which usually corresponds to a given percentage of their income
level prior to retirement.
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the multinational companies Royal Dutch und Philips, and some industry pension funds"h.
The larger part of the portfolios ot Dutch pension funds traditionally consists of low risk
investments such as (Dutch) government bonds, private loans, mortgages, and real estate.
Stock (and derivative) investment is usually much less present in the balance sheets of these
ti" ~mfunds .
Another important class of investors in the Dutch capital market is fonned by
insurance companies. As in other western countries, many Dutch individuals or companies
judge the risks to which their actions or decisions are exposed to be such that they want to
be insured. Due to economic growth (or other factors) this demand tbr insurance, in terms
of both its magnitude and its diversity, seems to be increasing over time. Among the
complex collectivity of these risks, which is far beyond the scope of this study, we follow
the traditional distinction used by Dutch insurance companies, i.e. (1) property insurance.
and (?) life insurance"'. Due to the nature of the risks for which they provide coverage and
the predictability of the futw'e claims associated with either type of risk, these two fornis
of insurance generally differ with respect to the contract period involved, i.e. short-term (e.g.
one year) for property insurance and long-term for life insurance. As a conseyuence,
insurance companies tend to fund the yearly claims involved in property insurance on a
year-to-year basis. Life insurance risks appear to be much more predictable (e.g. by applying
ss Table 2? in the 1993 report of the Dutch Central Bank (see De Nederlandsche Bank (1993)) provides data
on capital market investment by Dutch pension funds and insurance companies. which totalled to NLG 607286
millíon at the end of 1992. Investments of pension funds were equal to NLG ~3~95~7 million, and ubout 40rk of
this amount (NLG 171186 millionl was owned by ABP. Illustrative figures for the invested capital of the largest
Dutch pension funds are collected by Van Loo (1990, p. 341). The largest Dutch pension fund at the beginning
of 1989 was ABP linvested capitaL' NLG 1482R7 million). followed by PGGM (NLG 33? 15 million i, the twu large
metal industry pension funds INLG 186?5 million: 'Metaalnijverheid' t'Metaalindustrie'), Philips (NLG 16931t
million: 'A' t'B'1. Royal Dutch~Shell (NLG I 101O million). and the building industry pension fund (NLG 906~
million).
Ky Table 2? in De Nederlundsche Bank (1993) also provides information about the fractional inve,tment lat
the end of 1992) in govemment bonds, private loans, mortgages, und reul estate by pension funds tecluding ABP).
ABP. and insurance companies, which eyualled 69.3`7e, 90.7~-~, and R I. I~~c. respectively. Stock im~estment by these
funds was eyual to 34.6`k, 8.8~~~, and 15.U~k. respectively.
~" See Wolff (1989) for an illustration of the govemmental restrictions with respect to the domestic and
foreign investment policies of the Dutch pension funds ABP and PGGVI. Even when (local) govemment investment
regulations do not apply. investment in foreign markets may be limited. For example, in October 1993 the
European Committee proposed a regulation requiring pension fundï to invest at least 809r in national securities
or ECU-securi[ies (see e.g. de Vnikskrunr. Oc[ober ~. 1993).
y~ T}pical Dutch terms characterizing this distinction are 'schade-bedrijf' and 'leven-txdrijf'.
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mortality tables) and, conseyuently, expected long term claims from these contracts may be
funded by investing the present value of the expected claims in the capital markety'.
Therefore, life insurance claims seem to be very comparable with pension fund claims, so
it is reasonable to assume that Dutch insurance companies, just as pension funds, are
generally characterized by a long-term investment scope and have a natural incentive to
invest in low-risk interest-bearing securities.
Finally, investment funds should be included in the list of institutional investors in the
Netherlands. It can be observed that many such companies exist in the Netherlands`", most
of which are in fact Dutch-based. Two reasons can be advanced for the large number of
investment funds in the Netherlands: (i) the lack of investment tradition among individuals,
and (ii) economic and~or institutional circumstances, such as the interest rate level and tax
considerations. First, as outlined above, the mandatory participation in Dutch pension funds
traditionally took away the necessity for individual retirement saving among the majority
of Dutch individuals. If an individual investor wanted to invest capital on top of that, he was
expected to enter the Dutch stock, bond or real estate market privately, which was (and
probably still is) generally believed to be the arena where banks, institutional investors and
wealthy individual investors compete. Therefore, there have always been few incentives for
individual investors to enter these markets directly. This was recognized long ago by
investment trusts like Robeco who pooled individual capital in order to increase the scale
of investment and combine knowledge and information, so that better investment decisions
could be madey'.
The second reason for the increased number of investment companies in the
Netherlands is related to certain economic conditions in the last decade, especially (i) the
rapid decline of the interest ratey`, and (ii) the changed attitude towards investment- and tax-
management among many individuals. These factors generated a substitution effect in the
sense that many individual investors withdrew their capital from ordinary savings accounts
in order to reinvest this in higher-yielding and~or tax-managed funds. Their needs were
~
` The distinction between these two funding systems is expressed in Dutch by the terms 'omslagstelsel' and
'kapitaaldekkingsstelsel'.
v; For example, over 270 stocks were listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange at May 14, 1992, more than
40 qo of which were stocks of investment funds.
y4 tn fact, Robeco has become one of the largest investment funds in the world.
~5 The interest rate on long-tetm Dutch govemment bonds declined from 12.75~1r in 1981 to 5.75~k in 1993,
with a temporary increase to about 9~1~ in 1991.
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fulfilled especially by large Dutch banks and investment funds which initiated special
investment funds for almost all kinds of assets like Dutch stocks, European stocks, Asian
stocks, growth stocks, real estate, government bonds, warrants, and so on. Since the tax
treatment of investment companies in the Netherlands is quite favorable"`', these funds fulfill
a dual purpose, i.e. fine-tuned diversification ancl tax shelter.
Having discussed the dominant position of institutional investors in the Dutch capital
market, a final remark can be made with respect to 'other' participants which include
wealthy and non-wealthy ('ordinary') individuals, corporations, banks and foreign investors.
Ordinary individuals participate primarily through investment funds, as was noted above.
This has become clear as a result of the enactment, at February 1 in 1992, of a law stating
that substantial shareholdings (exceeding Sqo) and major changes in these shareholdings
should be publicly disclosedy'. The stream of announcements which have appeared since
then present information that, besides institutional investors, many large Dutch private
investors and corporations also hold blocks of shares in listed companies, but they seem to
do so for long term investment purposes. This indicates that their stock trading activity is
mainly strategically in nature, i.e. to preserve stakeholdings in various industries. Banks
have always primarily fulfilled an intermediary role in the Dutch economy. Besides
establishing investment funds and underwriting stock issues, they do not seem to hold large
open positions in securities. The position of foreign investors is unclear: although they might
be attracted to the Dutch capital market for tax reasons~~, there is little precise information
about their magnitude in the Dutch capital market, especially in comparison with the Dutch
institutional investors.
4.3 Relevant aspects of the Dutch tax code
The analysis in the preceding chapters demonstrates that the existence of tax
differentials among investors may affect stock pricing in and~or around the cum-ex interval.
Therefore, it seems worthwhile to discuss some aspects of the Dutch tax code which may
prove relevant for the ex-dividend effect study in the Dutch setting. In doing so, we will
vb This will be detailed later on in this chapter.
97 This law is called (in Dutch) 'Wet Melding Zeggenschap'.
~s An example of this, which will be further discussed in the next section, may be the possible mild taxation
of dividends and capital gains for foreign investors if there is a favorable treaty between the two countries.
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first detail some features of the prevailing tax system and compare these, for reasons given
earlier, with the tax system which is in effect in the US. The previous section revealed that
major investor groups in the Dutch capital market can roughly be characterized as pension
funds, insurance companies, investment companies, foreign investors, and individual
investors. This section will consider the specific tax status relevant for each of these groups
in more detail. The Dutch income tax system is based on the so-called 'classical' double-
taxation system in which (i) profits are taxed at the corporate level, and (ii) distributions out
of net profits (after corporate tax) are generally subject to income taxation at the personal
level. Such a system also still prevails in the US, whereas many other western European
countries have switched to some variant of the imputation system which tries to eliminate
the double taxation of dividends`'`'. For the present study, though, it is necessary to separately
detail both the corporate tax system (in Dutch: 'vennootschapsbelasting') and the personal
tax system ('inkomstenbelasting')""'. This will be done in the next two sub-sections. A third
sub-section is devoted to the withholding tax on dividends, a uniyue special provision in the
Dutch income tax code. In our empirical study with respect to Dutch stock and options
prices in the cum-ex interval which will be outlined in chapters 8 and 9, this feature appears
to play an important role in explaining the Dutch ex-dividend effect.
4.3.1 Corporate income taxation
Corporate taxes in the Netherlands are levied upon legal persons with an incorporated
status. The most important examples of this category include publicly or closely held
corporations"", cooperations, mutual insurance companies and mutual investment funds"'~.
The profits of such companies in a given fiscal year are taxed at a proportional tax rate. In
~~ Brealey and tvl~en i 19~)I, pp. 389-390), summarize the income tax ,y~tem~ employed by mo,t
industrialized countrie~.
~~ Since a full treatment of these two tax systems is beyond the scope of thís study. we will only focus on
the core or on aspects which may be especially relevant for the present research. For a more rigorous discussion.
see e.g. Stevens 119A l 1.
~o~ These are usually referred to by their Dutch abbreviations NV ('Naamloze Vennootschap') and BV
('Besloten Vemiootschap').
~~~~ The latter two legally differ from their counterparts which are organized as an NV or BV. For tax
purposes, however, these 'fondsen voor eemene rekening' as they are formally called are treated in an identical
way as the incorporated insurance and investment companies.
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the early ei~:hties, this rate was 4K~~r, but due to several political debates this rate was
systematically decreased from 43~k in 1y84 to 35~~c in 1993"".
Major sources of taxable income include operating income (interest payments are
deductible), cash dividends received from holding stocks, and capital gains and losseti
realized on whatever asset"". Unlike in the US, there is no exclusion for intercompany
dividends. However, the corporate income tax code provides two ways in order to (partly)
avoid taxation, which might be especially relevant for the present study. First of all, if some
company ownes at least 5~~r of the stock of another taxable company and this was
maintained throu,~~lrnut the entire previous fiscal year, the so-called 'deelnemingsvrijstellin~~'
(participation exemption) allows the corporation to neglect all gains and losses from the
participation for tax pcu-poses. In other words, when a company holds a number of stocks
of another company qualifyin; for the exemption"'~, dividends received and capital gains
realized from these stocks are untaxed, while realized capital losses are not deductible.
The second way to reduce or escape taxation is that some corporations can fonnally
obtain a tax-exempt status, either by titatute or by qualifying as an investment fund in fisr~ul
.rense. An important e~xample of the first category are pension funds, but also some other
legal entities which are regarded a~ socially useful such ati charity funds and religious
organizations are tax-exempt as well. Investment funds which are recognized as such by
fiscal authorities are taxable but their fiscal income is taxed at a zero rate. The motive for
this regulation has been to create a situation of 'transparency', such that there is no obvious
difference frorn a tax perspective between investing at the indivicíual level or through an
investment fund. The most important conditions to obtain this type of tax-exempt status""'
include that (i) the economic purpose of the company is to invest its entire capital in
securities, real estate or mortgage claims, (ii) the company faces restrictions with respect to
the utiage of debt finance, and (iii) net profits must be distributed to stockholders within
~n~ !v1ore preci,el~-. the corportue iax ratc in 19i13 i, ~(1~4 for t:uuhle pri,tit up tu NLG 2if1 CIf)0. ancl ~ï~d f~ir
the remainilrr.
"u However, there ii a special ' replacement reserve' provitiion lin Dutch: 'vervangingsreserve-regeling') in
the Dutch corporatc tax code allowing corpurations to use capital gains rcalized on specific a~sets ( without heing
taxed) in order to replace these assets.
'r'S This must be applied for each year.
'~t~ More fortnally, any investment fund desirin~ this special s[atus should send a request to the Dutch central
bank (' De Nederlandsche Bank'). which will investigate whether the fund meets the criteria laid down for the
status. If it complies with the request, tïtical authorities will also recognize the xtatus. Afterwards, the Dutch central
bank will check whether the status continues to apply.
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eight months after the fiscal year has ended. Also, some specific rules apply in determining
fiscal profit. For example, no claim can be made with respect to the participation exemption
mentioned above. Also, virtually all types of stock dividends and stock bonuses received by
the fund should be included in reported fiscal income"". Finally, the fund is allowed to
maintain two special reserves: a reinvestment reserve ('herbeleggingsreserve'), and a
rounding reserve ('afrondingsreserve'). The fund may add realized capital gains on securities
and realized gains from the sale of real estate to the reinvestment reserve"'", thereby
avoiding corporate taxation on these gains. It may use this reserve to increase the
distribution to shareholders above the minimum level implied by condition (iii). The
rounding reserve allows the fund to round the actual distribution to shareholders"~. By
enabling investment funds to require this favorable fiscal treatment, tax authorities aim at
creating a situation in which investment funds play, from a tax perspective, an intermediary
role such that gains and losses obtained at the fund level will quickly be made available to
and taxed at the individual stockholder level. Many Dutch investment funds have indeed
acquired this special fiscal status"~.
4.3.2 Personal income taxation
The income tax code applies to domestic natural persons. It details a number of income
sources from which taxable income is supposed to be derived. Besides labor income, these
sources include the income obtained from investment in securities (including stocks of
in7 Later on in this chapter, it will be revealed that there is an important and quite freyuently used type of
sta k dividend which is nomially not subject to income taxation, i.e. in case it is declared out of the share premium
reserve. This also holds for investment funds which are recognized as tax-exempt by tax authorities.
'~~" The fund is also obliged to deduct realized losses from this reserve.
't~ The maximum amount of this reserve is limited to I ~~o of the capital provided by shareholders at the end
of the year. To the extent that fiscal income should otherwise be negative, the reserve has to be added to fiscal
income.
"~ Some investment funds, however, deliberately forego this status. Examples are investment growth funds
such as Rorento which pursue a policy of not paying any dividend at all in order to increase the market price of
the stock as much as possible, enabling shareholders to generate high capital gains. Consequently, these funds pay
regular corporate income taxes over taxable income. It will be explained in the next sub-section that capital gains
are normally untaxed for individual Dutch investors, so that growth funds help to prevent individual investment
income from being taxed at the substantially higher personal top income tax rate.
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incorporated companies) or in a non-incorporated companies. Taxable income is subject to
a progressive rate schedule up to 60~Ie in 1993. Until 199Q this schedule consisted of nine
brackets starting at a rate of approximately 15~~~ with a top rate of 72~k"'. From 1990 on,
however, a radical shift in this schedule was established as part of the so-called 'Oort' tax
reform"' such that only three brackets remained (and a tax-exempt bracket) with rates (in
1993) of 38.4~10, ~O~Ic. and 60~k."'.
An important difference with the US personal tax system is the tax treatment of capital
gains in the Netherlands. Whereas realized capital gains on securities have always been
taxable in the US, and are fully taxable in the US since the 1986 tax reform";, any gain
realized on the sale of whatever asset by a natural person is normally not taxed at all in the
Netherlands and, consequently, realized capital losses are not deductible. There are,
however, two major exceptions. First, this exemption does not apply in situations where
capital gains and losses arise from the sale of assets which are recognized by tax authorities
as productive assetsj5. The second (quite complex) exception refers to the case in which a
private investor (together with his family) has held a substantial proportion of the to[al stock
of a company (i.e. about one third) for a period of five years"~. lf stocks are being sold
"~ In addition, there is a tax-exempt bracket for each individual. The tax rates corresponding with the brackets
were slightly different from year to year. The top rate, however, was (at least in the eighties) fixed at 72Q~r.
"~ This reform, deriving itt name from the chairman of the committee that prepured it, was the outcome of
political discussion set up, among other things, to make income taxation less complex, to remove some
inconsistencies, to reduce the number of deductible expenses, and to decrease the top tax rates. It should be noted
that this reform had a negligible effect on corporate taxation. Furthermore, the classical system itself remained
unaffected.
"; The rate of the first bracket has been subject to minor yearly moditïcations. Furthermore, it consists of
a tax part of 13~Io ( in 1993) and a social security part of 25.4~Io. For individuals being fi5 year or older at the start
of 1993. this rate was 20.5`7c (i.e. 13~1o plus 7.S~~o).
"~ To be more precise, net capital gains were also taxable in the US prior to the 1986 rax reform, but there
was a special regime for lon,q term capital gains ( i.e. gains realized after a sufficiently long holding period) which
were taxed according to a substantially lower rate. The 1986 reform eliminated the favorable treatment of these
gains. For more details, see e.g. Michaely ( 1991) and Robin ( 1991).
j5 For example, compare the situation of an índividual who has realized a capital gain from selling a
computer. The gain would be untaxed íf this computer was applied purely for personal usage. If, on the other hand.
the computer belonged to the assets of a non-incorporated company set up and ran by this individual, tax authorities
will most likely reyuire the gain to be included in company profit and, conseyuently, be added to the individual's
personal taxable income.
"~ This special provision is called the ' aanmerkelijk belang regeling'.
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from such a portfolio, capital gains are taxable at a fixed rate of 20~I~ "'. Dividends received
from any company, whether Dutch-based or not, are in principle fully taxable under the
income tax regime to the extent that they exceed a minor franchise"". The tax code
identifies anything that is distributed to a shareholder out of the company's capital as a
dividend payment, with the exception of distributions recognized as repayment of funded
capital. In ptactice, this means that all common types of dividend payments are taxable, with
one exception: the stock dividend which is paid out of the share premium reserve"y.
-1,3.3 Withholding tax on dividends
A special feattn-e of the Dutch tax code, i.e the dividend withholdin~ tax, should
definitely not be left unaddressed. To be more precise, all taxable distributions by Dutch
corporations, whether received by individual or institutional investors, corporations or
foreign investors, are subject to an immediate withholding of 25~~c. This means that only
75~Ic of the dividend is actually paid out to stockholders. This tax 'payment' may be settled
with the actual corporate or income tax which should be paid. More precisely, after taxable
income has been declared at the end ot~ the fiscal year, the amount of taxes to be paid is
determined net of the dividend withholdin~~ tax which was originally wíthheld when the
dividend was paid out. It should be noted that when the dividends are received by a foreign
investor qualifying for the participation exemption, full settlement of the dividend
withholdin~ is usually no problem. [f there is no qualification in fiscal sense, the Dutch tax
authorities appear to be very reluctant in repayin~ the full dividend withholding to foreign
investors, even when a tax treaty exists between the two countries. However, there will
usually be a refunding of 10~k for investors from a number of developed countries, such that
I S~Ir is retained.
"~ [t may be noted from the discussion above that when an inr~~~7iururedcompam holds this portfolio, capital
gains will t~ untaxed since the participation would then yualify for the parlicipation exemption.
"~ Dividends receiced helow the franchise level are untaxed. The exclusion amount has long been equal to
NLG S00 per year for each individual. but in 1986 it wati raised to NLG IOW per year.
"" In Dutch, thi~ is called a'stcxk dividend ten laste van de agio-reserve'. It will be argued in the nest
section that virtuall} alI stock dividends by Dutch companies are share premium reserve distributions.
The Dntcfi Settrn,~ b~
~4.4 Di~idend payout by Uutch corporations
In chapter 1 the term e-~--diridcii~l peri~id was introduced to encompass the entire time
span in which actions and events related to the dividend payout take place. It was argued
that these activities might include:
(1) decision making by the company about the level and the form of the dividend
proposal;
(2) declaration of the dividend (official announcement of the dividend proposal);
(3) adoption of dle proposal (if necessary);
(4) registration of the stockholders which are entitled to the dividend;
(5) listing the stock as ex-dividend;
(6) actual dish-ibution of the dividend.
ln the remainder of this section, some detaíls of the way dividends are distributed by
typical Dutch companies"" are provided. The analysis will address the aspects listed above.
Also, some examples from actual dividend proposals will be detailed.
4.~1.1 Choosing the dividend form
Let us imagine the situation of some Dtrtch company that maintains a policy of paying
out nonzero amowits of dividends, which fits into the interests of the current stockholders"'.
Therefore, it might be supposed that this company has decided upon a target dividend level
for the next year. Further decisions that the company needs to make, given the target
dividend, include the frequency and the form of the distributions. ln the US, it is very
common to pay quarterly dividends, which means that atter three interim dividends a final
dividend completes the annual dividend payout. Moreover, virtually all dividend payments
by US companies are made in the form of a cash amount made payable to stockholders.
Thi, sharply contrasts with the Dutch situation in at IeaSt two respects. First, it is st~u~dard
'~t' The exposition in this section will, however, be limited to those aspects which are especially rrlevant for
the present study. For a thorough analysis of dividend polic} and dividend pattems in thr Netherlands..ee Dorsman
1 Iy2iR1-
'~' See Dorsman (1988) for a detailed analysis of dividend poliries pursued by Dutch companiet.
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practice in the Netherlands that dividend is paid only once a year. Exceptions are the larger
Dutch companies and some investment funds. Besides a final dividend, these few companies
also pay only nne interim dividend, but not necessarily at six months prior to the final
dividend'". Second, and most important, there appears to be a wide variety in payout forms
applied by Dutch companies. In the analyses of Dorsman (1988) and Dorsman and





The first two categories are yuite straightforward: the dividend payment is made as a
cash amount, or consists solely of new stock. The latter two categories are hybrids of the
former and may be regarded as typical Dutch dividend forms. Upon declaration of a choice
dividend, the stockholder is allowed to choose between receiving either a cash or a stock
dividend. The combination dividend is even more complex: it consists of combinations of
either (i) cash and stock dividend, (ii) cash and choice dividend, or (iii) stock and choice
dividend. However, the latter combination does not seem to occur in reality according to the
samples investigated by Dorsman (1988) and Dorsman and Verboven (1990)''`. Furthermore,
it appears that the majority of the combination dividends occurred using the more complex
second form. All of this is illustrated by tables 4.l and 4.2, which provide freyuency
distributions of the dividend types used by Dutch companies in the years 1981-1988.
A number of implications from these tables are worth to be mentioned. First of all,
when comparing the total number of dividends, it follows that not many Dutch companies
do pay interim dividends, given that more than one interim payment is unlikely to be ever
made. Second, if interim dividends are being paid, they almost always (i.e. in nearly 90~Ic
of all cases) take the form of cash dividends. The payout variety of final dividends,
however, is much more wide: although the majority of the dividends appear to be cash
„
" For example, the stock Royal Dutch has the interim ex-dividend date in September, whereas the final ex-
date is in Mav.
'~; These span the years 1981-1988 and include virtually all dividends paid by Dutch-based stocks listed at
the Amsterdam Stock Exchanee. The total 'supply' of dividends by publicly listed Dutch stocks is in the order of
NLG 13000 million in 1990 ( see CBS 1199?, p. 38)).
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Table 4.1 Dividend types relevant for Dutch stocks in 1981-1988 (final dividends)
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Yeur To~ul Cush Srnck Cnmbina~inn Srock
1981 106 86 0.811 2 0.019 18 O.170 0 0.000
1982 t02 81 0.794 2 0.020 19 O.186 0 Q000
1983 96 81 0.844 2 0.021 13 0.135 0 0.000
1984 I(11 83 0.798 3 0.029 18 0.173 0 0.000
1985 I10 83 0.755 8 0.073 18 0.164 1 0.009
1986 108 83 0.769 7 0.065 18 0.167 0 0.000
1987 122 87 0.713 11 0.090 21 0.172 3 0.03i
1988 129 91 0.705 13 0.101 22 O.171 3 0.023
Overall 877 675 0.770 48 0.055 147 0.168 7 0.008
Note: The figures in this table are adapted from Dorsman and Verboven ( 1990). For each year, the table
lists the [otal number of fínal dividends, which is split up over four divídend types, both in ab,olute
numben and :u a percentage of the total number of dividends in that year. The total number of
comhination ctividend, 1147) is the sum of 93 cashtchoice and 54 cashtstock combinations.
dividends, it is clear that especially combination dividends (17~Ic of all) play a significant
role in choosing the appropriate way of paying out dividend by Dutch companies. Third, the
final dividend table shows that the single-cash type of dividend has been constantly
decreasing in popularity, from more than 80cIo in 1981 to 70oIc in 1988. Finally, it can be
verified from the notes in the tables that among combination dividends the cash and choice
type is the dominant form.
The figures provided by the two tables strongly support the idea that the dividend
proposal reflects a careful consideration of the appropriate payout type by the company.
Although this does not follow from the two tables, it is interesting to note that almost all
stock dividends paid by Dutch companies will normally be received by stockholders without
incurring taxes, includinK the dividend withholding tax. This is because Dutch companies.
when deciding to distribute stock dividends, appear to go even further in designing the
payout as optimal as possible for stockholders ( from a tax perspective). To be more precise,
the vast majority of stock dividends are paid out of the share premium reserve so they have
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Table ~.2 Dividend types relevant for Dutch stocks in 1981-1988 (interim dividends)
Yrrtr 7nrct! Cnsh Chnice Conibinution Srrick
19R I ?2i 35 0.893 0 0.000 3 0.107 0 0.000
~ yR' 2R 24 O.R57 I 0.036 3 0.107 0 0.000
1983 33 30 0.909 0 0.000 3 0.091 0 O.IIUt)
19H4 31 29 0.935 0 0.000 2 0.065 0 0.0(N)
19tS5 35 32 0.914 2 0.057 l 0.029 0 0.000
19li6 31 27 0.871 ï 0.097 l 0.032 0 0.0(H)
I 9K7 3? 30 0.938 I Q03 ~ I 0.03 f 0 0.000
I~)tili 36 29 O.R06 3 O.OR3 4 0.111 0 0.0(xl
O~~erall ?i4 ?~6 11.890 10 0.039 18 0.071 0 0.0(H)
Nnte: The (igures in this table are adapted from Dorsman and Verboven (1990). For each year, the table
litits the total number of interim dividends, which is split up over four dividend type.. hoth in
absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total number of dividends in that year. Th~ tutal number
of combination dividends ( IA) is the swn of 16 cashfchoice and 2 cashtstock combin,uiun..
an untaxable status for all stockholders''`. Moreover, many companies allow stockholders
to make a further choice whether they want their stock dividend to be paid out of the share
premium reserve or out of other reserves. The reason for this may be that the stockholder
clientele includes a pension fund or some other untaxed investor"'. Since these investors are
not affected by receivino dividends which are normally taxable, they prevent the share
premium reserve from being impaired by a higher amount than necessary by choosing stock
dividends from taxable reserves.
Although the two tables reveal that the majority of the dividend distributions in the
Netherlands are made in cash, they also demonstrate that many Dutch companies appear to
be very careful in designing the dividend payout such that the tax consequences for
investors are reduced. The wide variety and complexity of dividend proposals strongly
~'- When shares are issued at a higher price than the nominal value, accounting standards in the Netherlands
urae the company to split the issue amount into ( i) the nominal amount of the issue, and (ii) the share premium
amount ( in Dutch: 'agio'). Consequenth, the company's halance sheet also includes two separate items, i.e.
nominal eyuity capital and share premium reserve. A nnne usfr distribution out of the share premium reserve can
be received untaxed by shareholders.
'~' Such as another corporation holding this company's stock and yuatifying for the panicipation exemption
mentioned before.
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supports the idea that companies take into account the tax status of important groups of
shareholders. All of this contrasts very much with the situation in other countries, especially
with the US.
4.4.2 Declaring the dividend
By declaring the dividend, the company officially discloses the dividend proposal. Final
dividend proposals in the Netherlands used to be a part of the first announcement of annual
company results. However, the precise details of the dividend proposed at this stage are not
always provided. Especially when the company engages in using the choice or combination
dividend form it is not unusual to issue a statement that part of the proposed dividend
amount may be paid out as stock. Later, when the company has more relevant information
available about stockholders" reaction to the initial proposal, it will make an official
proposal. The character of interim dividend proposals, on the other hand, is much more
predictable. To see this, it may be noted that Dutch companies are frequently authorized in
the General Meeting of Shareholders to pay an interim dividend in the next year. The study
of Dorsman (1988) points out that stockholders consider the dividend payout by Dutch
companies to reveal important information about the current earning power of the company.
In line with the Lintner results discussed in chapter 1, Dorsman concludes that Dutch
companies are generally reluctant to announce a decreased dividend payout level, unless
strongly decreased earnings urge to do so. On the other hand, dividend increases will only
be announced if the company is convinced that this new level is sustained by current and
future earnings. Dorsman's final conclusion is that the primary objective in setting the
dividend payout level among most Dutch companies is to stabilize the yearly payout.
Companies hesitate to either decrease or increase the payout level since stockholders will
infer information from these modifications. Thus, only when the company's eaming power
has substantially changed there may be reasons to modify the current dividend payout level.
Within this theory, interim dividends may be viewed as a first indication of what total
dividends in the next year will amount to. Therefore, companies would probably even be
more reluctant (i) to pay an interim dividend in the first place, and (ii) if they do, to deviate
from the last year leveL It was already argued that interim dividends generally take the forrn
of cash payments. It also appears from e.g. Dorsman and Verboven (1990) that the interim
ex-dividend date for a given stock is virtually the same from year to year. Consequently,
interim dividends are indeed very predictable: they are mostly cash payments, the amount
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of which is relatively constant over time, and the ex-date is almost identical from year to
year.
4.4.3 The General Meeting of Shareholders, the ex-dividend date and the payment
date
Legal aspects with respect to the dividend proposal include the following. Book 2,
section 103 of the Dutch Civil Code requires that an officially listed company publicly
discloses available semi-annually and quarterly results immediately after the point in time
when they can no longer be considered as private infotmation shared by management. The
second subsection of section 103 states that the last qualification does not hold for dividend
proposals, whether interim or final, which should be announced immediately after the
decision to distribute a dividend has been made''6. According to section 105, subsection 3
of Book 2, dividends can only be paid upon approval of the company's financial statements
by the shareholders'". Subsection 4 of the same section allows the company to distribute
interim dividends when authorized by the General Meeting to do so. The General Meeting
itself should be held within 6 months after the financial year has ended (Book 2, section
108, subsection 2). Finally, section I15 of the same Book requires that shareholders be
noticed of the total dividend proposal over the previous fiscal year at least two weeks before
the Meeting.
The day at which the General Meeting is held is also relevant for the ex-dividend date
of final dividends. It was already stated in chapter 1 that it is important to know, both for
investors and exchange members, when the owners of the stock will be registered as the
dividend claimholders. Therefore, it proved convenient to define an ex-dividend date, which
is the first trading day at which the stock is sold without the dividend coupon. The ex-
dividend day of final dividends in the Netherlands is, as a general rule, defined as the first
i26 This requirement prescribes disclosure of the lotal amount of dividend to be paid. The company can make
a reservation with respect to some part which may be paid out in the form of stock, and (only) the latter details
may be proposed later on.
~~~ Usually, the dividend proposal is a part of the company's annual report, which should be approved by the
shareholders in the General Meeting. Many (larger) Dutch companies are so-called 'structuurvennootschappen', in
which case the Board of Commissioners ('Raad van Commissazissen') decides on the annual report and submits
it for approval to the shazeholders (see sections 163 and 164 of Book 2). See e.g. Francken ( I976) for a detailed
discussion of the implications of these sections.
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trading day following the day the General Meeting is held. Such a meeting is, however,
usually absent in case of interim dividends, so the ex-dividend date for interim dividends
is defined to be the trading day following the public announcement of the dividend by the
company. The actual ex-dividend listing of a stock traded at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange
will be announced by the stock market authorities in their daily official publication
'Officiële Prijscourant', usually one trading day prior to the ex-dividend day itself''~. The
Amsterdam Stock Exchange will, in case stock dividends are paid, allow for trading with
respect to the stock dividend corresponding with each share of stock. This trading lasts for
a number of months and provides an opportunity for the stockholder to choose the right
moment to sell the stock dividend or to buy additional 'pieces' of stock dividend''v.
Although stockholders have the right to reject the dividend proposal by majority
voting"", it is rarely observed that stockholders actually disapprove. If the proposal is
adopted, the actual payment of a cash dividend is scheduled at the so-called 'payment date'
('datum van betaalbaarstelling'). It has long bcen standard practice in the Netherlands that,
from the payment date until a number of weeks later, stockholders collected the dividend
by tendering the dividend coupon with the specified number at their bank, which settled the
dividend payment at the bank arranging the dividend payments"'. Although it is sometimes
still possible for investors to hold original shares and collect the dividend in the way
described, a more convenient (and cheap) way to buy and sell stocks is to participate in the
security transfer system set up by Dutch banks, which means that actual shares of stock (or
certificates of shares) are kept centrally, and a clearing system registers the owners of the
~̀ The front page of this publication contains a section called ' Fondsen met een no[ering ex-dividend of ex-
andere uitkeringen, ingaande .. ....' which lists the stocks going ex-dividend or ex-claim at the given date ( usually
the next trading day) along with all details of the relevant distributions. In the next issue, price quotations of these
stocks will be marked with an 'X' to indicate that the stocks have been traded ex-dividend or ex-c(aim. Exhibit
4.3 in the next subsection repeats a fragment of such a section for the example of dividend distribution by
Hagemeyer.
,
~` Market price listings of stock dividends are included in the Offciële Prijscnurunt, and they will normally
be equal lexcept for a rounding term) to the stock fraction times the stock price at that moment. An example of
this will be given later on in this section.
~;o See Book 2, section 120 of the Dutch Civil Code.
"' Subsection 7 of section 105 of Book 2 gives the holder of original shares the right to collect the dividend
over a period of at least five years.
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stocks",. Dividends are collected by the participating banks and paid out to stockholders at
the payment date"'. A nation-wide transfer system like this does not exist in the US.
4.4.4 Examples
Exhibits 4.1 and 4.2 below contain large fragments taken from dividend-related
advertisements made by two Dutch companies in 1992 and published in the Dutch financial
newspaper Het Fir~ancieele Da~~blad. We will briefly review both texts.
The first exhibit gives an illustration of an official announcement of the final proposal
with respect to the precise dividend form. In its press report of March 19, the company
Gamma had already disclosed the total amount of dividend, which was proposed to be paid
out over the financial year 1991, but it made a reservation with respect to the part which
might be distributed in the form of stock. The announcement in the first exhibit states that
Gamma actually proposes a combination dividend giving the holder of each share of stock
the right to receive the combination of (i) a cash dividend of NLG 0.95, and (ii) a choice
dividend of either a further NLG 3.65 in cash or 1~25 new share of stock. The example also
reveals another choice element, i.e. that each stockholder should individually inform the
company whether they want the stock component, if chosen, to be charged to the share
premium reserve or to the other reserves. Stockholders will be asked to confirm this
proposal at the General Meeting.
~;~ This transfer system is managed by the company Necigef B.V., which is a Dutch abbreviation of
'Nederlands Centraal Instituut voor Giraal Effectenverkeer B.V.'.
"; Most Dutch investment funds, especially those ínitiated by banks, additionally have their own transfer
system enabling participants to buy and sell at even more favorable terms, with transaction costs around O.S~~c as
opposed to the normal costs which are usually twice as high or even more. They also offer stockholders
participating in their system the possibility to automatically reinvest the cash dividend in additional stock of the
fund. More precisely, if the stockholder has not informed the fund that before the payment date that cash should
be paid out, the dividend will automatically be reinvested.
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Exhibit 41 Official dividend proposal of Gamma Holding ( source: Het Fi~tancieele
Daghlad, April 28, 1992; English translation by the author).
(Dutch text)
In aansluiting op ons persbericht van 19 maart 1992 wordt bekend gemaakt dat aan de
Algemene Vergadering van Aandeelhouders, te houden op 6 mei 1992, zal worden voorgesteld
een keuzedividend over het boekjaar 1991 per gewoon aandeel van nominaal f 5,- vast te stellen
van:
f 4,60 geheel in contanten, dan wel
een bedrag van f 0,95 in contanten plus f 0,20 nominaal in gewone aandelen (1 nieuw
aandeel op 25 bestaande aandelen) ten laste van de agioreserve of, desgewenst, ten
laste van de overige reserves.
( ..... )
Raad van Bestuur,
Helmond, 24 april 1992
(English translation)
Referring to our press repori of March 19, 1992, it is announced that the General Meeting of
Shareholders, to be held at May 6, 1992, will be proposed to confirm the declaration of a choice
dividend over the financial year 1991, per share of common stock with a nominal value of NLG 5,
amounting to:
- NLG 4.60 entirely in cash, or
- a cash amount of NLG 0.95 plus nominal NLG 0.20 in shares of common stock (1 new
share in every 25 existing shares), charged to the share premium reserve or, if desired,
to the other reserves.
( ..... )
Board of Executive Directors,
Helmond, April 24, 1992
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Exhibit 4.2 Dividend confirmation by Hagemeyer (source: Het Financieele Dagblad,
May 6, 1992; English translation by the author).
(Dutch text)
Ingevolge het besluit van de Algemene Vergadering van Aandeelhouders, gehouden op dinsdag
5 mei 1992, is het dividend over het boekjaar 1991 vastgesteld op f 5,68 in contanten. Houders
van aandelen met fondscode 35541 zijn gerechtigd tot de helft van het dividend 1991. Het
dividend zal naar keuze van de aandeelhouders of wel geheel in contanten worden uitbetaald, of
wel voor f 1,76 in contanten in combinatie met een stockdividend van 1132 gewoon aandeel
Hagemeyer van f 20,00 nominaal (3 1~80~0). Het stockdividend wordt uitgekeerd ten laste van de
agioreserve, dan wel, ter keuze van iedere aandeelhouder, ten laste van de ingehouden winsten.
De uitkering in aandelen, voor zover deze ten laste van de agioreserve plaatsvindt, is niet
onderworpen aan Nederlandse dividend- of inkomstenbelasting.
Het dividend wordt met ingang van 19 mei 1992 betaalbaar gesteld bij de hoofdkantoren van de
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. en de Banque Paribas Nederland N.V. te Amsterdam.
Bij keuze voor een dividend in contanten wordt de aandeelhouders verzocht dat voor 17 juli 1992
aan bovenstaande banken rechtstreeks of via hun intermediair bekend te maken.
Op dividendbewijs nr. 28 zal in contanten worden uitgekeerd f 1,76 per gewoon aandeel van
nominaal f 20,00 (hetgeen onder aftrek van 250~o Nederlandse dividendbelasting netto resulteert
in f 1,32 per dividendbewijs van één gewoon aandeel).
Behoudens voor zover aandeelhouders opteren voor een uitkering in contanten zal tegen
inlevering van 32 dividendbewijzen nr. 29 één nieuw aandeelbewijs worden uitgereikt, ten volle
delende in de resultaten over het boekjaar 1992 en volgende jaren, voorzien van dividendbewijs
nr. 30 e.v. en talon.
( ..... )
Indien aandeelhouders opteren voor een uitkering geheel in contanten, zal worden uitgekeerd op
dividendbewijs nr. 29 f 3,92 in contanten per gewoon aandeel van f 20,00 (hetgeen onder aftrek
van 250~o Nederlandse dividendbelasting netto resulteert in f 2,94 per dividendbewijs van één
gewoon aandeel).
Aan de houders van CF-stukken zullen hun rechten op uitkering in aandelen en het dividend in
contanten, onder aftrek van 250~o Nederlandse dividendbelasting, ter beschikking worden gesteld
door tussenkomst van de instellingen alwaar de dividendbladen van hun stukken zich op 5 mei
1992 bij kantoorsluiting in bewaring bevonden.







In accordance wíth the decision of the General Meeting of Shareholders, held Tuesday, May 5,
1992, it is announced that the dividend over the financial year 1991 is laid down at NLG 5.68 in
cash. Holders of shares with stock code 35541 are entitled to half of the dividend 1991. At choice
of shareholders, the dividend will either be entirely paid out in cash, or as a combination of NLG
1.76 in cash and a stockdividend of 1132 nominal NLG 20 share of common stock Hagemeyer
(3 1ISo~o). Each shareholder may choose the stockdividend to be charged to the share premium
reserve or to retained earnings. To the extent that the stockdividend is charged to the share
premium reserve, it is not subject to Dutch dividend or income taxation.
The dividend will be made payable as from May 19, 1992, at the head offices of ABN AMRO
Bank N.V. and Banque Paribas Nederland N.V. in Amsterdam.
When a cash payment is chosen, shareholders are asked to communicate this either directly to
the banks mentioned above or through their intermediairy.
A cash amount of NLG 1.76 per nominal NLG 20 share of common stock will be paid upon
delivery of dividend coupon nr. 28 (after deduction of 25oIo Dutch dividend taxation, a net
payment of NLG 1.32 will be made per dividend coupon).
To the extent that shareholders do not opt for payment in cash, one new share of stock will be
distributed upon delivery of 32 dividend coupons nr. 29. Each new share of stock will fully share
in the earnings of 1992 and later years, and is provided with dividend coupons 30, etc. and talon.
( ..... )
If shareholders opt for payment entirely in cash, an amount of NLG 3.92 per nominal NLG 20
share of common stock will be paid upon delivery of dividend coupon nr. 29 (after deduction of
250~o Dutch dividend taxation, a net payment of NLG 2.94 will be made per dividend coupon).
Claims with respect to payments in cash and in stock, after deduction of 250~o Dutch dividend
taxation, for holders of CF-securities will be settled by the institutions where the dividend coupons
associated with these securities were kept in deposit at office closing on May 5, 1992.
Naarden, May 5, 1992
HAGEMEYER N.V.
Board of Executive Directors
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Exhibit 4.3 Ex-dividend announcement of Hagemeyer shares (source: Officiële
Pr-ijscourant, May 5, 1992; English translation by the author).
(Fragment from: section listing ex-dividend stocks)
STOCKS LISTED AS EX-DIVIDEND OR EX-OTHER DISTRIBUTIONS
As from May 6, 1992
Stock
code




35543 Hagemeyer Sh. NLG 1.76 p.Sh. of NLG 20 28 5119~92
NLG 3.92 p.Sh. of NLG 20 or 1~32 th sh. 29 5~19~92
out of sh.prem.reserve or ret.earnings
(listing p. 1~64 th sh., code 49010)
35541 Hagemeyer Sh. NLG 0.88 p.Sh. of NLG 20 28 5119~92
(1~2 div. 1991) NLG 1.96 p.Sh. of NLG 20 or 1~64 th sh. 29 5~19~92
out of sh.prem.reserve or ret.earnings
(listing p. 1~64 th sh., code 49010)
The second example given in exhibit 4.2 is an announcement by Hagemeyer that the
dividend proposal has been confirmed by the General Meeting. There are some aspects
worth to be detailed further. First of all, it may be noted that the dividend proposals made
by Hagemeyer belong to the most complex dividend forms applied in the Netherlands. The
total dividend over 1991 is set at NLG 5.68, and will be distributed as a combination
dividend, i.e. a combination of (i) NLG 1.76 in cash, and (ii) a choice between a second
amount of cash (NLG 3.92) and 1~32 new share of stock. This form resembles the Gamma
example in exhibit 4.1 very much. However, this combination dividend will only be received
by holders of 'regular' shares of stock Hagemeyer. More precisely, at the time of the
announcement, two distinct types of Haaemeyer shares are traded at the stock exchange, i.e.
those with stock code 35543 ( the regular shares) and with code 35541 "~. It can also be seen
~;`t The distinction is due to a stock issue completed by Hagemeyer in the second half of 1991, which were
issued under the condition that they would only share in half of the eamings of 1991 (but fully with respect to later
years' earnings).
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that, to the extent that stockholders choose to receive stock dividend, they are asked to
choose whether it should be charged to the share premium reserve or to retained earnings.
Two dividend coupons are involved in the distribution of the dividend. Coupon 28 is used
to receive the 'inevitable' cash part, whereas stockholders should use coupon 29 either to
receive extra cash or to obtain a new share of stock. Cash payments are made after
subtracting the dividend tax amounting to 25010, which means that 75~Ic of the declared cash
is actually paid out. Dividend taxation is not relevant for share premium reserve stock
dividends, but, when some stockholder chooses to receive the stock dividend out of retained
earnings, the company is forced to withhold 25~1o for tax purposes. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that all taxable stockholders will choose the share premium reserve to be charged
when they want to receive stock dividends. The last paragraph mentions the so-called 'CF-
securities', which refers to the shares that are traded in the transfer system. The holders of
these shares should inform their participating bank or intermediary of their choice(s), and
the bank will undertake the necessary actions ro collect the dividend. The date of May 5,
1992 is crucial in the sense that this enables the system administration to produce a list of
stockholders which are entitled to receive the dividend.
Since the General Meeting of Shareholders Hagemeyer was held at May 5, 1992, the
next trading day, May 6,1992, is the ex-dividend day. Exhibit 4.3 shows a fragment taken
from the Off~iciële Prijscoin-unt ex-dividend announcements section included in the issue of
May 5, 1992, by which stock market authorities officially inform investors that shares of
stock Hagemeyer will be traded ex-dividend as from May 6, 1992. It can readily be verified
that the dividend figures correspond with those stated in the official Hagemeyer
announcement given in exhibit 4.2. It also shows that the two kinds of stock, with stock
codes 35543 and 35541, are listed ex-dividend separately, and the latter stockholders are
indeed entitled to only half of the proposed dividend. The announcement further contains
information about the dividend coupons associated with each part of the distribution, and
the payment dates for each coupon. It has already been mentioned above that the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange provides for trading in stock dividends. The Hagemeyer stock
dividend is no exception to this, as can be checked from the fact that the stock code 49010
is associated with the stock part of the dividend. This means that a separate item for the
stock dividend will appear in the Officiële Prijscourant for a number of weeks following the
ex-dividend day, where actual market prices resulting from trading with respect to the stock
dividend are listed. There is, however, a small problem in listing the stock dividend, since
the holders of code 35541 shares may receive only 1~64'h new share on each currently held
share, whereas the regular shareholders are entitled to the double amount. To avoid
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problems of interpreting the market price of the stock dividend, the stock exchange
announces, as can be inspected from exhibits 4.2 and 4.3, that the stock dividend will be
listed in eyuivalents of 1~64'h share"'.
The procedure of including a stock dividend as part of a choice dividend was even
more complicated by the Dutch insurance company Aegon in 1993. This company publicly
announced in April'"' a policy shift with respect to the choice between cash and stock. The
normal procedure (which e.g. applies in the Hagemeyer case outlined above) is that the
choice can be made from the ex-dividend listing of the stock, i.e. from the first trading day
after the General Meeting. The relevant ex-dividend day for the Aegon dividend distribution
was May 13 (i.e. General Meeting on May 12). Aegon announced the following time
scheclule:
April 1: Announcement of the choice dividend and disclosure of
the cash part ofthe dividend proposal;
April 2: Start of the choice period;
May 1 1: End of the choice period;
May 1 1 after closing: Disclosure of the stnclt part of the choice dividend,
based on the closing price of that day;
May 12: General Meeting: approvement of the dividend proposal;
May 13: Ex-dividend listing;
May 13-19: Trading of the stock dividend;
May 26: Payment date.
~~5 Another technique, which has also been applied by Hagemeyer, is to assign a number of dividend coupons,
each corresponding to the smallest common multiple. The Hagemeyer 1990 dividend distribution was very similar
to the 1992 distribution confirmation illustrated in exhibit 4.2, but holders of regular shares should deliver rn~o
dividend coupons, numbers 23 and 25, for [he choice dividend part of the dividend distribution, while the other
shareholders did not possess coupon 23.
The 'split-listing' technique is also used in cases where one new share cannot be made equal to some number of
individual stock dividends. For example, the stock part of the Nedcon choice dividend, with ex-dividend date May
l, 1991, amounted to 3`'10. This would imply that 33 1~3 stock dividends correspond to one new share, it was
decided to list the stock dividend in equivalents of I ~k.
t;b See e.g. the official announcement in Her Financieele Dogblad of April 2, 1993. Two articles providing
backgrounds of this policy shift appeared in the same newspaper at April 7('Aegon zet stockdividend op flexibeler
manier in') and April 22 ('Nederlandse financiële concems experimenteren met dividendbeleid') of that year.
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It is directly clear from this schedule Ihat stockholders have to choose between either
the known cash amount or an unknown stock dividend. Aegon, on the other hand, knows
what number of shareholders chooses for the stock dividend before it discloses the precise
details of the stock part. Aegon claimed"' that by introducing this new policy it will suit
the interests of major (especially US) investors having a typical aversion against the
'automatic' share issuance which frequendy occurs when the stock part of the choice
dividend is set in such a way that many investors will almost surely opt for the stock.
Instead of skipping the stock part altogether, Aegon apparently found it more attractive to
'obscure' the stock dividend element by introducing uncertainty about the stock dividend
itself.
4.5 'Tax-induced dividend trading incentives in the Dutch capital market
The previous sections discussed a number of relevant aspects of the Dutch capital
market, such as typical investor types, tax considerations, and the diversity of dividend
forms used in distributing dividends. A picture emerges from this discussion that Dutch
income tax aspects may be very relevant for either the choice of specific dividend forms at
the company level, and for the trading activity of distinct classes of investors around the
cum-ex interval. In the present section, we will collect much of this information in order to
analyze the incentives among classes of investors to engage in tax-induced dividend-related
trading, and it may be convenient to investigate these incentives for each class successively.
However, precise information about actual dividend trading incentives among these investors
is very difficult to obtain and, if available, it is not always unambiguously interpretable. We
therefore arranged a number of private conversations with specialists18 and the information
obtained from them has helped us substantially to get a clear view of dividend capturing and
dividend avoidance incentives among investors in the Dutch stock market.
It has been pointed out before that one of the unique features of the Dutch income tax
system, compared with that of the US, is that capital gains realized by individual investors
~~1 See the article 'Aegon zet stockdividend op flexibeler manier in' in Het Frnanciee(e Da,Qhlad of April 7.
1993.
~;8 More precisely. meetings were arranged with executives of Progress (the pension fund of the Dutch
multinational Unilever) and ABN~AMRO (one of the largest Dutch banks), with a specialist in Dutch income tax
legíslation. and with the former Listing Commissioner of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, responsible for orderly
trading at the exchange floor.
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are normally untaxed. Cash dividends, on the other hand, are fully taxable above the
individual franchise, and they are even subject to an immediate withholding of 25~I~ upon
payment in the form of a withholding tax. Thus, it can readily be concluded that individual
Dutch investors have a clear tax-induced incentive to avoid the receipt of cash dividends or
other types of dividends which are treated as cash dividends for tax purposes. The
divergence between the effective tax rates on taxable dividends and untaxed capital gains
may be very large: under the reasonable assumption that, among all individuals, the
wealthier individuals hold relatively more stocks, the differential may go up to 72~10 (until
1990) or 60~I~ (from 1990). As a consequence, these individuals have a natural tax incentive
to avoid the receipt of cash dividends. This may lead to behavior such as (i) holding stocks
that pay modest dividends or no dividends at all, or to (ii) engaging in dividend avoiding
strategies. An example of the first is holding stock of an investment fund which explicitly
pursues a policy of not paying dividends to their shareholders, which are quite common in
the Netherlands. The income obtained by these 'growth' funds is subject to corporate
taxation, since these funds do not qualify for the favorable investment fund tax status.
However, it will typically be true that the corporate tax rate is substantially lower than the
top income tax rate. By holding stocks in a growth fund reinvesting profits net of corporate
tax, individuals in top personal income tax brackets are better off from a tax perspective.
The second type of behavior may be clear from a theoretícal point of view, but it may
be that tax authorities recognire these strategies as improper trading activity"`'. It has been
made clear to us that the Dutch fiscal legislation will invalidate dividend avoidance
strategies when the following two circumstances can reasonably be assumed present'~~:
(i) the cum- and ex-trades are arranged between the same two parties, and they are
organized as a package deal;
(ii) there is no meaningful price risk involved in the combined deal.
Thís legislation has been designed for cases in which parties arrange a forward contract
such that prices are set for both parts of the deal. It may, however, be argued that especially
~;y This has long been the case in the L'S, where capital gains realized within the minimum holding period
where recognized as 'short tenn capital gains' which were taxed at the ordinary rate. As was argued before, [he
Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated even the preferential treatment of long term capital gains.
~;~~ See Van der Loo (1993), who recalls that the Dutch Supreme Court decided, for the case of 'selling the
dividend', to consider the capital gain as ordinary income for tax purposes.
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the second circumstance fails to hold, since there is always some time between the two
mornents at which trading takes place, and also since the relative stock price decline at the
ex-dividend cannot, at least with the present knowledge, be predicted. The Dutch tax court
has nevertheless recognized"' some less clear special transactions (e.g. without a repurchase
deal) as improper from a tax perspective. It may therefore be concluded that individual
Dutch investors have a tax incentive to engage in dividend avoidance strategies, but they
should be aware of the fiscal barriers in exploiting them. On the other hand, investors will
also incur transaction costs when actually employing these strategies, which may be very
substantial: even for transactions of very wealthy individuals'~`', they appear to be in the
order of I ~~c to 1.5~~c for a rotmd trip'~". Obviously, this can make some dividend avoidance
strategies unattractive, but definitely not all of them given the large tax rate divergence
between cash dividends and capital gains.
Among the important class of institutional investors, pension funds have a legal
untaxed status, so they are indifferent between dividends and capital ~ains from a tax
perspective. Although they are not expected to play a dominant role as iiritiator.r of either
dividend capturing or dividend avoiding strategies, they may be tempted to engage in them
if desired. However, we have concluded from our conversations that the latter strategies will
likely be exceptional for the following reasons. First of all, many pension funds are typically
characterized by a long term investment policy by which stocks are selected on their long
tenn cash tlow projections. Therefore, short term dividend-related trading is unusual from
a policy perspective to begin with. Second, there seems to be some kind of divergence in
the way different types of income are viewed by pension funds (and maybe also by other
relatively risk-averse institutional investors). In this view, cash dividends from holding
stocks fits into the core strategy associated with investment (sometimes referred to as
'planned income'), whereas capital gains and losses occur infrequently'~. If this view is
indeed widespread, it even reinforces the idea that pension funds consider dividend-related
trading as very unusual, especiatly dividend avoidance trading. Third, it was made clear to
~~~ See Van der Loo I 19931.
~;~ This implies buy or sell orders in the magnitude of NLG 100 000 worth of stock.
14; A large volume of dividend avoidance trading involving stnrk oprin~rs has recently occured with respect
to shares Royal Dutch. We will provide a detailed analysis of this type of dividend avoidance strategies in chapter
6.
'~ Note that this behavior fits well into the theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984), which was briefly
discussed in chapter l.
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us that dividend capturing strategies have an unfavorable 'optical' side effect with respect
to the fund's policy: since dividends and capital gains or losses seem to be viewed as
separate sources of income, dividend capturing implies buying when stock prices are high
and selling when they are low. In sum, although some of the arguments provided may or
may not fit well into existing financial theory, we conclude from our conversations that
pension funds are not specifically active in initiating dividend-related trading around the ex-
dividend day.
Many of these arguments will also hold for large insurance companies, since it was
discussed before that their investment strategy does not substantially deviate from that of
pension funds. Nevertheless, their fiscal status is different, since insurance companies will,
as a starting point, face the situation that all income from holding stocks is subject to
corporate taxation. It was already argued that corporations holding at least S~o of the stock
of another corporation could apply for the participation exemption, which creates an
untaxable status for the dividends and capital gains obtained from that participationj5. Since
investment income is either untaxed or equally taxed for insurance companies, they are not
confronted with differential taxation of cash income or capital gains income obtained from
a given stock. Consequently, as in the case of pension funds, we foresee no specific reasons
why insurance companies would be active in initiating dividend-related trading.
Dividend and capital gains income of investment funds, whether they are fiscally
recognized as such or not, receive a non-discriminatory treatment, i.e. they are either both
untaxed or both fully taxed. Investment funds qualifying for the fiscal status ( the majority
of all investment funds), are obliged to meet restrictions with respect to payout of income
from holding securities. It has been explained to us that, in this context, dividend capturing
strategies are known for the adverse side effect that, while the dividend received should be
paid out as income of the current year, the concomitant capital loss decreases the
reinvestment reserve, which decreases future payouts from this reserve. This would be felt
as a disadvantage by the stockholders of the fund: they would rather have the fund investing
in securities paying cash income and (hopefully) increasing in value. Therefore, investment
funds also seem to be no specific candidates for the role of initiating dividend-related stock
trading in the Netherlands.
In the analysis thus far we have not been able to identify any class of investor having
a clear tax preference to receive dividends in the Dutch capital market. Although it appears
~l' This might be the reason why Dutch insurance companies typically hold relatively large positions in the
stock of selected companies.
TITe Dutch Setting gl
that we have addressed the major investor classes in the capital market, it may be useful to
investigate whether some other classes may be assumed to play an active role around the
ex-dividend date. First of all, it may be true that large foreign investors initiate dividend
capturing in the Dutch market. The reasons to do this include the situation that a tax treaty
exists between their home country and the Netherlands, indicating that Dutch dividends
could be received under a favorable tax treatment. It should, however, be reminded that the
Dutch tax authorities are not very willing, even in negotiating the establishment of a tax
treaty, to give up much of the dividend withholding tax. It may therefore be assumed that
even for non-domestic investors there is some tax to be paid on receiving Dutch dividends,
but it remains questionable whether capital gains under the same tax treaty would be taxed
higher in their home country, given the fact that they are not taxed in the Netherlands.
A second example of investors which can be assumed to be interested in receiving
dividends are corporations with tax losses, for which offsetting income is needed. Although
these actions cannot simply be ruled out altogether, it may generally be expected that such
companies would do better, i.e. in the interests of their own stockholders, to invest in assets
by which innovative products can be made and higher cash flows can be realized. These
cash flows would also, and even more so, guarantee the proper usage of tax losses. But,
admittedly, such companies might be tempted to exploit dividend capturing strategies as a
short term policy.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has dealt with relevant aspects of the Dutch setting related to stock trading
activity in the ex-dividend period. Among other things, it was pointed out that large groups
of institutional investors (i.e. pension funds, insurance companies, and investment funds) and
wealthy individual investors are likely to play a very significant role in security trading in
general in the Netherlands.
Since the existence of differential taxation was identified in chapter 2 as a possible
explanation of the ex-dividend effect, our analysis in this chapter also includes an
investigation of interesting aspects of the Dutch system of (income) taxation. In fact, the
Dutch tax system appears to be very relevant for the study of the ex-dividend period effect.
As one of the last countries in Europe, the Dutch income tax system is still based on the
classical double taxation system of corporate income, quite comparable with the tax system
currently in use in the US. Other important features of the tax system, however, distinguish
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the Dutch system from that of the US, such as the untaxable status of capital gains received
by individuals, and the existence of a withholding tax on cash dividends.
Another unique feature of the Dutch setting is the common practice to distribute
dividends in highly complex forms. It was argued that choice and combination dividends,
in which stockholders are allowed to choose between receiving cash or stock, are very
popular among Dutch companies (and Dutch stockholders). Furthermore, companies appear
to be very careful in designing the choice elements of their dividend proposals, i.e. they
frequently offer a large part of the dividend in the form of stock charged to the share
premium reserve, which can be received untaxed by investors. There might be two reasons
why Dutch companies are very willing to employ the stock dividend as a payout device.
First, it enables them to issue some new shares each year. The second reason would be that
the tax status of shareholders is very important when preparing the dividend proposal at the
company level. Moreover, the feature that stock dividends themselves can be traded on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange confirms that stock dividends play a major role in dividend
policy. Due to the existence of this market, Dutch investors can regard a stock dividend as
'near cash', which can simply be collected by selling the stock dividend.
The last section of this chapter investigated the presence of tax-induced dividend-
related trading incentives among investors in the Dutch capital market around the cum-ex
interval. The existence of the very preferential treatment of capital gains income among
individual investors, and the structure of the corporate tax regime itself allowed us to
conclude that no class of investors has a clear tax incentive to prefer dividends over capital
gains. While institutional investors are all neutrally treated from a tax perspective, individual
investors have a strong tax motive to avoid the receipt of taxable dividends. This may be
a reason for the existence of so many stock dividends chargeable to the untaxable share
premium reserve. It was also concluded that institutional investors, while being neutral, will
not be expected to initiate dividend-related strategies. Reasons for this were mostly found
in specific investment policies pursued by such investors, which generally disallow for short
term strategies aimed at realizing capital losses, even when the dividend income would
offset these losses. The only classes of investors which might be engaged in dividend
capturing activities would be foreign investors for which Dutch dividends after all taxes are
higher than capital gains after all taxes, as well as corporations seeking income for loss
compensation. However, we doubt whether the trading activities of these two classes will
generally dominate trading around the ex-dividend date.
Many of the issues discussed in this chapter will appear to be especially useful in the
next chapters. First of all. the Dutch tax setting and the risk attitudes of investors in the
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Dutch stock market will be implemented in the risk-tax model of the ex-dividend effect
detailed in the next chapter. Also, dividend avoidance strategies using call and~or put
options, which appear to be employed more than just once in the Netherlands, will be
discussed in chapter 6. Finally, chapters 8 and 9 take the Dutch setting as the starting point
of our empirical analysis of the Dutch ex-dividend effect.
5 THE RISK-TAX MODEL
5.1 Introduction
The tax model detailed in chapter 2 provides an analysis of how the existence of
differential taxation with respect to dividends and capital gains affects the equilibrium stock
rate of return in the cum-ex interval for the specitïc case that all investors in the capital
market are risk neutral. This setting was introduced since it was employed in an important
part of the theoretical and empirical literature, as was discussed in chapters 2 and 3. It was
shown for the Kalay-variant that in such a setting capital market equilibrium requires that
the expected rate of return on the stock in the cum-ex interval reflects the tax-induced cash
preference of the market as a whole, which is determined as the average of all investors'
cash preferences weighted by the fractions of individual wealth invested in the stock relative
to total market value of this stock. If investors such as security traders and investment
companies, who are usually characterized by identical tax rates on dividends and capital
gains, are very much prominent in terms of wealth to be invested, then it could be shown
that the expected cum-ex rate of return will be equal to zero or, stated differently, that the
expected relative ex-dividend day stock price decline will be equal to one'~fi.
Obviously, the risk neutrality framework is only an approximation which can be
justified using the assumption that each investor is solely interested in the level of the
expected rate of return, irrespective of the risk associated with this expectation. Rather, it
is more plausible that the existence of risk causes the expected rates of retum on risky assets
to be higher than the riskless interest rate. Moreover, optimal portfolio choice involves
optimal use of portfolio dii~ersificution or choosing efficient pnrtfolins"'. Only a few papers,
such as Heath and Jarrow ( 1988) and Michaely and Vila (1991), incorporate the risk aspect
in the ex-dividend day pricing problem. The Heath and Jarrow model shows that, when risk
does matter to investors, expected gains from employing dividend capturing or avoiding
strategies are typically characterized by a trade-off of tax incentives against risk bearing.
'~ In the Kalay-model with transactions costs, the equilibrium rate of return and relative decline will be in
a range around zero and one, respectively.
~y~ See e.g. Brealey and Myers (1991), chapters 7 and 8.
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Michaely and Vila reach a similar conclusion, but they also show that both the level of tax
rate heterogeneity among investors and the level of risk in the market detennine the
expected rate of return in the cum-ex interval. Although both models explicitly consider the
risk aspect associated with stock trading, they both fail to take the diversification aspect into
account since they focus on one single risky asset. An important question may, for example,
be whether portfolio rebalancing related to dividend capturing affects the holdings of all
risky assets or just a few.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we will derive the equilibrium
characteristics of the extended model. Among other things, it will be shown that risk and
tax features have an important influence on the equilibrium relationships. Subsequently, we
will recall some aspects of the Dutch setting from the previous chapter in order to generate
a specific version for the Dutch capital market, which can be used to derive testable
implications for our empirical analysis.
5.2 Market equilibrium with differential taxation and risk aversion
In this section we will extend the tax model framework employed in chapter 2 to
include risk aversion among investors. We will refer to the resulting model as the 'risk-tax'
model of the ex-dividend effect. Our model applies the differential taxation version of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with respect to the cum-ex interval14". This type of
equilibrium research of the ex-dividend effect has only recently be explored. We will first
detail the equilibrium analysis, after which an interpretation follows. Among other things,
it will be argued that existing risk-tax models of the ex-dividend effect such as Michaely
and Vila (1991) are special cases of our model.
~;x Models discussing the role of differential taxes in financial economics can hardly be called new. One of
the pioneering studies was done by Farrar and Selwyn (1967). Brennan (1970) extended the CAPM to include
differential income taxation, and a more generalized version was developed by Auerbach and King (1983). The
derivation of the Brennan model is summarized in the appendix to chapter 12 of Elton and Gruber (1991).
Furthermore, Moerland (1978) provides an equilibrium analysis of how various tax systems affect the value of
corporations.
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5.2.1 Assumptions and eyuilibrium derivation
In section 2.2, we have already stated a set of basic assumptions for the tax model
under risk neutrality. The risk-tax model uses the same set, with a few modifications. First,
it also uses the differential taxation assumption A3' given earlier in section 2.4. Second, it
includes the following modified assumptions AS and A6' with respect to investor
preferences and risky asset rate of return distributions:
AS': Investors are risk averse individuals who maximize the expected utility of their
end-of-period after-tax wealth;
A6': Investors have homoge~neous expectations about (before-tax) stock rutes of
return in the interval that have a jnint normul rtistribi~ti~~ir: stock rates of return
are uncorrelated between any two intervals~;`'.
Taxation is included in the model in exactly the same way as was done in the tax
model of chapter 2. The most important characteristics of the hypothesized income tax
system are that investors may receive a different tax treatment of cash income and capital
gains income, investor tax rates may differ across individuals, and all tax rates are flat at
the individual level.
We explicitly deal with risk by assuming that all investors are risk-averse and
maximize the expected utility of end-of-period wealth after taxes, given their investment
opportunities and the asset rate of return distributions. Let us again define W' as the
beginning wealth of investor i(i-1,2,...,I), and WT' as the after-tax wealth at the end of the
cum-ex interval, such that'~"
~;~~ The risk-tax model is a model of portfolio selection for mean-variance decision makers. It seems,
therefore, that we could avoid the usage of a normality assumption by reyuiring the utility functions of all
individuals to be redefined in terms of the mean and variance of the portfolio rate of retum, such that expected
utility increases for higher mean and decreases for higher variance. However, a recent study of Bra kett and
Kahane I 1992) shows that this procedure may inctude inconsistencies with respect to risk averse behavior as we
know it. The authors prove fand illustrate for some common utility functions indudina the negative exponential
function which we will employ) that it may lead to important biases in practical decision making, such as the
preference of assets having Ink~ir means and hi,qher variances. This may even be tme when the asset distributions
are considered appro.rimuteh. normaL Thus, mean-variance portfolio theory is only consistent with plausible risk
averse behavior when either (i) utility functions are quadratic, or (ii) asset rate of retum distributions are normal.
15f1 As was done in chapter 2, we will contine our analysis to the cum-ex interval.
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where RT' is the after-tax rate of return of investor i from investing wealth in the cum-ex
intervaL It will further be assumed that each investor's preferences can be ordered according
to a negative exponential utility function, U', defined over individual end-of-period after-tax
wealth' S1:
U' - U'(WT') - 1- exP(- ~ `W`~) ; tp' ~ 0 , t1 i. (35)
The parameter ~' can be described as the investor's measure of absolute risk aversion,
while the inverse (i.e. 1~~') denotes his degree of risk tolerance. The higher the value of ~',
15~ The negative exponential utility function is simply chosen as an illustration of the equilibrium derivation.
Identical equilibrium results can be obtained for all derived utility functions u(p,6`') over the mean p and the
variance 6' of the rate of retum distribution, such that the partial derivative conditions u,~0 and u,~0 hold and
u is a concave function. The negative exponential utility function, which is characterized by constant absolute risk
aversion, supports these conditions. See also Ingersoll (1987, p. 92). As was azgued in footnote 149, it is also
essential for mean-variance analysis that the rate of return distribution is norrnal.
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the more risk averse the investor is15'. Figure 5.1 illustrates the curvature of such utility
functions for specific risk tolerance levels. It can be seen that the functions are concave, so
they exhibit positive but decreasing marginal utility at every wealth level, and the degree
of concaveness increases for higher levels of ~'.
Assumption A6 states that the cum-ex rate of return distribution of risky assets is
jointly notmal, which is summarized by the following notation
R -- N(E(R),S) , (36)
where R denotes the random rate of return vector in the cum-ex interval, E(R) is the vector
of expected cum-ex interval rates of return (both vectors have J elements), and S is the (JxJ)
variance-covariance matrix of the cum-ex rates of return of the risky assets.
The equilibrium analysis involves deriving expected rate of return expressions similar
to (8) through (12) and a budget constraint such as (6). The objective of each investor is to
maximize the expected utility of end-of-period after-tax weaith by selecting an optimal
ponfolio of risky and~or riskless assets15;, characterized by the fractions w~ (j-1,2,...,J) and
w~ of initial wealth of investor i invested in risky asset j and in the riskless asset
respectively. Thus, each investor will select the optimal vector of fractional risky asset
holdings, w'`, given his budget constraint, such that
- argmaxw~ E~U'(W~~)~ (37)
It is shown in appendix A to this chapter that, after restating the objective in terms of
the individual portfolio rate of return, the optimal portfolio decision follows from
maximizing the derived function u', defined over the mean and the variance of the individual
portfolio rate of return, i.e.
u ; ~E~Rr~) ~~~R r~)~ - E~Rr;)
; ~'W `6'(Rr~) , (38)
where the expected after-tax portfolio rate of return is specified in (12j and the variance is
'S2 More precisely, constant absolute risk aversion means that each investor is endowed with some degree
of risk aversion, which does not vary with the level of end-of-period wealth after taxes.
's' We continue to assume that the riskless asset can be bought or sold in unlimited amounts at the given and
uniform riskless interest rate.
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given by
~~~Rt~~ - ~ 1 ''S wi . (39)
The equilibrium analysis with differential taxation is somewhat complicated by the fact
that we have not modelled the bond market itself"`'. Since the focus of the present study is
the ex-dividend effect, we will simplify our analysis by employing the slightly unrealistic
assumption that the return from the riskless asset is taxed at the individual capital gains
rate's~ so that there is no differential taxation for (cash) interest income and capital gains
income. Differentiating u' with respect to w', after making the appropriate substitutions for
the after-tax rate of return yields the following first order condition"`'
(1 - Z~JE(R~)- (l - 2;JRf1 - ( i~i- i~)d - ~'W i(1 - i~)'-S wi`- 0 (40)
where 0 is the (Jx]) null vector. Rewriting this result and introducing some new notation
produces the individual demand function in terms of the optimal individual fraction
vector"':
~s~ Among other things. the riskless rate of retum under differential taxation cannot simply be given
exogenously, as is assumed in CAPM-like models such as the present one. Since investors have tax-induced
incentives in the stock and bond markets, the equilibrium relationships should result from simultaneous eyuilibrium
in bo[h markets.
iss Usually, interest income is taxed at the individual tax rate for cash income.
isb It can yuickly be verified that the first order condition is sufficient for the constrained maximum problem.
The Hessian matrix can be obtained as
(~ wi)~
- - ~ W (1-i~)-S .
The Hessian should be negative definite for a global maximum. Given that tq' and W' are positive by definition.
this corresponds to reyuiring that the variance-covariance matrix S be positive definite. This, in tum, requires that
any portfolio of rísky assets has positive variance, which follows directly when no pair of (combinations of) risky
asset rates of retum exists being either perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated.
ts~
We use the '-1' superscript to denote the inverse ofa matrix. The i-superscript is induded in the expected
before-tax stock rate of return vector to indicate the equilibrium vector demanded by investor i. It is not guaranteed.
at least at this stage of the derivation, that individual demand is supported in the resulting equilibrium.
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where
-'~E(R~)- Rrl- (1-T')d ,
1 I - T ~~`}~' - , ~' -
~'( 1 - TtJ I - t~
(41)
(42)
The parameter `f" can be described as the individual's tax-adjusted risk tolerance. The
individual tax-induced relative preference for cash income T' was also employed in chapter
2. The derivation of the market equilibrium requires the market to be cleared. which can be
obtained after setting total monetary demand for each risky asset over all individuals equal
to the market value of the asset. This yields the following expression:
SV - `Y~E(R)- R~1- (1-i)d
where V denotes the vector of risky asset market values, and




j - ~-i (44)
The latter two parameters can be interpreted as the average tax-adjusted risk tolerance in the
market, and the average of investors' tax-induced relative cash preference, weighted by the
individual tax-adjusted risk tolerance. The latter is an extension of the corresponding
parameter in the tax model of chapter 2 to incorporate the risk attitudes of investors. The
equilibrium market value vector can be used to establish the equilibrium vector of expected
rates of return on risky assets as
E(R)- R~.lt (I-t)d} ~SV . (45)
The last term in this expression. the vector of risk premia of the risky assets, can be
rewritten using the familiar concept of the nwrket pni~tfnlio, i.e. the portfolio consisting of
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all risky assets15". The total market value of this portfolio is denoted as Vm, and it contains
each risky asset according to the fraction vector wm (the elements of which sum to one),
such that
V-
Vmwm , wn,~ 1- 1 , (4V)
and we can write the vector of risk premia as
1 SV- v"' Sw
U~ ~r~ m
(47 )
Furthermore, we define the beta-coefficient of a risky asset by the covariance of the
asset's rate of return and that of the market portfolio, relative to the variance of the market
portfolio rate of return (6,;,), such that the beta vector (3 is obtained as
R- Sw - Swm
w ~Sw ~m m am
(48)
The equilibrium expected rate of return on the market portfolio, E(Rm), can be deterrnined
as
V
E(Rm) - w,n~ E(R) - Rft (1-i)d,n t~' 6n~ , (49)
where dmw,,,'d defines the dividend yield on the market portfolio. Finally, the results above
can be used to obtain the following expression for the equilibrium vector of risky asset rates
of return
E(R)- R~~lt (I-ti)dt IE(Rn)- R1- (1-i)d,,,~R - Rfl} (l-T)d} nn,(3 .
(50)
A closer look at this equilibrium expression yields the insight that the premium over the
riskless rate of retum consists of two components: (i) a tax-induced premium (1-i)d, and
(ii) a risk premium nm(3. The tax-induced premium is the direct influence of the dividend
payment and the existence of differential taxation on the rate of retum, and it only arises
in the expression for the dividend paying stock (i.e. stock 1 in our terminology). Whether
158 See e.g. Copeland and Wesron (1988, p.181).
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it actually is a premium to begin with depends on the magnitude of the risk aversion
weighted tax-induced market cash preference parameter T. A premium results when the
value of T is less than one.
The risk premium in the rate of return expression is a straightforward extension of the
risk premium in a non-tax world to the current setting. The tax~dividend element embedded
in this premium is affected by (i) the magnitude of risk-tax factor T, and (ii) the dividend
yield on the market portfolio dm. Our model was set up in such a way that a dividend is
being paid only on stock L This was done because it is quite normal that only a few out
of the total number of traded stocks (or just one stock) go ex-dividend on the same trading
day. Consequently, the tax~dividend term will typically be small relative to the other
determinants of the risk premium, and we will neglect it in our further analysis's`'.
5.2.2 Interpretation of the risk-tax model equilibrium
Before discussing the implications of the risk-tax eyuilibrium, it is useful to derive two
other relationships. First, we can convert the eyuilibrium expression (50) into an expression
for the equilibrium expected relative price decline of the dividend paying stock 1, i.e. E(ce),
using the relationship given in (20). This yields
R~ } ~,~~ R ~E(á) - ti -
d~
(51)
Second, it is possible to obtain the following expression for individual fractional
holdings in equilibrium by combining equations (41) and (50) to
159 Note that the taxldividend element in the risk premium is calculated as the produrt of the risk-tax term,
the market portfolio weight and the dividend yield. Suppose some stock with a beta coefficient of one determines
S~h of total market value, pays a relatively large dividend yield of S~~r, and the risk-tax factor t is 0.85 (a value
typically found in our empirical study of chapter 8). Even under this conditions, the addition to the tax~dividend
term in the risk premium would not be higher than 0.0375~1r. In order to relate this to the market rate of retum
E(Rm), suppose it is estimated as the change in the value of some market index over the cum-ex interval of, say.
2 points at a reference level of 400 points. The market rate of return would then be 0.50`70. Note also that. although
we have restricted risky assets to be only stocks, total market value should include all risky assets.
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; ~~nw''- `f' S-'(,r'-T)d} "' w
W ; ~ „~;W 6n~
(52)
Let us start the discussion of the equilibrium by proving consistency with results
obtained earlier. First, when there is no income taxation in the economy, all individual risk-
tax factors t' are equal to one by definition and the value of the aggregate factor i is also
equal to one. The equilibrium rate of return equation (50) then reduces to the standard
CAPM-expression'~'. A similar conclusion follows for individual holdings of the risky asset.
It can quickly be verified from (52) that the first term in the right hand side disappears, such
that every individual holds risky assets proportional to the market portfolio weight vector
w~,, and the remainder of personal wealth is invested in the riskless asset. This feature is
known as ttrofurrd separatin~t"'', referring to the situation that investors choose optimal
portfolios by selecting combinations of only two basic portfolios. Second, when risk is
assumed away and the riskless interest rate is set to zero, the existence of differential
taxation makes equation (51) consistent with the Kalay equilibrium result given in (21).
We will now turn to the implications of the risk-tax model itself by first supposing that
tax rates would be equal across investors. There may at least be two ways in which 'equal
taxation' can be interpreted, i.e. (i) when there is one single tax rate for all individuals and
all sources of income, and (ii) when there is no discrimination of income on the individual
investor level. In both variants, however, we have i'-1 for all individuals, so t-1 and the
tax effects virtually disappear. The only remaining influence is via the market risk parameter
~I', which contains (individual) tax rates. Since before- and after-Cax rates of return for each
investor in these equal-taxation situations are only different up to a taxation factor, there will
be the effect of increasing the market values of all assets1ó'. Investors continue to choose
risky asset portfolios by holding fractions of the market value vector. Thus, we can state the
conclusion that the feature of two-fund separation remains existing under a
'~ See e.g. Copeland and Weston (1988, p. 197).
'~' See e.g. Copefand and Weston (1988, p. 181).
16~ This can be verified from equation (43), from which the market value vector V can be obtained after pre-
multiplying by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix. In the equal-taxation situation, the value of the
aggregate tax-induced cash preference parameter 2 is equal to one and, consequently, the dividend yield term drops
out. However, each individual risk parameter `i" contains the terrn (1-to) in the denominator, which is between
zero and one. This implies that ihe value of the aggregate parameter `Y is higher than the corresponding value in
the no-tax setting- so that the market value of each risky asset is also higher.
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nondiscriminatory system of income taxation.
Matters become different when tax rates may be unequal for dividends and capital
gains. The existence of a tax-induced premium (or discount) in the equilibrium rate of return
was already uncovered in the preceding sub-section"''. Another effect is that it appears from
the individual holding expression (52) that investors make portfolio decisions which involve
tax-induced elements, which is given by the first term of the right hand side. These holdings
will be referred to as tu.~-induced hnldings, although they are determined by tax and risk
factors. It can be seen that three elements play a role in the extent to which tax-induced
holdings are maintained in the cum-ex interval, i.e. (i) the difference (T'-ti), (ii) the
dividend yield vector, and (iii) the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix. We discuss
these elements right now.
The first element is the difference between the individual's tax-induced cash preference
parameter T' and that of the market as a whole. When this is positive, the investor likes to
receive cash more than the market does. In the situation of equal taxation, the market
preference for cash was neutral (i.e. T-1). With groups of investors who are more and less
wealthy, more or less risk averse, and more or less differentially taxed, there is an aggregate
market preference which may be less than, equal to, or higher than one, depending on the
distribution of these characteristics over investors.
The second element is the dividend yield. If an investor has a higher tax-induced cash
preference than the market, he is willing to hold securities that pay cash. In doing so he has
a choice between the riskless asset and, in the catm-e.~ interral onlv, the dividend stock.
Since we have assumed that interest income is taxed at the individual capital gains rate, it
follows that, the higher the dividend yield, the more the cash preferring investor will hold
1e' Note that the analysis of Michaely and Vila (1991) is a special case of our model. This can be verified
by setting J-1 (there is only one risky asset in their model) and R,-O. Furthennore, they model uncertainty with
respect to stock prices, which is related to the variance of the rate of retum by multiplying through by the syuared
stock price. Implementing this for the expected relative stock price decline, we obtain the following equation:
N, (P, )'a~(R, )
E(á) - t - ,
`I'D~
where `; is the total number of shares and NiP, is the market value of the (single) risky asset. The above
expression is eyuivalent with their equation (30).
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the dividend paying stock"'. Since investor wealth is given at the start of the interval, these
increased holding should be associated with revised holdings of other risky assets and~or the
riskless asset. We will return to this within a moment.
The third element of the tax-induced holdings is the inverse of the variance-covariance
matrix. Loosely speaking, the matrix S is a summary measure of the level of risk in the
economy. It is intuitive that the higher the collective risk level in the market, other things
equal, the more reluctant risk averse investors will be to increase their holdings of risky
assets in general, and this effect follows from the inverse matrix.
The existence of tax-induced holdings raises the related question whether investors,
although they might deviate from holding a fraction of the market portfolio, would also
choose less than fully diversified portfolios after rebalancing. This means that we have to
investigate whether the tax-induced holdings are proportional to the market portfolio
holdings expressed by the second term in equation (52). The central question is then whether
the matrix product S-'d is a multiple of the market portfolio weight vector w,,,. In order to
examine the latter, it is useful to note that the market value weight vector is identical in the
cases of equal taxation or no taxation. Therefore, we can evaluate the properties of the
market value weight vector under the assumption that taxation is absent. The market
portfolio is a member of the set of fully diversified risky asset portfolios, usually called the
efficient set or efficient frontier'~~. It is outlined in appendix B to this chapter that the
weight vectors of efficient portfolios, denoted by w~, , can generally be written in the form
w , - xS-'E(R) t ~,S-' 1 , (53)
where x and ~, are parameters. Since the dividend yield vector by assumption contains non-
zero elements only for j-1, it will be clear that S'd will generally not be proportional to wm.
The dividend therefore has a'distorting' effect on investor portfolios in the sense that they
will deviate from the policy of only choosing fully diversified portfolios. Whether investors
will actually engage in positive tax-induced holdings for some asset, depends, again, on
(i) their specific level of tax-induced cash preference relative to the market, and (ii) the
'~ In case interest income is taxed as cash income, cash-preferring investors choose to hold the riskless asset
(instead of the dividend paying stock) only when the interest rate over the cum-ex interval is higher than the
dividend yield.
i65
See e.g. Brealey and Myers (1991, Ch. 8). Recall that the market portfolio is a portfolio of risky assets
only, i.e. the elements in the weight vector w,,, sum to one.
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correlations between rates of return of risky assets'"`'. What can be said is that the dividend
payment not only influences the holding of the dividend paying stock, but has consequences
for the holdings of other stocks and~or the riskless asset as well.
It follows from the risk-tax model that two-fund separation will generally fail to hold.
Investors make portfolio choices involving tax-induced holdings, either positive or negative,
in many or all risky assets. In doing so, they trade off tax-induced incentives against bearing
nondiversifiable risk. In contrast, when there is no dividend, investors do choose tYSky asset
portfolios which are members of the efficient set. This conclusion is very relevant for the
investigation of the ex-dividend effect. It predicts that, given the tax rate structure in the
economy, risky asset portfolios chosen in the before-interval are efficient and are primarily
based upon the rate of return distribution and the personal tax situation relative to the
market. [n the subsequent cum-ex interval, even when the rate of return distribution would
be unaltered, many investors would revise their portfolios, simply because stock 1 goes ex-
dividend. When doing so, they deviate from being well-diversified. These positions will be
rebalanced when the after-interval is entered'~'. This latter finding is also supported by
Michaely and Vila (1991) for their case of one risky asset ( the dividend stock). However,
besides assuming away the effects of a positive interest rate, they fail to uncover the
~,,hdiversification cffect .
5.3 Implications of the risk-tax model for the Dutch setting
5.3.1 General implications
Chapter 4 has provided some details about the institutional setting of the Dutch capital
market. A number of aspects appeared especially uniyue for the ex-dividend effect in the
'~ Note that the matrix S includes the covariances of assets rates of return, and the correlation between
specific pairs of assets may be more or less strong. The inverse matrix may therefore contain negative elements
possibly affecting the matrix product 5'd in such a way that negative values appear in the resulting vector. This
can be true even when the variance-covariance matrix is positive definite.
167 It can be argued that all portfolio rebalancing actions in the cum-ex interval and in the after-interval aze
likely to involve substantial transactions costs. lf so, the relevant trade-off becomes tax incentives against loss of
diversification and~or transactions costs.
~fih Moreover, since their model only investigates two assets, two-fund sepazation must hold by definition in
their model.
98 c~~unre,. s
Netherlands. These key aspects will briefly be summarized below.
We have argued that a few investor groups seem to play a major role in the Dutch
capital market-. (wealthy) individuals, taxable institutions, and untaxed institutional investors.
Individuals in the Netherlands have a capital gains tax rate equal to zero under normal
conditions. Their dividend tax rate, however, may be quite high, i.e up to 72~10 (until 1990)
or 60cIc (from 1990)'~y. Therefore, individual investors in the Netherlands can be
characterized by a quite low degree of tax-induced cash preference, i.e. their T'-values are
less than one or even much less than one. In fact, these individuals have a clear tax
incentive to ai~oi~l the receipt of the dividend. Institutional investors in the Netherlands are
either untaxed, in which case t'-1 by definition, or equally taxed on both sources of
income. so that the value of T' is also equal to one for them. Consequently, all Dutch
institutional investors can be characterized as having a neutral tax-induced cash preference
in the sense that their t'-values equal one. It was also argued that, due to the income tax
system, the Dutch capital market does not seem to include an investor group with a clear
tax-induced incentive to pr~fer the receipt of dividends and interest"". This implies that
there is no recognizable investor group for which the value of i' is higher than one. A first
implication in applying our model to the Dutch settina would be that the overall value ~
should not exceed one.
The value of the market tax-induced tax preference parameter T is, however, also
determined by the risk attitudes of investor groups. It is very difficult to make generally
valid statements about the dearees of risk aversion among market participants, and we will
not claim to provide definitive answers. However, the private communications hinted at in
chapter 4 suggest that pension funds and insurance companies are usually characterized by
portfolio investment policies which are based on long tetm rate of retum and risk trade-offs.
Moreover, their policies are typically called 'conservative', which means that (government)
bond investment is very prominent in their policies. Furthermore, there appear to be
informal internal 'hurdles' when actually engaging in short-term strategies like dividend-
induced trading in the cum-ex intervaL Investment companies basically seem to pursue
similar investment policies founded on long term perspectives, although they may be less
'~y Interest payments are deductible under the Dutch income tax code. Our model assumes that interest is
taxed at the individual capital gains rate, which implies that investors with negative holdings in the riskless asset
effectively pay the riskless interest rate net of capital gains taxes on their borrowing.
'~t' As a matter of fact, individual investors havine unused dividend and interest exclusions are candidates for
such groups. However, since these exclusions are not very large. they are not assumed to play a substantial role.
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risk averse than pensíon funds and insurance companies. It was, however, also
communicated to us that investment companies are extremely reluctant to initiate typically
short-term strategies such as dividend trading if this would lead to substantial open positions
in even the smallest time interval.
The preceding can be interpreted in the terminology of our model as follows. The risk-
tax model suggests that optimal portfolio selection when a dividend is present includes
deviating from a policy of being fully diversified, given the investor's risk tolerance.
Assuming that institutional investors normally hold well-diversified portfolios, it may be the
additional undiversifiable risk what seems to worry them so much. Although this is all very
difficult to express in a yuantitative way, it can be used as an argument to state that
institutional investors may be rather unwilling to bear the additional undiversifiable risk by
exhibiting a degree of risk tolerance `h' which is even lower than the low value relevant
'outside' the cum-ex interval (where it is already low). Next, it can be recalled that the
market cash preference parameter t includes the individual risk tolerance measures `I'' as
weights. If risk tolerance is very low for institutional investors in the cum-ex interval, it can
be suggested that individual investors would have much weight in the determination of the
aggregate risk-tax parameter Z. If this is true, than it can be predicted for the Dutch setting
that the weighted average i is typically less than one, since individuals generally have Z'-
values les, than one.
5.3.2 The dividend withholding tax and dividend concealing behavior
Our model assumes that all taxes have to be paid at the end of the period. The usual
procedure in the Netherlands is that taxable income has to be declared after the fiscal year's
end. Actual payment of taxes follows later, and sometimes much later due to disputes and
subsequent negotiations with tax authorities. Since our model ignores this kind of payment
delay, there is no straightforward way to incorporate a withholding tax feature like the
Dutch dividend withholding tax. On the other hand, the withholding tax rate may be relevant
for the analysis of the Dutch ex-dividend effect via a totally different route, which will be
outlined below.
It is Qenerally in the interest of tax authorities to receive tax amounts as soon as
possible. Consequently, the Dutch tax system maintains the general principle that income
taxes should be paid when income is earned. This is, however, not very easy to carry out
in practice since tax-payers may have deductible amounts which are recognized at a later
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time. [n order to resolve the timing difficulties arising from this the Dutch income
legislation includes, among other things, a number of provisions to collect taxes when
income is earned. The most important one is the wage withholding tax which taxes the
periodical (monthly) wages of Dutch employees at the moment they are paid out. The
structure of this withholding taxation system resembles the income tax system as much as
possible, so that tax-payers with no substantial deductible items or additional income can
safely assume that all taxes will have been paid at the end of the fiscal year. A similar
system of 'paying-as-you-earn' applies to income earned by entrepreneurs and corporations,
although the withdrawal is less periodical than the employee withholding tax.
Another form of withholding taxation, detailed in chapter 4, applies to dividends paid
by Dutch companies. Among a number of possible reasons for installing this type of
taxation in the Netherlands, we will pick out two. The first is, again, the 'pay-as-you-earn'
principle outlined above. A second reason may be that the flow of dividends from Dutch
companies to shareholders is found to be highly uncontrollable by Dutch tax authorities.
This may provide a rationale to impose tax at the very first stage of the income source, i.e.
when dividends are paid out. It is important to recall that the total dividend paid out by
corporations is subject to public disclosure, but the actual recipients are usually noC publicl~~
known. Whether or not due to this, it has been frequently suggested to us"' that many
wealthy Dutch individuals actually pursue a policy of not declaring received dividends for
fiscal purposes at the end of the year. The incentive for this policy of dividend concealing
is straightforward, since these individuals would save the~ difference between their (top)
income tax rate and the 25~Ic withholding tax rate, a difference which can amount savings
up to 35oIo or more of the dividend payment. On the other hand, it remains true that
receiving untaxed capital gains is still even more attractive.
~~~ This picture not only arises from informal conversations, but also from newspaper articles and actions of
the Dutch Ministry of Finance. For example, in an article in Het Finuncieele Daghlod of March 20~22, 1993 about
the 1992 results of the Dutch real estate investment fund Breevast, its director states that no cash dividend will be
paid since investors pay 25`~o taxes on it. But more important is a policy measure, recently suggested (see Her
FirtanrieeleDaghlad, September 17, 1992 and De Volkskranr, January I5, 1993) by the Dutch Minister of Finance.
according to which banks would be obliged to give full disclosure to the tax authorities about the recipients of cash
dividends. This so-called system of 'renseignering' was formerly introduced for interest payments, and proved to
be very successful. Dutch capital market investors also appear to be extremely sensitive to rumors and suggestions
made by tax authorities. The dividend disclosure suggestions indeed astonished the market. More recently, the
announcement of the idea to introduce taxation of the (capital gain) returns of growth funds in order to abolish the
property taxation also resulted in panic behavior with respect to the shares of these funds (see Het Finor~cieele
DuKhlad. April 6, 1993). Later in 1993, this idea was withdrawn.
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Now suppose that dividend concealing policy is indeed common practice among
individual investors. The implication for our model would be that dividends are effectively
taxed at the withholding tax rate of 25~Io, and for these individuals the value of T' would
be equal to 0.75, since capital gains are not taxed. Recalling from the discussion above that
individual investors in the Netherlands have large weight in setting the value of the
aggregate market parameter t in the cum-ex interval, the 'concealing' variant of the risk-tax
model would predict that the value of i is also expected to be close to 0.75 in equilibrium,
i.e. equal to one minus the 'opportunity cost' of the concealing strategy. The prediction of
the concealing variant for the tax-induced premium in the expected rate of return of the
dividend paying stock in the cum-ex interval, i.e. (1-i)d, is therefore that it will be equal
to 25~I~ of the dividend yield, or somewhat lower when foreign investors, who can reclaim
part of the withholding tax, are also heavily involved in the cum-ex interval trading with
respect to the stock. This illustrates that the dividend withholding tax rate may play an
important role in explaining the ex-dividend day behavior of Dutch stock prices. This will
be empirically investigated in chapters 8 and 9.
5.3.3 Stock dividends
It was revealed in chapter 4 that stock dividends are important payout devices for
Dutch corporations. Most of the times, they appear in association with a cash dividend. The
result is either a choice dividend or a combination dividend. It was also argued that stock
dividends in the Netherlands will virtually always receive an untaxed status. It is therefore
interesting to investigate the implications of introducing stock dividends into the model
discussed in the current chapter.
It must, however, immediately be noted that distributing a stock dividend solely
increases the number of shares outstanding. It is important to realize that the total market
value of the company's equity capital is not altered, since the stock dividend is essentially
equal to the payment of a cash dividend under the simultaneous condition that the dividend
be reinvested in the company as equity capital"~. However, the market value per- shcrre is
,~" This characteristic appears to be very well-known among Dutch companies. They even encourage investors
to choose for the stock by setting the stock part of the choice dividend high enough that the cash part is virtually
always less worth. For a discussion of this, see e.g. the article 'Aegon zet stockdividend op flexibeler manier in'
in Het Financieele Dagblad, April 7, 1993.
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decreased by the market value of the stock dividend. Thus, apart from the taxation aspect,
the effect of distributing a stock dividend on the market price of the stock should be the
same as when a cash dividend was chosen"'. Consequently, it is allowed to treat cash and
stock dividend payments in an equivalent way in our model. The only difference in the
analysis is that the relevant tax rate for stock dividends, since individuals can receive it as
a capital gain, should be set to zero. It is straightforward from our model that the tax-
induced premium in the equilibrium expected stock rate of return expression will be equal
to zero for stock dividends"~`. In reality, however, this may not be encountered for the
following reason. It has been pointed out in chapter 4 that stock dividends can be officially
traded in the Dutch capital market immediately when the stock goes ex-dividend, so that the
stock dividend can be 'cashed in' by the investor immediately if he wishes to do so.
Unfortunately, there appear to be substantial costs involved in such transactions, especially
for lower 'volumes' of stock dividends"'. Although the stock dividend can be received
untaxed, its realization can be quite rostly. Thís invalidates the theoretical prediction of no
ex-dividend effect in the case of stock dividend, to a considerable extent.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an equilibrium model of the expected rate of return
in the cum-ex interval when investors are risk averse and when differential taxatíon exists
for dividends and capital gains. Our model is an application of the extended CAPM to the
case of the cum-ex interval. The equilibrium expected rate of retum for the dividend paying
stock includes a tax-induced dividend-related premium and a risk premium. Another feature
of our model is that investors having different tax rates on dividends and capital gains may
choose portfolios from several risky assets, one of which is the dividend paying stock, and
a riskless asset. In contrast to existing models such as Michaely and Vila (1991) which
prove to be a special case of our model, we are able to show that dividend payments not
only influence optimal investor holdings of the dividend paying stock, but also the holdings
'" For the Dutch setting, this is even more so since stock dividends can immediately be 'cashed in' by selling
them atthe Stock Exchange.
'~~ [.e. under the restriction discussed before that individual investors determine the aggregate parameter t.
'~s These costs can amount to half of the value of the stock dividend, and are typically higher than the
corresponding cost for collecting a cash dividend.
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of other stocks. The reason for the latter effect is that the dividend payment causes investors
to deviate from mean-variance efficient risky asset portfolios. Thus, they will trade off tax-
incentives against bearing undiversifiable risk. A related consequence is that two fund
separation will no longer hold. Also, the model reveals the portfolio rebalancing is only
temporary, i.e. portfolio holdings are reverted to the 'old' efficient holdings directly after
the cum-ex interval, and two-fund separation will be restored.
The eyuilibrium analysis was subsequently directed towards the Dutch setting. Some
arguments were advanced to defend the assumption that especially individual investors' risk
a~ui tax rate characteristics will be dominant in determining the market tax-induced cash
preference parameter. We pointed out that the dividend concealing variant of the risk-tax
model may be very important in explaining the ex-dividend effect in the Dutch setting. This
assumes that wealthy individuals are the dominant investor group (in terms of risk tolerance)
for the determination of the aggregate risk-tax factor T, and that they exploit all means to
conceal the receipt of the dividend when declaring taxable income, thereby accepting the
dividend withholding tax charge of 25~~0, rather than being taxed at a higher rate.
Consequently, the tax-induced premium in the rate of return of the dividend paying stock
is expected to be around 25~Io of the dividend yield. We have also addressed the impact of
the generally untaxed stock dividends, which appear to be so popular among Dutch
companies. We concluded that, although our model suggests that the tax-induced premium
will be zero for these dividends, substantial transactions costs upon realization of the
dividend are a clear disadvantage.
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Appendix 5A: Restatement of the objective function in terms of the mean and
variance of the portfolio rate of return
It will be shown in this appendix how maximizing the expected utility of end-of-period
after-tax wealth, given a negative exponential utílity function, corresponds to maximizing
a derived function in terms of the mean and variance of the after-tax rate of return of the
investor portfolio. It must be shown that
E~U(W)~ o u(N,6') , (54)
where the symbol o must be read as 'yields the same maximum as', and N and 6' denote
the mean and the variance of the after-tax portfolio rate of return.
Dropping the i superscript, we first rewrite the utility function in terms of R using
the definition of end-of-period wealth
W - W(1 t R) , (55)
and substitute this into the negative exponential function U(W)-1-exp(-~W), ~~0, so that
utility is a function of R:
U(R)- 1- exp(-~ W).exp(-~ WR) .
Expected utility can now be expressed as
rE~U(R)~ - 1- exp(-~ l~-E~exp(-~ WR)~ .
(56)
(57)
The expected value term in the right hand side is related to the characteristic function of the
normal distribution. This can be seen by recalling that the characteristic function, C(6), for
an arbitrary density f(z) defined over the random variable z, is given by"`'
176 See e.g. Hastings and Peacock (1975, p.12).
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C(A) - E.exP(t6.i)~ - ~exp(t6.ï-)f(-C.)d.r . (5g)
where t is the imaginary quantity defined by t'-1. If we compare the expected value term
of (56) with the expression in (58), it appears that they are related to each other using the
substitution 6 - t~W, i.e.
E~exp(- ~WR)~- C(t~W) . (59)
Since R is a linear combination of normal variables, it rnust itself also be normal.
Consequently, the characteristic function in the latter equation must be that of a normal
distribution with mean }t and variance 6' equal to that of the portfolio, so that, using the
same substitution for 6, the maximand can be restated as"'
C(t~W)- exp[- ~WNt '~'-W'-6' (60)
After substituting this last result into the expected utility expression, we obtain
E~U(R)~- 1- exp~-~ W(1 t N- '~ W6')', , (61)
which is indeed a function of the portfolio mean and variance. The term Ir-'~~W6' in the
squared brackets is the certainty equivalent rate of return. It follows directly that expected
utility is higher, given the individual risk aversion parameter tp and initial wealth W, when
the certainty equivalent rate of return is higher. Therefore, choosing the optimal portfolio
by maximizing expected utility yields the same solution as that obtained from maximizing
the derived function u(ft,ó'), i.e.
u(p,a')- p- '~Wa' . (62)
QED
~~~ See Hastings and Peacock (1975, p.96).
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Appendix SB: The mean-variance efficient opportunity set
Suppose we have a number of J risky assets which are assumed jointly normally
distributed, with parameters R, the vector of expected rates of retum, and S, the variance-
covariance matrix of these rates of return. By selecting portfolios of these assets, an investor
is able to create many new opportunities which are all characterized by their portfolio means
and variances. Especially interesting are those portfolios which have the lowest variance,
given a particular rate of return level. These portfolios are called meun-t~uriunce efficieret
portfolios, and they are members of the efficient ,ret. In this appendix, we will derive a
mathematical expression for this efficient set""
The mean and variance of the rate of return of portfolio P, NP and 6P , of a portfolio
of risky assets can be defined as
~tp - w'E(R) ; 6p - w'Sw . (63)
The portfolio with minimum variance, given the rate of retum pp , can be found by solving
for the optimal vector of portfolio weights, w(pp), which is the solution to the following
problem
min - w S w
subject to
w` 1 - 1 ,
w E(R) - ltP .
(64)
(65)
The individual weights may be less than zero, in which case the asset will be sold short.
The Lagrangian of this problem is
'~R The derivation is based on [ngersoll (1987, p. 82 ff.). Note that the result describes the opportunity set
in terms of the equilibrium hefore-rat rate of retum, which is needed as a benchmark result in the main text of this
chapter.
Tfie Risk-Ta.r Mndel ~ tt ~
~-' w S w t x(N - w~ E(R)) t~,(1 - w 1) . (66)
Differentiating this function with respect to w gives the first-order condition
0- Sw'- xE(R)- í~l ,




This characterizes the weight vector of efficient portfolios.
6 STOCK OPTIONS AND THE CUM-EX PERIOD
6.1 Introduction
There is little doubt to the qualification that financial markets and financial innovations
play a crucial role in capitalist economies"~. The innovative securities created in the last
decades include the emergence of the Eurodollar markets, zero coupon bonds, junk bonds,
the swap markets for currency and interest rates, and the immense number of contracts
which are contingent on some price: the so-called derivatire securitie.r or deriratires.
Examples of derivatives include options and futures contracts, futures options, interest rate
contracts such as caps and floors, and commodity futures.
Two important functions of innovative securities can be observed~"". The first is to
enable corporations and investors to alter the return and risk characteristics of the portfolio
of assets in such a way that specific risks are eliminated (i.e. hedging) or, just the opposite,
are explicitly bome. The second function is that these securities may provide ways to avoid
or redress the consequences of the existence of market imperfections such as different fixed
versus floating borrowing rate structures among investors or differential taxation of specific
sources of income.
Obviously, the latter function of financial innovations seems to be very interesting for
the present study. More specifically, we will pick out simple European-style call and put
options contingent on the price of the dividend paying stock and investigate the
consequences of introducing such contracts into the risk-tax model detailed in the previous
chapter.
The central theme of sections 2 and 3 will be whether call and~or put options can be
employed to obtain a portfolio with the same before-tax rate of return as the stock in all
states of the world, but with a higher afte~--tczr rate of return. The synthetic stock strategy
which will be discussed in these sections will indeed have this characteristic. Section 4
provides an analysis of option-based dividend avoiding strategies, which resemble the
synthetic stock strategies to a large extent but are not identical. This discussion is relevant
~w For more details, see Finnerty ( 1992) or Duffhues (1993).
iso See Duffhues (1993).
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since the dividend avoiding strategies have actually been employed in the Dutch practice and
have received much attention in financial press in 1993. We also point out the relevance of
transactions costs in employing dividend avoiding strategies, and we will briefly re-examine
the role of stock dividends as alternative for cash payout.
6.2 Stock rate of return replication and put-call parity
One of the interesting aspects of financial innovations is that they may provide payoff
patterns which cannot easily be created by (combinations of) traditional securities such as
stocks and riskless bonds, or cannot be created at all. Stock options are very good examples
of this. This section addresses the issue of whether alternative portfolios of options and~or
the riskless asset exist that produce the same before-tax rate of return as the stock itself, but
a(possibly) different after-ta.r rate of return at the individual level.
Let us once again consider the situation of a stock paying a dividend in the cum-ex
intervaL Also, suppose that European-style call and put options'H' exist which, for simplicity,
are assumed to expire at the end of the cum-ex interval. The set of assumptions employed
in deriving the risk-tax model will be maintained in this section. Consider a portfolio created
at the beginning of the cum-ex interval consisting of one call option long, one put option
short, both with exercise price X and expiring at the end of the cum-ex interval. Also,
riskless assets maturing at the end of the cum-ex interval are bought to an amount equal to
the present value of the exercise price X. The payoff of this replicating portfolio at the end
of the cum-ex interval, denoted as Y'~ , is
- max[P- X,0]- max[X- P,0]t X. (69)
Since the payoffs of the call and the put options cannot simultaneously be non-zero for
any ex-dividend stock price P, this can be simplified as
T,.- (P- X)t X- p , (70)
which means that the stock payoff is exactly replicated by the payoff of this portfolio,
'x' American-style call (puU options are defined as rights to buy (sell) a given amount of the underlying asset
at a si~ en esercise price during a given period of time. When the option is European-style, it cannot be prematurely
rSerCi~tiL
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whatever the actual outcome for P may be. Using first-order stochastic dominance
arguments, it readily follows that the current price of this portfolio is equal to the price of
any security with the same payoff. Obviously, the primary candidate for this security is the
underlying stock. But the relevant price only concerns the non-dividend related part included
in the stock price. This is true simply because the payoff of the 'whole' stock is the end-of-
period price plus the dividend. The before-tax rate of return on the stock in the cum-ex
interval, R, was defined earlier in equation (2) as
R- P- Pt D (71)
The capital gain component in this rate of return is obtained by subtracting the
dividend yield d-D~P. Using the equilibrium relationship (50) from the risk-tax model, we
can write the eyuilibrium expected before-tax capital gain as
E(R)- d- R~} 7c~- (1-i)d- d- R~} t[- Zd , (72)
where n is the equilibrium risk premium associated with the dividend paying stock'x'. Since
the stock rate of return is assumed to be normally distributed, we can use the substitution
R-E(R)fóz, where a is the standard deviation of the rate of return and `z defines a standard
normal variable. This enables us to write for the ex-dividend stock price P
P-P(1tR~}7cta~)-iD . (73)
The present value of the ex-dividend stock price can be defined as the cum-dividend
price P, 'net' of the present value of the (deterministic) ex-dividend effect ~D, i.e.
P - - P - PV(ti D) , (74)
where P- is the net stock price and PV(.) denotes the present value operator (at the riskless
interest rate). The market price of the proposed replicating portfolio involving options must
also be equal to P-, so that
~s~ Note that eyuation (50) expresses this premium as the product of the market risk premium n~, and the
stock's beta-coefficient.
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P- P- PV(T D)- P- P~, t PV(X ), (75)
where P~. and P~, denote the prices of the European-style call and put options respectively,
and PV(X) is the present value of the exercise price. This relationship may be rewritten as
PP - P- Pt PV(X t ti D) , (76)
which is known as the pt~t-ca!! parit~~'"' relationship, since it relates the prices of European-
style call and put options with the same exercise price and the same maturity. The latter
variant of the parity relationship explicitly includes the known discrete dividend payment
on the underlying stock. More important for the present study is the following rewriting:
P- P, - P,t PV(Xf~D) , (77)
which implies that a portfolio consisting of a European-style call option, a similar put short,
and an amount of bonds equal to the present value of the sum of the exercise price and the
expected ex-dividend stock price decline has an identical payoff as the stock itself.
Before using this result further, let us first brietly characterize the nature of the
replicating portfolio in the no-tax case, when the market risk-tax parameter ~ is equal to 1.
Figure 6.1 provides a graphical illustration of the put-call parity relationship when there is
a dividend payment on the stock in the no-tax case. The end-of-period payoffs of the stock,
call, put, and bonds are sketched as a function of the end-of-period stock price (abbreviated
as the 'Ex-div. price'). The call and put option in this example have an exercise price equal
to 160, and the dividend payment corresponds to 4.75. Consequently, the riskless bond
payoff element in the replicating portfolio is always equal to 164.75, irrespective of the level
of the ex-price. The call and put option payoffs intersect at the ex-price level of 160, and
it can be verified that for lower ex-prices the call payoff is zero and the (written) put payoff
is negative. For ex-prices higher than 160, the put payoff is zero, whereas the call payoff
is positive. When the payoffs of the call, put, and the bonds are added for each ex-price
level, this results in the payoff of the stock, which is given by the solid line indicating the
sum of the ex-price and the dividend payment.
'~~ See e.g. Hull (1993, p. 167).
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6.3 Differential taxation and svnthetic stocks
The previous section established the result that adding (European-style) options to the
available set of securities permits investors to create a'synthetic' stock by holding the
replicating portfolio, which is characterized by the same end-of-period payoff as the stock
going ex-dividend. Therefore, the market prices of both the stock and the synthetic stock
must be equal. Given the market equilibrium relationships, it is interesting to invéstigate the
effect on the rate of return at the individual investor level. It should be noted that this is a
non-trivial question since the returns from option trading are generally regarded as capital
gains income by tax authorities and are taxed accordingly'"a. Especially since capital gains
~sa This is not always true. In the Netherlands, for example, there have been discussions about the way
income from executive stock options should be treated for fiscal purposes. Since this type of income should in
principle be characterized as capital income, it should not be taxed at the individual level. This leads to an
increasing tendency to substitute stock options for ordinary wage income. The Dutch tax code responded to this
by imposing a notional percentage of the income being recognized as ordinary income. For more details, see
Veld (1989).
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are untaxed for individuals in the Netherlands, this seems to provide a way to earn the stock
retum while avoiding the taxation of the dividend component.
As stated in the previous section, the proposed replicating portfolio involves a long
position in a European call and a shor[ position in a European put option with the same
exercise price X, both expiring at the end of the cum-ex interval. Also, an amount equal to
the present value ofthe exercise price plus the expected ex-dividend stock price decline is
invested in riskless bonds. This portfolio was shown to have an equilibrium expected before-
tax return equal to that of the underlying stock itself.
The relationship between the before-tax rate of retum, R, and the after-tax rate of
return on the stock at the individual investor level. R'~, can be recalled from (9) as
R`s- (1 - i~)R- (T~- T4)d , (78)
where i~ and t~ denote the individual marginal tax rates on ordinary income and capital
gains income respectively, and d is the dividend yield of the stock. The individual's rate of
return of the replicating portfolio (the synthetíc stock) in the cum-ex interval will be denoted
by R~T and can be defined as the after-tax retum on the synthetic stock relative to the price
of the synthetic stock at the beginning of the cum-ex intervaL The market price of the
synthetic stock is given by the put-call parity relationship and the equilibrium prices of its
elements. The individual rate of return on the synthetic stock can be determined by taking




where R~ is the riskless interest rate over the cum-ex interval. Substituting the put-call parity






Using the before-tax rate of retum on the stock in (71), we finally obtain for the synthetic
stock rate of return
~~5 Recall that we have assumed in chapter 5 that interest is taxed at the individual capital gains rate.
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- (1-ti~)R- (1-i~)(l-i)d . (81)
Now consider the premium G(i), i.e. the difference between the individual rates of retum
on the synthetic stock and the stock, as a function of the stock market parameter i:






defines the individual's relative tax-induced preference for dividends over capital gains,
which was also employed in the risk-tax modeL Similarly, the parameter i reflects the
relative dividend preference of the market as a whole, weighted by all individuals' risk
tolerances'"~.
Before drawing conclusions from equation (82), it should be noted that the right hand
side is determinate to any investor, provided that the stock market is in equilibrium. If the
difference is positive for some investor, a premium over the stock rate of return results from
'switching' to the synthetic stock without incurring extra risk. Probably the most important
conclusion is therefore that any individual who prefers dividends, for tax reasons, less than
the market does (i.e. for whom T' ~ T) will strictly prefer the synthetic stock over the stock
itself'g', since the dividend yield is positive by assumption and every individual's capital
gains tax rate is, realistically, less than 100oIo. This implies that these investors will
substitute the synthetic stock for the stock component in their optimal portfolios which were
166 More precisely, the weights are aIl individual's risk tolerance coefficients, scaled by one minus the
individual capital gains tax rate.
~s~ Note that the term 'prefers' is meant in the sense that the synthetic stock (first-order) stochastically
dominates the stock for this investoc Formally, this condítion requires that the investor is not worse off in all
states of the world when holding an alternative security. and he is strictly better off in at Ieast one state of the
world. Any investor preferring more wealth over less, or formally, with a utility function exhibiting positive
marginal utility of wealth at any wealth level, will then strictly prefer the altemative security. The risk-averse
investors in our model all have such a utility function. For more details, see e.g. Copeland and Weston (1988,
p. 92 ).
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Figure 6.2 Rates of retum on the stock and the synthetic stock.
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derived in the analysis of the risk-tax model~"". Also, the extra rate of return from switching
to the synthetic stock is higher when the dividend yield is higher. Furthermore, the rate of
return premium from switching is very much depending on how much of the differential
taxation effect is already reflected in the stock rate of return, which is symbolized by the
market parameter t. For example, when the market contains many dividend disliking
investors (with a low level of T' ) who are less risk-averse (i.e. having a high risk tolerance
level), then the overall value T will also be relative low, so that only those investors with
more extreme levels of tax-related dividend aversion will benefit from switching to the
synthetic stock. On the other hand, the investors with i' ~ i will be the ones to prefer the
stock over the synthetic stock, so that they simply stick to the risky asset portfolio
composition prescribed by the risk-tax model. Thus, the overall effect of the existence of
call and put options with respect to the dividend paying stock is to enable the eyuilibrium
to be less inefficient in the Paretian sense: by holding the synthetic stock instead of the
stock, some investors will be better off since they are able to avoid (part of) the adverse
~Rx In order to avoid the unrealistic situation of unlimited tax-arbitrage opportunities, we implicitly assume
that this kínd of substitution at the individual investor level can only be done with respect to the individual
optimal stock position resulting from the setting without options, i.e. the position suggested by the risk-tax
model of chapter 5.
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consequences generated by the unfavorable tax treatment of dividend income, while no other
investor is worse off'"`'. This is a very important and desireful feature (from the point of
view of investors) of the new eyuilibrium.
It might be interesting to illustrate the synthetic stock rate of return premium along the
same data as used in figure 6.1 that illustrated put-call parity in a non-tax world, where the
dividend payment equals 4.75 and the cum-dividend stock price is 154. In addition, it is
assumed that the ordinary income tax rate for a given individual investor is equal to 60oIc
and that capital gains are untaxed, so that his tax-induced dividend preference parameter t'
equals 0.4. Now suppose that the market parameter T is equal to one, which may be
supported in the case that equally-taxed investors dominate the market. Since in that case
the equilibrium expected stock rate of return does not include a tax-induced premium, there
will be a relatively high gain for the investor when he switches to the synthetic stock. The
premium for this investor when ti-1 is symbolized by G(1), and can be rewritten from
equation (82) into
G(1) - (tid-T~)d . (84)
This expression has an intuitive explanation. When T-1, the market as a whole
considers dividends as interchangeable with other income on tax grounds. This is definitely
not the view of our investor, who has a clear tax preference for capital gains. Therefore, his
premium from switching to the synthetic stock should be equal to the dividend yield,
multiplied by the difference between his tax rates on dividend income and capital gains
income. The dividend yield in the example is equal to 3.1~Io (-4.75~154), and the premium
from switching for the investor is approximately equal to 1.85~1o when t-1. This is
visualized in figure 6.2, which shows the individual expected rates of return as a function
of the stock price at the end of the cum-ex interval (abbreviated as 'ex-price'). The solid
line represents the rate of retum on the stock, whereas the small dashed line (the upper line)
gives the rate of return on the synthetic stock when T-1. The vertical distance between
these two lines is equal to 1.85~Io for any ex-price. The figure also shows an intermediate,
large dashed line which corresponds with an alternative case in which T-0.85 holds in the
market'`"'. When the market tax parameter 2 is less than one, there will be a tax-related term
included in the rate of retum. This implies that our investor, whose tax parameter is still less
'x~~ Note that our definition of Pareto-efficiency obviously excludes tax authorities as market participants,
since these are worse off.
'~ Our empirical analysis in chapters 8 and 9 will reveal that this is a typical value for the Dutch setting.
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than the market parameter, continues the benefit from switching but his premium, denoted
as G(0.85), is reduced. This can be seen from the following equation, which is also derived
from (82):
G(0.85) - (1-T~)(0.85-i')d ~ (T~-T~)d . (85)
The rate of retutn premium in the latter case is equal 1.39qo, which still corresponds to 45010
of the dividend yield.
The analysis in this section may be summarized by emphasizing some important
results. The first is that, given the stock market equilibrium, the synthetic stock provides an
opportunity to avoid (part of) the adverse effects of the market imperfection of
discrimirtator-ti~ income taxation'y', which permits the capital market equilibrium to be less
inefficient in the Paretian sense. Second, it was demonstrated that the magnitude of the
individual gain from switching is very much depending on the individual's tax status relative
to that of the market as a whole, and on the dividend yield leveL Third, it appears that when
the tax rate heterogeneity among investors is large, there will be more investors whose tax
status discriminates dividends more than the market reflects, and, consequently, switching
will be more attractive. If, on the other hand, many investors are characterized by the same
tax status (or when one investor holds a large number of the firms' shares), then the
equilibrium expected stock rate of return will also reflect this status (the status of the block
holder), and switching will only be profitable for a few investors having a less favorable tax
status. Fourth, it is obvious that switching to the synthetic stock is only feasible when call
and put options with respect to the dividend paying stock exist in the first place. If this is
not the case, then the results reduce to those of the risk-tax model without options presented
in the previous chapter.
It should be stressed that our analysis presumes that options prices are contingent on
the equilibrium price of the underlying dividend paying stock, and do not affect the
eyuilibrium price of the stock. In order words, we assume that introducing options does not
increase the level of market completenes.c. The only effect is that option portfolios may
generate after-tax payoffs at the individual level. Therefore, the portfolio selection problem
faced by each investor in the cum-ex interval may be characterized by two hypothetical
stages. In the first stage, all investors decide how much to invest in each risky asset
19~ Note that, when dividend and capital gains tax rates would be equal at the individual investor level,
there would still be the situation that income taxation exists in the first place, but the harmful effects of
unequal taxation are avoided at the individual level.
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(excluding options), which essentially entails a trade-off between tax incentives and the level
of diversification. This results in the stock market equilibrium relationship. Contingent on
this equilibrium allocation, investors are enabled to substitute the dividend paying srock for
the synthetic alternative, if they wish to do so. Since the rates of return on the stock and the
synthetic stock are perfectly correlated, it follows that the introduction of the options does
not affect the locus of the efficient frontier. Consequently, each stock's price continues to
be based upon co~~ur-ianccs with the other stoeks in the market, while options prices are
determined by the mean and rar~iunce of the underlying stock's rate of return.
Finally, it may be noted that the simultaneous equilibrium analysis of stocks and
options with respect to the cum-ex interval is, to the best of our knowledge, new in financial
economic literature, and not addressed by recent papers such as Michaely and Vila (1991),
who only consider a limited stock market equilibrium. Although the study of Grammatikos
(1989) provides an empirical analysis of the ex-dividend day effect of 'optionnable' versus
'non-optionnable' stocks in the US, it lacks an equilibrium specification of how the effects
should be investigated. Also, the equilibrium analysis of stock and options prices under
differential taxation is unaddressed in the extended CAPM-models such as Brennan (1970),
Auerbach and King (1983), and Elton and Gruber (1991).
6.4 The Dutch practice: replicating strategies, transactions costs and stock dividends
Having established the theoretically interesting result that option-based synthetic stocks
can be applied to replicate the stock payoff in the cum-ex interval, it may be useful to
consider whether such tax-induced strategies involving stock options can be recognized in
the Dutch practice. The Dutch tax system, where capital gains are normally untaxed for
individuals, supports the important feature that the tax rate differential may be very large
at the individual level (currently up to 60~Io), which makes switching to synthetic stocks
relatively attractive. Another interesting feature is that the Dutch capital market provides for
well-established options trading in many Dutch stocks. Therefore, there are reasons to expect
non-trivial trading activity involving option-based strategies in the Dutch case'y'.
19~ This contrasts to the current US situation, in which there is no meaningful tax rate differential between
ordinary income and capital gains income. Thus, strategies such as dividend capturing, which seem to occur
yuite freyuenHy in the US (see e.g. Grammatikos (1989)), are unlikely to be inspired by tax considerations
among US individual investors. As discussed earlier in this study, US corporate investors enjoying the (partial)
dividend exclusion may be responsible for this.
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Indeed, it has currently been documented in the financial press'y' that large-scale
dividend-avoiding strategies using options are being executed around the ex-dividend days
of liquid stocks such as Royal Dutch which have a relatively high dividend yield'y'. This
is exactly in line with the predictions of the analysis in the previous section. Therefore, this
section will first investigate these actually employed strategies of dividend avoidance in
more detail'"5 using the data presented in the example discussed in the previous sub-sections.
Among other things, we will make clear that these dividend avoiding strategies which use
deep-in-the-money put options are not literally stock replicating strategies, although they
resemble the effect of the synthetic stock to a great extent. The second sub-section discusses
the role of transactions costs in designing dividend avoidance strategies. Finally, we briefly
reconsider the case of stock dividends as an alternative route for dividend avoiding due to
cash payout.
~`" At March 25, 1993, an article appeared in Het Firruncieele Dughlud describing a so-called 'dividend
arbitrage' strategy, as proposed by director J.L. Heeremans of the Dutch stock brokerage firm Stroeve in
Amsterdam, in which Americsn-style put options are written, which will be discussed in the main text. At
April I, 1993, we had a private discussion with Mr. Heeremans, in which he explained many details about the
actual practice of dividend-related trading around the ex-dividend date, for which we are much indebted.
~"; An immense trading volume was recorded at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange with respect to Royal
Dutch stocks at May 13 in 1993, one day before the ex-dividend day. This can be illustrated along the
following figures: 17.8 million (double counted) shares were traded for a total value of NLG 3 billion, which
was nearly 85`70 of the total traded value at that day. Normal daily volume of Royal Dutch shares is around I-2
million (double counted). Furthennore, two transactions alone accounted for 14.2 million of this day's Royal
Dutch volume (i.e. 80~Ir). Also, two huge option orders were recorded at the European Options Exchange, i.e.
50.000 and 21,000 put options May 175 were written. Finally, Royal Dutch was by large the number one in
trading volume at the New York Stock Exchange. For more details, see Her Financieele Da,qblad of May 14,
1993.
AII of this did not escape anyone's attention, including the Dutch Ministry of Finance which installed a special
commission to investigate these 'dividend stripping' strategies, as they were called in the meantime (see the
articles in Her Financieele Dugblad of May ~4 and I5, 1993 and Van der Loo (1993)). This resulted in an
announcement by the Finance Secretary of State (see Her Finoncieele Dogblod of lune 28, 1993) that the
Dutch tax code would be altered such that the profitability of dividend stripping strategies would be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated. No single proposal has, however, been enacted until now (i.e. February 1994).
19S This discussion is based on Duffhues, Dorsman and Verboven (1993).
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6.4.1 Dividend avoidance by writing deep-in-the-money put options
Consider again the situation of an investor, for whom capital gains income is untaxed
but dividends are taxed at a rate of 60~7c. Also, recall the example presented earlier in which
the stock pays a cash dividend D of 4.75 and the cum-price P is 154. Suppose this investor
holds a given number of shares of this stock immediately before the beginning of the cum-
ex interval. Since both his income tax rate differential and the dividend yield of the stock
are relatively high, he faces the situation that continuing the stock holding in the cum-ex
interval will be associated with a high income tax burden due to the dividend payment
which is scheduled in that interval. Therefore, it may be in his interest to pursue a strategy
which avoids as much as possible that investment income in the cum-ex interval will be
recognized as ordinary income. The following strategy appears to be applied to this problem
in the Dutch practice. It suggests ( i) that the investor should sell his shares at the beginning
of the cum-ex interval, (ii) that he should write deep-in-the-money put options maturing
after the stock's ex-dividend listing to the equivalent of the amount of shares at the cum-
instant1Y6, and (iii) he should invest the proceeds in riskless assets (bonds) maturing at the
same time as the put option. By doing so, he escapes the receipt of the dividend payment.
In retum for this, he earns the cum-price of the pu[ option, which will be very substantial
since the current stock price is much less than the exercise price for a deep-in-the-money
put option. The cum-price of the put option compensates the investor for the high
probability that the put option will be exercised after the stock's ex-dividend listing'y',
causing the investor to pay the relatively high exercise price in return for the stock. But
there is also a small probability that the put option expires worthless when the stock price
at maturity is higher than the exercise price. lf it is assumed thai the investor wishes to re-
establish his initial stock position, then he should buy the shares himself when assignment
of the option does not take place.
Suppose the investor chooses a European-style put with exercise price 170 and a short
time to maturity for the strategy. When the put is deep-in-the-money and the maturity is
short, we can approximate the cum-price of the put, denoted by P~, as
t~ We will continue the discussion of the example on a per share basis, i.e. one share of stock
corresponds with one put option.
~y~ For American put options, it is intuitively clear that exercising immediately prior to the ex-dividend
listing is never optimal, since waiting to at least the ex-date is stricdy preferable (see e.e. Cox and Rubinstein
(1985)).
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P~,J - X- P t i D . (86)
This approximation is inspired by the put-call-parity relationship given in (76) and results
from the following additional assumptions. The present value discount factor will be very
close to one when the cum-ex interval is relatively short, so that PV(XftD)-XtTD. The
call option in the parity relationship is deep-out-of-the-money. The cum-price of this call,
given the fact that the dividend will be paid just before the call matures, will be very close
to zero'~~~19~.
The dividend avoiding strategy essentially involves the following. The investor starts
with a position in stock and ends up with the stock plus some cash amount, which may be
positive or negative. The cash flow is due to the fact that the initial stock position is
liquidated, a put is written, and the proceeds are invested in riskless bonds. At the end of
the period, the bond payoff is used to repurchase the stock, either via assignment of the put
or in the market. Assuming that the riskless interest rate over the (very short) cum-ex
interval is negligible, we can determine the before-tax payoff of the dividend avoiding
strategy, denoted by Y', , as
wK In order to check the validity of the approximation, we have determined the price of the put option
with the adjusted Black and Scholes model, where the net stock price P given in (74) replaces the cum-
dividend price P(this model will be briefly discussed in chapter 7). Assumíng that the riskless interest rate is
7.SrIo per year, the volatility is 20~1o per year, and the risk-tax factor i is O.RS, we obtained model prices for
option maturities of 2, IS and 30 days being equal to 19.97. 19.53, and 19.OR respectively. The approximation
yields a value of 20.04. The error relative to the model price therefore amounts to 0.35~Ic. 2.61r7e, and 5.03~Ic
respectively. Thus, the approximation is fairly accurate when both the put option maturity and the cum-ex
interval extend over a few days. The error is still between 2 and 3"Ic of the theoretical price when the option
maturity is about half a month. When the option maturity becomes longer (e.g. 30 days), the approximation
becomes inaccurate. However. our focus in this sub-section is on put options which expire very soon after the
stock has gone ex-dividend, since the investor wants to re-establish his stock position at the end of the cum-ex
interval. This allows us to use the approximating formula given above for the purpose of our analysis without
loss of much generality.
~y~' Note also that the approximation is most valid for American-style deep-in-the-money put options with
a very short maturity, but expiring after the stock has gone ex-dividend. For these options, the premium over
the e.rercrse ralue or ir~trrnsic ralue at the cum-instant, i.e. X-P, is very close to ZD, since the probability that
the put will be exercised just after the stock has gone ex-dividend is very close to one. Note that for the
European-style eyuivalent, this premium will at most be eyual to that of the American put, since European put
options are never worth more (and frequently less) than their American counterparts. The figures included in
the previous footnote show that the theoretical price of the European deep-in-the-money put option is indeed
less than this upper bound.
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The return on the dividend avoiding strategy can be found by subtracting the cum-price of
the stock, which is the initial investment. Using the approximation for P~ mentioned above,
this gives the following expression:
Y'~- P- Pr- max[X- P,0] - X- Pt ZD- max[X- P,O1 . (88)
The return on the dividend avoidance strategy, r„-P, is entirely made up of capital gains.
Therefore, the after-tax rate of return of the dividend avoiding strategy for the investor, R;`,
is approximately equal to
R~T - ( l -
X- Pt TD- max[X- P,0]
P
(89)
By manipulating the numerator of the right-hand-side, this expression can be rewritten as
R~~ - R~T - ( ] - i~ max[P- X,0]
P '
(90)
where R~T is the after-tax rate of return on the synthetic stock, which is given in (80). The
latter expression provides a good opportunity to compare the dividend avoiding strategy with
the strategies of holding the stock or the synthetic stock. Figure 6.3 gives a graphical
representation of the rates of retutn of either strategy as a function of the stock price at the
end of the cum-ex interval`o".
~tp This figure uses the same data as in figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.3 Rates of return of dividend avoiding, the synthetic stock, and the stock.
The synthetic stock line parallels that of the stock itself, although at a higher rate of
return level. The reason for this as detailed before is that the synthetic stock offers the
investor the opportunity to alleviate the unfavorable tax effect of the dividend. It can be seen
that the dividend avoiding strategy offers much the same as the synthetic stock strategy,
since the dividend avoiding line coincides with that of the synthetic stock up to the point
where P-X. From that point on to the right, the dividend avoiding strategy suffers from the
problem that the stock should be repurchased at the relatively high market price of the stock,
which causes the after-tax rate of return'"' on the dividend avoiding strategy to be bounded
above by (1-i~)(X-PfiD)~P. The difference between the after-tax rates of return of the
dividend avoiding and the synthetic stock strategies involves precisely the maximum term
in (90), which is essentially the payoff function of a written call on the stock with exercise
price equal to X and with the same maturity as the put option.
Z"~ It should be recalled that we have introduced specific assumptions for the interest rate and the cum-
~ price of the put. For example, if the put is American-style, it may have a time premium over its intrinsic value.
This will have the effect that the rate of retum line is initially (i.e. up to the point where P-X) is slightly above
the synthetic stock Iine, then becomes horizontal, so that it ends below the synthetic stock line. On the other
hand, the higher the exercise price of the put, the more negligible the premium over the synthetic stock will be.
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Overviewing the strategies of stock, synthetic stock, and dividend avoiding for an
investor like the present one, who has a substantially lower tax rate on capital gains
compared to ordinary income, it has been concluded earlier that the stock strategy is strictly
dominated by the synthetic stock strategy. The dividend avoiding strategy, however, is not
literally a stock replicating strategy, although it resembles the effect of the synthetic stock
to a great extent. Dividend avoiding essentially involves a trade-off between a higher rate
of return over the stock strategy (or even over the synthetic stock strategy when the put
option is American-style), and accepting a higher level of (total) risk. The lower the exercise
price of the (American) put option, the more positive the rate of return differential for lower
ex-dividend stock prices, but the opportunity loss when the ex-dividend price is high will
also be more imminent. On the other hand, when the exercise price is relatively high, the
rate of return of dividend avoiding (at lower ex-prices) virtually coincides with that of the
synthetic stock, while the opportunity loss threat (at higher ex-prices) is also greatly
reduced. In the limit, i.e. when the put exercise price is set infinitely high, the rate of return
lines for both the dividend avoiding and the synthetic stock will be identical. The fact that
the dividend avoiding strategy has been used more than once by Dutch investors implies that
this 'high-end risk' is simply neglected by these investors, probably because they do not
expect the stock price to go up by a substantial amount in the very short maturity of the
option't".
In establishing alternative routes to escape the unfavorable dividend taxation, we have,
however, neglected one factor which may substantially reduce the attractiveness of these
routes, i.e. the existence of transactions costs. We will address this issue in the next sub-
section.
6.4.2 Transactions costs and dividend avoidance strategies
Evidently, buy or sell transactions in the securities market are costly. Usually, these
costs are positively related to the amount involved in the transaction, although it may be at
~~~ Another issue which will be left unaddressed is that Dutch fiscal authorities may recognize the gain
from the dividend avoiding strategy as dividend income instead of capital gains, as is pointed out by Van der
Loo (1993). As was stated in chapter 1, our study concentrates on the economic aspects of the ex-dividend
effect, not on the legal aspects. We add to this that, even when some dividend avoidance transactions have
been disapproved by tax courts, this does not mean that the opportunity to engage in such strategies is ruled
out for investors. Without claiming anything, we suggest that this might primarily be due to the lack of
consistent legislation, causing tax authorities to sue every individual transaction.
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a decreasing rate. Let us assume that transactions costs are proportional to the purchase or
sell amount according to a factor 11. Furthermore, these costs are assumed to be present only
for stock and option transactions, and not for riskless bond transactions. It is also assumed
that these costs have no tax effect, which means that transactions costs paid cannot be offset
against ordinary or capital gains income ín order to lower the tax burden.
An obvious effect of the existence of transactions costs is that strategies involving buy
and sell activities are made more costly compared to strategies in which no specific action
is taken. Consequently, the rate of return obtained from these 'active' strategies is lowered
when transactions costs exist. Thus, it is useful to view the stock strategy, where no special
actions are taken, as a benchmark strategy. The other two strategies, the synthetic stock and
dividend avoiding strategies, are based on special buy and sell actions. All three strategies
presuppose that the stock is available at the beginning of the cum-ex interval. Therefore, the
transactions costs associated with the purchase of this position may be neglected, because
it is the increnteiita! or marginal cost that matters for the analysis. To make a proper
evaluation of transactions costs, we will define the incremental cost as the total (per share)
transactions costs less those costs which are attributable to the investment of current wealth.
The per share investment of wealth equals P for all three strategies, i.e. irrespective of
which strategy to choose, the investor always at least incurs t~P as cost.
The synthetic stock strategy involves some additional costly actions at two instants.
First, transactions costs arise due to the purchase of the call option and the sale of the put
option at the cum-instant. Also, the investor repurchases the stock at the ex-instant, either
through exercising the call or through assignment of the put. It follows from the payoff
nature of the call and the put options applied in the synthetic stock strategy that the
repurchase of the stock will always be done at the exercise price X. The incremental
transactions costs of the synthetic stock or replicating strategy, denoted by Q~, can therefore
be determined as
Q,.- rl(P, t P,} X) . (91)
When transactions costs exist, the after-tax return on the synthetic stock will be lowered by
this amount. In rate of return terms, the deduction from the after-tax synthetic stock rate of
return can be obtained by dividing Q~ through by P, i.e.
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t1(P, t P,, t Xl
~' - P
(921
where q~ is the rate of return deduction resulting from the existence of transactions costs.
The dividend avoiding strategy also involves costly additional trades: the sale of the
deep-in-the-money put at the cum-instant, and the repurchase of the stock via assignment
or in the market at the ex-instant. Analogous to the method used for the synthetic stock
strategy and using previous results, the dividend avoiding incremental transactions costs, Q~,
can be calculated as
`~t max[P,X - r)~X- Pt tDt max[P,X]~ . (93 )
The rate of return deduction in the case of dividend avoiding, q;, , is therefore
~ ~~X- Pf TD} max[P,X~~
~` P
(94)
It is interesting to put some numbers on these expressions using the example continued
throughout this chapter. From the data given earlier, we can evaluate the rate of return
deductions employing two alternative values for the cost rate rl, i.e. O.So1o and 1~Io. The
lower rate may be a fairly good estimate in the Dutch setting for the rate incurred by
wealthy individual investors trading relatively large amounts. The higher rate may be
thought of as the rate typical for normal volume transactions by individuals in the
Netherlands. It can easily be verified that the cost of either strategy is virtually equal when
the same ( high) exercise price X-170 is chosen and the ex-dividend price does not exceed
this pricezt;. In this situation, we have q~-0.62c1o for the lower cost rate and q;,-1.23oIo for
the higher rate. It should be recalled that the rate of return premium from switching to the
synthetic stock or to dividend avoiding is equal to 1.85o1c in the example (when T-1) or
1.39oIc ( when i-0.85)'`~. These figures make clear that transactions costs have a very
substantial impact. Indeed, even the lower individual cost rate may easily wipe out a very
significant portion of the premium from switching. For less wealthy investors, this effect is
~a~ When X is much higher than P, the call price P~ will be close to zero, so that Q,-Q,.
~~ The precise value of t is also relevant for the level of transactions cost, but substitution of t-1 or
i-0.85 has a negligible effect on the value of q.
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even more dramatic'"`. These figures illustrate that transactions costs may quickly make
alternative routes unprofitable.
The synthetic stock strategy, on the other hand, allows to choose any exercise price for
the call and the put. So why not select at-the-money options, e.g. with exercise price
X-150'? The advantage of such an exercise price is that the cost base of both the options
and the stock repurchase is reduced, since the prices of the European call and put options
will both be""' in the order of 1, compared with the deep-in-the-money put price of 20.
Using these options in the synthetic stock strategy, the transactions costs rate of return
deductions will be in the order of O.S~Ir for the lower rate and 1 ~~o for the higher rate.
Although these cost figures are still very substantial, it is clear that the investor is better off
using the at-the-naone~~ synthetic stock, rather than the deep-in-the-money dividend avoiding
strategy. It has been very surprising to us that the latter strategy appears to be used in
practice, despite its cost disadvantage. The argument that the European Options Exchange
in Amsterdam only provides trading in American-style options is not very convincing, since
it is quite easy for market makers to trade these type of options in the over-the-counter
market.
Although the net rate of return premium from switching might be higher when some
parameters have more favorable values (e.g. higher dividend yield or a lower cost rate due
to negotiating, etc.), the basic message of this sub-section is that transactions costs largely
invalidate the effectiveness of the well-designed option-based strategies to avoid the ordinary
income taxation of the dividend. It appears that there will be a significant net gain left over
only in very favorable situations.
6.4,3 Again: stock dividends
The important role of the stock dividend in the Dutch setting has already been detailed
earlier. It was argued in chapters 4 and 5 that tax consíderations are thought to be the
primary source for the popularity of this dividend type, because the stock dividend can
zu5 When the cost of the strategy is evaluated for an investor ab-eudy holding the stock and who considers
switching, then the 'initial' costs 11P~ also become relevant as marginal costs because he must first sell his
stock in order to avoid the receipt of the dividend. This increases the costs to q,-1.129 for the lower cost rate.
and to q; 2.23`7r for the higher cost rate.
~~ The model prices resulting t}om the adjusted Black and Scholes model, and using the same additional
data as in footnote 198 are 0.90 for the call and 0.88 for the put.
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effectively play the role of the cash dividend without the adverse income tax effects. It is
useful to repeat this argument again. The analysis in this chapter first seemed to establish
a route enabling firms to pay out cash dividends and perrnitting investors to capture them
at the capital gains rate to a large extent. However, these routes appeared to be very costly
from the investors' point of view so that their effectiveness is highly questionable.
Moreover, they can only be used when options are being traded with respect to the stock,
either in the official market or in the over-the-counter market'"'.
Thus, the stock dividend may be a natural, less costly, and therefore more efficient way
to protect the stockholders against the adverse tax effect, provided by the firm itself. On the
other hand, it should be recalled from chapter 5 that the sale of the stock dividend (the
'fractional shares' ) will also generate substantial transactions costs, and it is not clear
whether these will be~ less than the triple costs in the synthetic stock and dividend avoiding
strategies, even for wealthy investors owning many shares.
6.5 Summary
This chapter has focused on several aspects of introducing the existence of European-
style call and put options contracts into the risk-tax market equilibrium model detailed in
the previous chapter. It was first investigated how the existence of these call and put options
affects the portfolio decisions of investors at the individual level. The options market was
restricted to provide trading with respect to the dividend paying stock only, and we
abstracted from options on two or more stocks or on portfolios of stocks'"". Consequently,
options trading in our model does not affect the risk structure generated by the risky assets,
the level of market completeness is not increased, and the locus of the efficient frontier is
preserved. Within this setting and using the equilibrium results generated by the risk-tax
model, it was demonstrated that option-based strategies can be designed that replicate the
dividend paying stock's before-tax payoff. The advantage of such replicating strategies is
that the adverse effects of differential taxation may be substantially redressed for individual
investors. It appeared that investors with a lower tax-induced dividend preference than that
reflected in the market may benefit from switching to a synthetic stock instead of holding
the stock ítself. Another strategy, the dividend avoiding strategy, is a less general variant
~o~ Also, these strategies are liable to disapproval by tax authorities.
~ox Examples of the latter include index options.
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of this strategy offering a similar effect. An important consequence of this is that options
trading allows the market equilibrium to be more efficient in the Paretian sense, since the
adverse effects of the dividend income taxation can be reduced for some investors while
making no other investor worse off'"".
It is interesting to note that this effect will be more pronounced in the Dutch setting
compared to the current US situation in which individuals are now eyually taxed at both
ordinary income and capital gains. For the US, our model predicts that T'-1 for the vast
majority of invesrors"" and, conseyuently, the market average T may also be close to one.
This in turn predicts that no tax-induced holdings are to be expected from whatever source,
so all investors not only hold efficient risky asset portfolios, but these will also reflect the
market portfolio. Since investors make optimal portfolios by investing in riskless bonds and
the market portfolio of risky assets, two-fund separation should hold and there seems to be
no specific tar-indrrcecl need for option-based strategies such as synthetic stocks, except
perhaps for some dividend-preferring investor groups like corporate and~or foreign investors.
These investor groups may use dividend capturing strategies to collect the dividend, as was
documented earlier.
A fin~il re~mark concerns the existence of transactions costs, which were not included
in the model for reasons of simplicity. It was, however, demonstrated that their presence has
the main intluence that the profitability of alternative investment incentit~es is significantly
reduced. It is quite easy to imagine situations in which investors would eventually lose on
choosin~ the synthetic stock, despite their tax-induced attractiveness. This largely depends
upon the magnitude of the parameters influencing the gain from switching (such as the
dividend yield and the tax rate difterential), and the level of transactions cost. Consequently,
only some investors or even no investor at all may prefer switchin~ since it is too costly to
do so. If this happens, we are back to the initial risk-tax equilibrium situation in which no
option trading exists at all.
z~ Of course, this statement about the increased levet of efficiency is only valid if the tax authorities are
excluded in the definition of market participants. Therefore, we make no claim to any social welfare improvement.
~tt' As ouUined before. LiS corporations and specitïc foreign investors may be characterized by a t'-value
different from one.
7 THE PRICING OF AMERICAN-STYLE OPTIONS
WITH DIVIDENDS AND TAXATION
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter considered the introduction of call and put options in the risk-tax
environment. Because we restricted ourselves to options that mature at or very close to the
ex-dividend date, a pricing model for options could be avoided up to now. This chapter will
focus on the pricing of such options. The famous study of Black and Scholes (1973) has
produced a consistent pricing model for European-style options on stocks. It assumes,
however, that no dividends are being paid on the underlying stock and that no taxation takes
place. Other studies, such as Merton (1973), Roll (1977), Geske (1979) and Whaley (1981)
extend this model to include dividend payments. Ingersoll (1976) uses the continuous
dividend model of Merton (1973) to investigate the effect of introducing a single tax rate
with respect to dividend income on the option price, whereas capital gains are untaxed.
Neither of these models, however, examine the case of differential taxation in the economy.
We will argue that, in order to derive an option pricing model in the risk-tax setting,
it is necessary to understand how dividends and taxes affect the equilibrium price of the
stock. If we do not know this, we face the problem that the riskless hedge property which
underlies the risk neutral valuation of options does not apply. Therefore, it is necessary to
endoRenize the equilibrium ex-dividend effect predicted by the risk-tax equilibrium in the
option pricing analysis, rather than assuming it away or treating it as exogenous.
The remainder of this chapter will first provide a discussion of the essential features
needed to derive an option pricing model for European-style call and put options. Next, we
will move on to the pricing of American-style options, and we will derive a version of the
log-transformed binomial model of Trigeorgis (1991) which is adapted to our risk-tax
setting. This model is able to value complex options in a quíte efficient manner, which
makes it attractive to employ in our empirical study of the ex-dividend effect in American-
style call and put options prices in chapter 9.
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7.2 The ex-di~ idend effect and European-st}~le options
Let us focus on the case of a European-style option contract (call or put) maturing after
the cum-ex interval. Suppose we want to evaluate the price of such an option at a point in
time before the cum-ex interval"'. It is useful to divide the option's maturity into a number
of equally spaced intervals, indexed by t, and one of these is the cum-ex interval. Standard
option pricing theory (in which dividends and taxation do not exist) suggests that a pricing
function for European-style options can be obtained by applying the following procedure"':
l. Assume that the stock rate of return in every interval is normally distributed, and
is uncorrelated with that in any other interval; assume also that all parameters are
constant in all intervals;
2. Prove that, given the market price of the stock at the beginning of any interval, a
riskless hedge portfolio involving the stock and the option can be maintained over
that interval:
3. Detet7nine the expected price of the option at maturity, as if investors would be
risk neutral;
4. Ohtain the option price a~ti the present value of the expected option price (from 3),
cliscounted at the riskleti, intcretit rate.
Let us discuss whether this procedure can be applied to the pricing of a European-style
option with one known discrete dividend in its maturity in a siuation of differential taxation.
The first assumption states that stock rates of return in any interval are normally distributed
and uncotTelated. This implies that the stock rate of return in interval t. R,, can be written
as
R~- E(R~~ t 6~- ~ (95)
where z is a standard normal variate, and E(R~) and 6, are the mean and standard deviation
parameters relevant for interval t. Standard option pricing theory simply treats these
parameters as given. This is not obvious when the stock price experiences an ex-dividend
effect. Rather than introduce this effect as an exogenous value, we endo,~erti-e this effect
~" We maintain the set of assumptions employed in the risk-tax model.
''~ The application of this procedure for standard options cases can be found in textbooks such as Hull
(19931.
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by using the equilibrium rate of return expression of the risk-tax model'". This can be
recalled from (50), after adding the 't'-subscript, as
E1R,~- R~:~} (1 -t)d,} n,~~.~R~ , d t . (96)
where the dividend yield d, is nonzero only when t refers to the cum-ex interval. The
stationarity restriction in step 1 of the above procedure can be implemented by requiring the
riskless interest rate and the variance-covariance matrix to be equal in all intervals, which
implies that the expected stock rate of return is identical for all intervals e.rcept the cum-ex
interval, unless the risk-tax parameter T is equal to one'". Therefore, we obtain the mean
and standard deviation parameters as
E(R~)- RJt ( 1-i)d~} nn,R ; 6~- a, b't . (97)
The second step in the procedure is very important since it enables the application of
risk neutral valuation for the purpose of option pricing'". We will now show that the
riskless hedge portfolio construct continues to apply in our case of dividends and taxation''fi.
In fact, we need to demonstrate this property for the cum-ex interval only, since similar
results directly follow for the other intervals by setting the dividend yield equal to zero.
Suppose the portfolio H is created at the beginning of the cum-ex interval, consisting
of a number of h shares of the underlying stock long and one option short. The price of the
stock and options will be denoted by P and P„ respectively. The before-tax return on this
portfolio over the interval, H-H, is equal to the sum of the returns on the constituing
elements, i.e.~"
~'j The standard deviation follows directlv from the variance-covariance matrix.
~'~ We will prove further on in the curcent section that the existence of a nonzero ex-dividend effect will not
ínvalidate the valuation procedure.
`" See Black and Scholes (1973).
~'fi We have argued in chapter 6 that the introduction of símple call and put options in the risk-tax model does
not affect the level of market completeness the only effect will be rhat some investors switch to the synthetic stock.
Since the options provide ~redund~mt~ before-tax payofts preserving the locus of the efficient frontier. it follows
that option prices are contineent on the stock price at the beeinning of any interval.
~'~ We will drop the 't'-subscript with respect to the dividend and the dividend yield for simplicity.
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ff- H- h-P- P} D~- ~P,- (98)
The rate of return definition given in (95) can be used to write the return per share as
P(E(R)f6z]. The retum on the option element in the portfolio needs more elaboration. It
must first be noted that, for a given exercise price, the price of the option at any point in
time is a function of only two variables: the current market price of the stock (P) and the
remaining time to maturity (indicated as T). These two inputs comprise all such things as
market expectations about the relevant stock price movement in the remaining time to
maturity, the riskless interest rate, and so on. We denote the option pricing function by
Po(P,T), and use the following notation for the partial derivatives of this function with
respect to its arguments, i.e.
aP aP ~'P
f, - aP' . .f - - c~T '
.f,~ - aPaP ~
(99)
It should also be realized that the option is European-style and matures after the
dividend has been paid. Therefore, only the capital gains element in the stock return over
the interval, i.e. P(R-d), is relevant for the end-of period option price''fr. Finally, when the
length of the interval is assumed to be sufficiently short, we may apply a technique called
Ito's lemma, which suggests that the return on the option. P~,-P~, can be written using (95)
as'' `'
~f~~P[E(R)- d]t f,t ~f~~P'~~ } f~P6~ . (100)
Combining the return expressions for the stock and option elements of the portfolio and
rewriting, we obtain
H- H- U~- f,)P[E(R)- dl - f;- ;f„P'rs't (h- f-~)P6-t hPd . (IOI)
An important implication of the last expression is that, when the parameter h is set equal
to f,, the stochastic element involving 'z cancels out:
~~H The capital gain, P-P, follows from the rate of retum definition R-(P-PtD)~P as P-P-P(R-d), where d-D~P.
~~~ For a derivation of Ito's Iemma, see e.g. Hull (1993, Appendix IOA).
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' ' P'6'} hPd .H- H ~,-; - -.t,- ;f~~ (l0?1
Since there is no uncertainty in the return on the portfolio H, given that h-f,, it tollows that
every investor regards the hedge portfolio H as a riskless asset over the interval and,
therefore, it should have the same price as the riskless asset''". It is easy to demonstrate that
this property carries over to any other interval for which the dividend yield d is equal to
zero.
Now that the validity of the hedge portfolio is preserved for the case of option pricing
with dividends and taxation, we can apply risk neutral valuation as suggested in steps 3 and
4 of the procedure. This implies that the option price should be evaluated assuming that the
expected stock rate of return in any interval does not involve a risk premium. Furthermore,
it was already observed in chapter 6 that the prices of European-style options maturing after
the cum-ex interval only incorporate the non-dividend-related part of the current stock price.
i.e. the net stock price P. This means that we can obtain the market price of a European-
style call option using the Black and Scholes model, where the current stock price P is
replaced by the net stock price~ P, which is given in (74). This yields the following
expression for the call price P~:
P, - Pt, .N~k~- exp(- r~T)X~N~k-(5~~ ,
In(P„ ~X) } L~'~} ~ 6~ ~T
k- - .
~~
P~~ - P„- exp(- rf7~iD- P~~[ l-exp(- r~7~~clt~] .
(103)
where the parameters r~ and C5 must be interpreted as the instarttancnus eyuivalents of their
discrete counterparts R; and 6. This implies that the exponent temis in the pricing function
are (riskless interest rate) discount factors"'. The zero subscript in P,,, P;,, and d„ indicateti
~~t~ It may be argued that a hedge portfolio can also be obtained by reinterpreting the put-call parit~
relationship given in (76), such that a portfolio of one stock long, one put long, and one call short also produces
a riskless return. tt should. however. be noted that this procedure would only lead to a model for the option
porrjnlio price, i.e. P~ P,. and not to a model for the options themselve,.
~~' Furthermore. the parameters r„ á, and T must alI refer to the same unit of time. It is common to express
them on a yearly basis.
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that the relevant parameter values refer to time 0, i.e. the moment at which the option is
valued. The value of h(the hedge ratio) must be determined as the partial derivative of the
call pricing function to the current stock price P,,. In the appendix to this chapter it is shown
that this vields
h - [ l - exp ( - rrT)T d~~] .N~k~ . (]04)
The put-call parity relationship (76) can be used to obtain the pricing function for ihe
European-style put option.
7.3 American-style options and the log-transformed Binomial option pricing model
The option pricing formula derived in the previous section can, at least theoretically,
be extended to a formula for American-style options, which may be prematurely exercised
at any point in the option's maturity. The solution to this would be to add an infinite series
of boundaries stating that the (call or put) option price at the start of any instantaneous
interval is the maximum of either exercising directly or holding the option until the end of
that interval. Although such a procedure is intuitive, it is virtually impossible, especially for
American-style put options'", to derive closed-fonn solutions which are direct extensions'"
of the European-style formula (103). On the other hand, some numerical approximations
have been proposed which may provide quite satisfactory alternatives. One of these is the
Binomial model, developed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), which approximates the
continuous diffusion process underlying (103) by a discrete process based on a
multiplicative binomial random walk. A variant of this model, recently proposed hy
Trioeorgis (1991), is the so-called 'log-transformed' Binomial model (abbreviated as the
,~,
--- The pricing of American-style put options. with or without dividend payments, indeed involves an infinite
series of relerarv exercise boundaries. which makes a closed-form solution unfeasible because of mathematical
complexity. In contrast. it appears that onh~ a very limited number of exercise boundaries are relevant for
American-style call options, i.e. at the start of every cum-ex interval included in the maturity of the option, and
at the expiration date. Therefore, when there are no dividend payments on the underlying stock, the American-style
call is identical to the corresponding European-style calL Cox and Rubinstein ( 1985, Ch.4) discuss the exercise
boundaries in more detail.
„z
-- An example of a closed-form valuation model tbr an American-style call option when there is at most one
known discrete dividend payment ( but no taxation) is the model developed by Roll ( 1977), Gexke ( 19791. and
Whaley 119811.
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'LTB' model). This LTB model will be used in our empirical study of the ex-dividend
effect in Dutch call and put options prices in chapter 9. For this reason, we will first discuss
some essential features of American-style option pricing using the LTB model in the next
sub-section. Subsequently, we will provide a few numerical examples using this model.
7.3.1 The LTB model
We have already suggested in the preceding section that the maturity of an option can
be viewed as consisting of a(potentially large) number N of equally-spaced intervals, one
of which is the cum-ex intervaL In any of these intervals, the stock rate of return is assumed
to be normally distributed with stationary parameters, and it is uncorrelated with the rate of
return in any other interval.
The standard Binomial model"~ (without dividends and taxation) approximates this
situation by assuming that the stock price in any interval may either go up by a factor u or
go down by a factor l~u. The multiplicative binomial process obtained for the stock price
in this way is an adeyuate approximation for the continuous stock price process underlying
(103) when its (risk neutral) expected value and variance converge to the corresponding
parameters in the continuous process. It can be shown"' that this is accomplished by letting
rr - exp-~ T~N ,
r - ~c's'~
9 - ~ t ~ - T~N .
- - á
(105)
where 6 is the (risk neutral) probability that the stock price moves up in any interval.
Unfortunately, this approximation may suffer from stability problems in the sense that ihe
number of intervals N should exceed a minimum value determined by the parameters of the
associated continuous process. This can be demonstrated"`' by noting that the parameter 6
should have a value between zero and one in order to be interpreted as a probability
parameter, i.e. OS9S1. It can be verified from (105) that this is eyuivalent to
~~~ See Cox. Ross. and Rubinstein (1979) or Hull ( 1993).
,,;
See e.g. Cox and Rubinstein (19R5, pp. 19R-201).






The up probability will, therefore, either be negative or greater than one when this additional
condition is not met, so that the variance of the discrete process is not defined.
Recently, Trigeorgis (1991) has proposed a rather simple modification of the binomial
process offering superior properties. His basic idea is very simple: instead of modeling the
maturity date stock price using the discrete-time binomial process, he suggests to construct
a binomia] tree for the natiu-al logarithm of the stock price. Essentially, this log-transformed
process involves different values for the discrete distribution parameters, i.e. the up factor
u and the (risk neutral) up movement probability A, given the parameters of the continuous
process. Analogous to u and 6 in the discrete process above, let the symbols U and O be
the corresponding parameters with respect to the log-transfon-ned process. Trigeorgis shows
that, in order to permit the log-transformed process to be an adequate approximation, the
parameters U and O should be determined as
U-
V







Trigeorgis notes that the log-transformed binomial process has three properties which,
in sum, make this process clearly superior over the 'ordinary' binomial process. First of all,
the U and O estimators are designed such that they specify the same distribution as the
underlying continuous process. In the limit for large N, the values of U and O become
equal"' to In(u) and 6 as specified in (105). Second, it readily follows that, given the
natural restrictions (i) that the variance of the continuous process is nonnegative (i.e.
~'T?0), and (ii) that the number of intervals N be nonnegative, the log-transformed
~~~ This may be verified by noting that, for larger N, the value of U becomes closer to 6~(T~N) and.
consequendy. O converges to'ht'h[(r~'Lá')~~].~(T~I~i).
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binomial process is uncatditionall}~ stable''~~, i.e. no external restrictions such as a minímum
number of sub-intervals are needed. Finally, the log-transformed binomial process appears
to provide a substantial gain in computational efficiency when option prices are evaluated
using this type of stock price process. This means that, in general, the option model price
converoes much faster (i.e. for substantial lower values of N) in comparison with the option
pricing model based on the ordinary binomial process''`'. Collectively, we believe that these
characteristics provide convincing arguments to favor the log-transformed binomial process
over the ordinary binomial process.
Given the specification of the log-transformed binomial process, we can obtain model
prices for American-style call and put options by setting up 'binomial trees' for the stock
and the option price in the standard way"". Essentially, American-style option pricing
involves a recursive procedure by which the option price at every node is determined as the
maximum value obtained from either (i) directly exercising, or (ii) holding the option for
at least another interval. Among the major advantages of the LTB option valuation
procedure is the flexibility with which it can be applied to other types of options, including
very complex ones"'.
7.3.2 American-style option pricing with dividends and taxation: some examples
[t may be useful to illustrate the results above by a numerical example in which the
price of American-style call and put options is determined using the LTB model in a world
with differential taxation. Suppose there is one cum-ex interval in the maturity of the option,
and the known (cash) dividend D will be segregated from the stock price after Nd intervals
from the present moment.
The parameters needed for the calculation include the (risk neutral) mean and variance
of the stock price process in the maturity of the option. As was noted before, this requires
"" This can be seen by noting that, from ( 107), the term in the syuare root expression for U is always
nonneeative and, consequently. [(r,-~tr')T~(NU11'~I and -IS(r;-'L~'IT~(NU151. This, in tum, implies that O must
be between 0 and I.
,
- This will be illustrated in the next sub-section.
"~ See e.g. Cox and Rubinstein (1985), Verboven (1989) or Hull (1993).
~'~ See Hull (1993, Ch.l6) for a discussion of several 'exotic' options. Virtually all of them may be valued
with the binomial procedure.
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knowledge about the characteristics of the stock market equilibrium which specifies the
market"s expectations conditional on the current stock price. When the risk-tax model is
assumed to be valid in every interval with constant parameters, the (homogeneously) risk
neutral expected stock price at maturity, conditional on the given current stock price P„ and
the dividend D,can be determined as
É(P r) - Po I 1} E(R ) J'~ - Z D~ 1} E(R )] h- ",, (108)
where the E(.) operator defines the expected value as if investors were risk neutral. The
intuition underlying the last equation is the following. The current stock price P„ includes,
among other things, the market's assessment of the dividend payment. The market expects
the stock price to grow by the factor [lfE(R-)] in every interval. In the cum-ex interval,
however, the stock price growth factor is [1fE(R )-tid], since the dividend is separated from
the stock price"'. The first term in the right-hand-side of (108) is equal to the future value
of P„ after N intervals, compounded at the rate E(R ). This amount should be corrected for
the future value of the ex-dividend stock price decline after the last N-Nd sub-intervals. The
expected growth rate over the maturity directly follows when E(P7) and P~~ are known. Since
the ex- dividend effect is nonstochastic, we can obtain'" the variance rate 6' from the
variance-covariance matrix S. Finally, the instantaneous riskless interest rate over the
option's maturity can be obtained from R, using standard compounding techniques. This
allows us to determine the values of the parameters U and O of the LTB modeL and the
binomial tree for the stock price can be constructed. Option prices follow from applying the
appropriate set of boundary conditions and workin~ back through the binomial tree up to
time 0.
~i~
- Note that the dividend yield d is detined here as the dividend payment relative to the stock price at the
start of the cum-ex interval. The stock price growth in this ínterval is equal to [ltE(R)t(1-2)d-d]. or simply
I( I tE( R 1-tdl.
-3: [f necessary, the variance rate ,hould be restated on an instantaneous basis.
Tlze Pricins,~ ~~f Anrerirai~-st~~le Option.r x~ith Diridends anrl Taxatron 141
Table 7.1 Model prices for American-style and European-style call and put options for
various dividend levels.
( I 1 ( 2) cY-O. I I 3) P„ I I 0, ~-0. I, T~-QO l i
Call Put Call Put Ca!! Pnt
D Am Eur: Am Eur Am Eur: Am Errr Am Ettr: Am F.ur
I II.8R LLR6: 6.31 5.46 7.47 7.45: I.77 I.05 16.48 16.48: O.IS 0.10
2 1139 11.32: 6.70 ~.7~ 6.83 6.80: 2.08 L~4 15.66 15.66: 0.18 0.13
3 10.89 1Q79: 7.09 6.0~ 6.21 6.18: 2.45 L45 14.84 14.84: 0.23 0.16
4 10.40 10.27: 7.49 6.36 5.64 5.59: 2.R8 1.68 14.04 1~.04: 030 U.20
5 9.91 9.76: 7.9] 6.68 5.08 5.03: 3.35 1.95 13.23 13.23: 037 0.24
10 8.00 7.43: 10.25 R.50 3.64 2.6R' 6.31 3.75 10.00 9.39: I.10 0.65
I S 7.02 5.44 : 12.96 10.65 3.41 f. I 8- 10.02 6.39 10.00 6.(1 I- 3.0? LS I
(4) P~; 90 (5) P„-90, cY-0.1. (6) P~~-90. 6-0.I. T~-O
T~,-0.015
Call Put Cal! Put Ca[I Put
D Am Eur: Am Eur Am Eur: Am F,ur Am Eur: An: Eur
1 6.1 R 6.17: I LSR 9.77 1.66 1.66: 10.70 5?R 1.66 1.66: 10.85 5.28
2 5.80 5J9: 12.06 IO.32 1.37 1.37: I L55 S.H6 1.36 1.36: I 1.70 S.R6
3 SAR 5.42: 1~.66 IQ6K I.IS 1.15: 12.40 6.47 l.l~ I.15: I?.55 6.47
~ 5.18 ~.07: 13.27 11.16 0.93 0.93: 13.25 7.11 0.93 0.93: 13.40 7.1I
5 4.87 4.73 : 13.89 I I.65 0.7i 0.75 ~ 14.09 7.7R 0.75 0.75 : 14.25 7.79
10 3.51 3.24: 17.15 14.30 0.21 0.21 : 1834 l I.49 0? I 0.21 : 1850 I I.i0
IS ?.6R 2L0; ~0.71 L7.ïl 0.04 0.04: 22.58 I 5.55 Q04 0.04; 22.75 15.57
Note American-style ( Am) values are deterniined using the LTB model with N-50, and European-style
(Em-) values follow from the adjusted Black and Scholes model given in ( 106). Unless otherwise
stated, ihe table uses the followine parameter values: the current stock price P„ is equal to 100, the
exercise priee X is ]00, the instantaneous riskless interest rate r; is IOi~ per year, the volatility cY
is 0.25 per year, the option maturity T is 0.75 year, the ex-diviclencl date is at one third of the
option's muturity (T~-O'S), and the market rísk-tax parameter 2 is eyual to 0.85.
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Table 7.1 provides some illustrative results of call and put option prices when there
is one known dividend payment in the option's maturity'". American-style prices are
obtained from the LTB model, and their European-style counterparts are valued using the
adjusted Black and Scholes model given in (103). The first panel uses a basic set of
parameters, which is slightly altered in the other panels in order to emphasize some effects.
Let us summarize some observations from this table. The first panel describing the case of
at-the-money call and put options with the stock paying a dividend at one third of its
maturity, and the dividend D is varied. It can be verified that (i) when premature exercise
is not very likely (e.g. for call options when the dividend payment is relatively low), the
American-style model values are hardly higher than the associated European-style values,
and that (ii) call (put) prices are decreasing (increasing) for higher dividend levels. This is
consistent with familiar stochastic dominance results';`.
A comparison of the first and the second panel shows that a lower volatility not only
decreases all optíons prices, but reduces the value of early exercise. The remaining panels
provide some opportunities to check whether the LTB model with only 50 intervals'"'
provides adequate approximations. The third panel provides the case of an in-the-money call
option with a relatively low volatility parameter, where T~ is chosen such that the cum-ex
interval is the first discrete interval. It has been proven"' that the last cum-dividend instant
is the only rational premature exercise instant for an American-style call option. This implies
that the American-style call option price at the beginning of the cum-ex interval is either
equal to Pt,-X (exercise), or equal to the associated European-style price (no exercise, i.e.
holding the call option up to its maturity). The figures in panel (3) are consistent with this:
given the relatively low volatility of 0.1, the price of the American call is equal to its
exercise value of 10 for sufficiently high dividend levels. For lower dividend levels, the
American price equals the European price.
Panels (4) to (6) can be used to illustrate the case of an in-the-money put option. They
"~ Cox and Rubinstein 1 19RS, Ch.S) and Trigeorgis ( 1991) provide more extensive tahles of call and put
prices when dividends exist. However, their calculations assume away any analysis of the ex-dividend day effect,
or, in terms of our model, they implicitly use 2-1 for all stocks.
z~s See e.g. Cox and Rubinstein ( 19R5, Ch.4).
~ib The ordinary binomial model, as Trigeorgis (1991) notes, may need up to 500 intervals to obtain the same
level of accuracy as the LTB model with 50 intervals. It is obvious that the LTB model uses much less computer
time. We programmed both models in Pascal language and, on a 4R6DX50-based personal computer, we estimate
the LTB model to be at least 20 times faster for the same level of accuracy.
"~ See e.g. Cox and Rubinstein ( 1985, p. 140).
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all demonstrate the relative importance of the premature exercise opportunity embedded in
American-style put options, especially when the stock price volatility is low as in the fifth
example. The rather extreme last panel supposes that the stock will go ex-dividend
immediately (i.e. no interva] is in between). When the volatility is sufficiently low, then the
American put price will be equal to its exercise value"~. The last panel illustrates this: the
American put option prices are equal to X-(P„ZD), i.e. the exercise value of the option just
after the stock has gone ex-dividend.
7A Summary
This chapter has been devoted to the pricing of call and put options on dividend paying
stocks. We first demonstrated that the riskless hedge property developed by Black and
Scholes (1973) continues to apply with dividends and taxation, provided that the stock
market is in equilibrium. This implies that, instead of treating the ex-dividend effect as
purely exogenous, we should use the stock market equilibrium properties in order to be able
to use risk neutral valuation techniques developed in the option pricing literature, leading
to a version of the Black and Scholes model adjusted for our risk-tax setting.
The second section provided a number of details with respect to American-style call
and put option pricing using the log-transformed binomial process, proposed by Trigeorgis
(1991), as an approximation of the continuous process underlying the Black and Scholes
analysis. It was argued that the associated LTB option pricing model has characteristics
making it quite preferable to the ordinary Binomial option pricing model.
Numerical models such as the LTB model also have the desirable feature that they can
be applied to a considerable number of more or less complex types of derivative contracts
which are difficult to handle by continuous process models. Important examples in our study
are American-style call and put options, which will be investigated in chapter 9. Therefore.
we will use the LTB model in our empirical analysis of the ex-dividend effect in options
prices.
~;~ See e.g. Cox and Rubinstein (1985, pp. 245-252).
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Appendix 7: The European-style call option pricing function and the hedge ratio
This appendix will derive an expression for the hedge ratio h using the European-style
call option pricing model (103). It was argued in the main text that h must be equal to f,,
the partial derivative of the call option price (denoted by f) to the current stock price P~.
Note that f contains the integral function N(.) and the upper limit k is a function of both P~
and T. The stock price partial derivative f, is
-f~,' [1-exp(-r~T)Td„]N(k)t P„N'(k)k'- exp(-ry7~XN'(k-Cs~)k~
The following relationship between N"(k-6~T) and N~(k) can be shown to hold:
N"(k-6~)- N~~~) Po eXP(I-~~ ,X
so that f, can be rewritten as
(109)
(110)
f~ -[ 1- exp (- r~T) t c1~~ ] N(k) . (11 1)
8 AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE EX-DIVIDEND
EFFECT OF DUTCH STOCKS
8.1 Introduction
The preceding analysis has detailed several aspects which may prove to be relevant for
the focus of the remainder of the present study: an empirical investigation of the ex-dividend
effect in the Dutch setting. We will try to find out to what extent the implications of the
risk-tax model described previously are supported by Dutch stock and option price and
volume data. This chapter considers the ex-dividend effect of stocks, whereas the next
chapter considers the prices of call and put options contingent on dividend paying stocks.
This chapter is organized as follows. We will first derive some testable hypotheses and
implications from the risk-tax model applied to the Dutch setting. Next, we briefly discuss
the result of existing studies of the Dutch ex-dividend effect, offered by Dorsman (1988)
and Dorsman and Verboven (1990). Section 4 discusses the methodology used in our
research. The fifth section contains the results of the cum-ex interval study. In section 6, we
extend our analysis to the larger cum-ex period, which is centered around the cum-ex
interval. This is done in order to investigate whether dividend-related effects are restricted
to the cum-ex interval itself. A summary of our main findings concludes this chapter.
8.2 Hypotheses and implications for the Dutch setting
8.2.1 Abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex interval
The risk-tax model developed in chapter 5 provides an equilibrium expression for the
expected cum-ex interval rate of retum of a dividend paying stock, which can be recalled
from (50) as
E(R)- R~t (]-t)d} ~~,(3 , (112)
where n,,, is the market risk premium. R is the stock's beta-coefficient, R, is the riskless
interest rate over the cum-ex interval, d is the dividend yield of the stock, and T is the risk-
tax parameter in the market. The latter reflects each individual's relative tax status t'
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weighted by his (tax-adjusted) risk tolerance `I". It was therefore interpreted as the risk-
adjusted, tax-induced market preference for cash versus capital gains income. Among other
things. it was assumed in the risk-tax model that the dividend payment is perfectly known,
so that dividend-related premium and the risk premium in the eyuilibrium rate of return
expression are additive. Since the relevant difference between the cum-ex interval and the
before- and after-intervals is the fact that the dividend is segregated from stock, it is useful
to split the expected cum-ex interval rate of return into a('normal') non-dividend related
part''". E(R~~,). and an 'abnornial' part which is generated by the dividend payment, E(AR).
so that the expected abnonnal (dividend-related) rate of return of the dividend paying stock
in thc rum-ev interv~al is defined as
E(AR) - E(R)- E(R, ~) . (113)
It follows directly from the eyuilibrium expression given above that the risk-tax model
sug~ests that the expected abnornial'~" stock rate of return is equal to
E(AR)- (1-~)d . (114)
As a conseyuence, our theory predicts a nonzero abnormal return or ex-dividend effect
when the parameter T is different from one. It should be noted that this parameter is present
in both the tax model under risk neutrality and the risk-tax model. There is, however, a
principal difference between the meaning of this parameter in each of the two models, as
may be verified from by recalling definitions given in (17) and (44). The ~-parameter in
the tax model is a weighted average of all individual tax-induced cash preference parameters
t', where the wealth invested by individuals in the stock are used as weights. The idea
expressed by the tax model is that tax incentives are always exploited to the maximum
extent, and hence the most wealthy investors will set the value of i in equilibrium. In the
risk-tax model, however, the risk attitude of investors is an important additional factor in
"y [t should be recalled that we have assumed the market dividend yield term. (1-t)dm, which is embedded
in the market risk premium rz,,,, is eyual to zero. This is reasonable when the weight of the dividend paying stock
in the market portfolio is small. See also footnote 159 in chapter 5.
~`t`~ The usual association of the term 'abnormal rate of retum' is to refer to a rate of retum premium or
discount due to some anomalous (i.e. not plausible or intuítive) phenomenon. Empirical studies investigating these
anomalous events are commonly called 'event studies'. The ex-dividend effect is not generally regarded as an
anomaly. Nevertheless. we will maintain the analogy with the event study methodology by using the term abnormal
rate of retum for the ex-dividend effect, i.e. denoting the impact of the ex-dividend 'event'.
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determining the aggregate value of the parameter i. It is therefore not at all straightforward
in the risk-tax model that wealthy investors set the value of ~ in eyuilibrium. Rather, it is
determined by tax incentives und risk tolerance.
Let us use the theoretical results to obtain hypotheses and implications which may be
tested in general and. for the purpose of the remaining part of the present study, with respect
to the Dutch setting. One of the most important yuestions is whether the ex-dividend effect
is a tax effect in the first place. It was argued in chapter 4 that there appears to be no
meaningful category of investors in the Dutch capital market that has a clear tax preference
for cash income (i.e. for which t'~l), while the group of wealthy individual investors can
be characterized by a clear tax-induced cash aversion. The value of i in the Dutch setting
will therefore theoretically not be higher than one. As a consequence, the finding of a
nonnegative average abnormal rate of return is consistent with a differential tax effect. This
yields the following implication:
[1] If the ex-dividend effect is a tax effect, the abnormal rate of return should on average
be nonnegative.
Chapter 4 detailed a number of features associated with dividend payments by Dutch
companies. To begin with, there appears to be a unique variety of dividend forms in the
Netherlands. Besides the 'regular' cash and stock forms, Dutch companies increasingly use
(sometimes complex) forms involving a choice between cash or stock or a combination of
cash and stock or cash and choice dividends. Moreover, it appeared that stock dividends,
either as part of a choice, or in a combination, or as 'stand-alone', are usually declared
against the share premium reserve which means that they are recognized as untaxable by
tax authorities. We concluded from this that many Dutch companies are 'fine-tunina' the
dividend payment in the sense that they want to redress the adverse tax effects of the
dividend for the shareholders. Therefore, given that the abnormal rate of return (i.e. the ex-
dividend effect) is positive on average. a differential tax explanation of the ex-dividend
effect suggests that it will be more pronounced for taxable dividends such as cash dividends,
in comparison with dividend forms containing untaxed stock dividends. On the other hand.
it was also argued before that transactions costs involved when the stock dividend is 'cashed
in' can be quite substantial, redressing the difference between the ex-dividend effects
associated with cash and stock dividends. Nevertheless, we test the following implication
in order to further characterize a tax effect:
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[2] If the average abnonnal rate of return is positive, a differential tax explanation
suggests that it is more pronounced for cash dividends.
In our opinion, the Dutch setting provides an interesting case by which the tax model
can be tested against the risk-tax model, ~iven that the ex-dividend etfect is hypothesized
to be a(differential ) tax effect. The risk-tax model suggests that investors decide to hold the
dividend paying stock based on a trade-off between tax incentives and the loss of (full)
diversification. ln this model, the dividend yield parameter d and the tax status of investors
are the dominant factors with respect to this choice. The essential difference between the
tax model and the risk-tax model is what factors determine the market parameter z in the
cum-ex interval, i.e. (i) tax incentives only, or (ii) tax incentives and risk attitudes. If the
first is true, then it is plausible that the presence of large tax-indifferent Dutch institutional
investors (with i'-1) cause the value of T to be in a range around one (in the tax model
with transactions costs). We have, however, argued in chapter 4 that many Dutch
institutional investors are rather risk averse in generaL Moreover, we have explained our
belief that these investors are especially reluctant to engage in strategies which do not fit
into their long term investment planning, and dividend-related trading in the cum-ex interval
is a good example of this. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that, based on risk-tax
arguments, the weights of Dutch institutional investors are very small in the cum-ex interval.
This implies that (wealthy) individual investors or foreign investors with T'~I dominate the
value of T in risk-tax sense. As a result, both the tax model (with transactions costs) and
the risk-tax model predict, for different reasons, a positive average abnormal rate of return.
An important distinction between these two models can be found in their correlation
predictions. The tax model suggests that tax-induced trading is most prominent (and the
stock rate of retum is less abnormal) in high-yielding, liquid stocks with low associated
transactions costs, since these stocks are the primary candidates for tax-induced trading.
According to the risk-tax model, investors balance tax incentives against risk-bearing, and
the abnormal rate of return is positively correlated with the dividend yield. Moreover, there
is no special reason to expect a correlation with (proxies for) liquidity costs and~or
transactions costs'11. The preceding arguments can be summarized into the following two
implications:
~~' The risk-tax model asserts that every investor bases his portfolio decisions on tax and risk factors.
Although less liquid stocks and~or higher effective transactions costs will increase the cost of establishing
portfolios. it will not have a pronounced effect on equilibrium portfolio choice.
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[3] The tax model ( with transactions costs) suggests a negatire correlation between the
abnornial rate of return and (i) the dividend yield, and (ii) proxies for liquidity and~or
transactions costs:
[4] The risk-tax model suggests that the abnormal rate of return (i) is ~ositivel~~ correlated
with the dividend yield, and (ii) nc~t correlated with proxies for liquidity and~or
transactions costs.
It was argued at the end of chapter 5 that there seems to be an unspoken policy among
Dutch individual investors of not declaring dividends for tax purposes. By doing so, the
taxable dividends can be 'earned' net of the dividend withholding tax which is in the order
of 15 to 25 percent of the dividend amount. By doing so, investors try to escape from being
taxed at a significantly higher rate. If this policy of dividend concealing, as it was called,
is true, then all investors have effective T'-values in the order of 75 to 85 percent (since
capital gains income is usually untaxed for these investors), so that the overall ti-value is
of the same magnitude. Consequently, the abnormal rate of return predicted by this dividend
concealing model (as a special case of the general risk-tax model) is close to the effective'~`
dividend withholding tax percentage over the dividend yield. The 'general' risk-tax model,
in contrast, will typically predict a higher percentage, ret1ecting the 'true' or 'unconcealing'
top income tax rates of investors. Another piece of evidence discriminating between the
general risk-tax model and the dividend concealing model can be inferred from the results
previous to versus after the 'Oort' tax reform, which was discussed in chapter 4, came into
effect. An interesting part of this reform was the substantial reduction of the top income tax
rate. Whereas the general risk-tax model predicts that the abnormal rate of return will be
lower after the reform, the dividend concealing model predicts no difference since the
withholding tax rate was not altered. In sum, we have the following implication
discriminating the dividend concealing model from the general risk-tax model:
151 The dividend concealing model (as a special case of the general risk-tax model)
suggests that:
(i) the average abnormal rate of return is in the order of 15 to 25 percent of the
dividend yield:
'~' The dividend withholding tax rate is 2i9~, but foreign investors may be able to reclaim 10 percent-points,
leavine an effective tax rate of 159~ for these investors.
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(ii) the average abnormal rate of return is not different before or after the Oort tax
reform came into effect.
A final remark can be made with respect to the extent that different predictions may
hold for final dividends versus interim dividends. The exposition in chapter 4 revealed that
it is customary among the very majority of Dutch companies to pay a dividend only once
over a financial year. However, some of the larger Dutch companies and some investment
funds propose two dividend payments in a year: an interim dividend and a final dividend.
Unlike the situation in the US where dividends are usually paid out quarterly, it is quite
exceptional to observe a Dutch company paying out more than twice a year. Interim
dividends by Dutch companies are frequently made in the form of cash. Moreover, the ex-
dividend day for these dividends is normally scheduled at the trading day immediately
following the day at which the interim dividend is publicly announced. In contrast, there is
usually a quite substantial time gap between the announcement date and the ex-dividend date
of final dividends (i.e. at least two weeks). This implies that the abnormal rate of return of
final dividends may be assumed to be a pure ex-dividend effect. In the case of interim
dividends, it seems that the effect is obscured by a possible announcement effect. However,
the companies paying interim dividends in the Netherlands appear to do so in a quite
predictable way: the ex-dividend day (and therefore also the announcement day) is usually
very much the same from year to year, and the amount involved is very much related to the
dividend of the previous year'". Also, we believe that Dutch companies typically use the
final dividend rather than the interim dividend as a signalling device. Therefore, we expect
no difference between the abnormal rates of return of interim and fin~tl tlividends.
8.2.2 Abnormal trading volume
We have confined our theoretical analysis thus far to the abnormal rate of return on
the stock. On the other hand, it is very intuitive to expect abnormal rate of return behavior
to be associated with abnormal trading volume. It may therefore be worthwhile to
investigate dividend-induced effects on total volume, in terms of the total number of shares
traded, from our theoretical risk-tax model discussed in chapter 5, which will be done right
~~; Moreover, many Dutch companies paying interim dividends relate the increase in the interim dividend
from year to year to the increase in the total dividend of the previous financial year.
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now.
The amount of individual wealth invested in each risky asset must be equal to the
product of the number of shares of the stock held by the individual in equilibrium (denoted
by n'~) and the~ market priee of the stock (P), such that
W'~,'
W''H~'' - rt'' P , it'` -
P
where W' is the total amount of individual wealth, and w'` denotes the eyuilibrium fraction
of wealth invested in the dividend paying stock. Recalling the equilibrium expres~ion for
individual holdings of the dividend paying stock given in (52) and making the appropriate
substitutions yields the following relationship for n'`:
n
n'~ - ~ (t'- i)~~S ~a~~ t ~ -n~„~ . (116)P P 6„~
where [...~, denotes the first element of the resulting vector. Expected total (double-counted)
volume in numbers of shares (indicated as E(TN)) is obtained after summing the absolute
value of trading volume over all individuals and using the definítion of `4~ in (44)'~':
~S-~d~ ~ `p n,,,
E(TN)- ' ~ `E' Í'- ~ ~t -N'„~
P ~- ~ P 6„~
(117)
It is quickly verified that the first tern~ in the right-hand-side of this expression is the
dividend-induced or 'abnormal' part of expected trading volume, whereas the second term
is the nornial volume'". It may be more convenient to multiply the total number of shares
traded by the cum-dividend stock price P in order to obtain total trading volume in monetary
unitti (or 'effective volume'). Expected ahnormal ( double-counted) total effective volume,
which will be referred to as E(ATV), is then
~~ Note that the presence of an expected value tenn in the market risk premium a,,, implies that trading
volume is also an exprctation.
~~~ Since our model is a one-period model, individual normal volume should be understood al the numbcr
of shares held in the ponfolio wfien no dividends are paid in Ihat perioc'I. With constant parameters in each period,
it is identical to the number of shares held in the previous period 1 i.e. no revision takes place). Due to the dividend
payment in the cum-ex interval. dividend-relared labnormal) volume may occur so that the number of shares held
is revised.
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E(A7'V)- L S 'd~ ~ y~~ ~r~- T ~ (118)
This abnormal volume equation allows us to state some additional empirical
implications. First of all, the term in the absolute value operator indicates that volume will
be more abnorn~al when the tax rate heterogeneity among investors is more pronounced.
This is even enhanced when dividend-related trading is primarily initiated by investors with
higher degrees of risk tolerance ~'. Also, the tax status of the dividend form should be
important for the magnitude of average abnormal volume. Therefore, we can further
investigate the presence of a tax effect using abnormal volume implications similar to the
rate of return implications [I] and [2] given in the previous sub-section, i.e.
[6J If the ex-dividend effect is a tax effect, abnormal trading volume should on average
be positive;
[7] If the ex-dividend effect is a tax effect, abnormal trading volume should be more
pronounced when cash dividends are involved.
The tax heterogeneity aspect provides another opportunity to distinguish the dividend
concealing model from the general risk-tax model. The dividend concealing model
presupposes that the effective tax parameters t' of all taxable (individual) investors are quite
close to each other and to the market average ~. The Qeneral risk-tax model suggests a
higher overall trading volume when a higher degree of tax rate heterogeneity is expressed
in the market Although we cannot rule out atl abnormal trading volume in the~ dividend
concealing model, it should be much less compared to the general risk-tax model.
This completes the analysis of testable implications from ourymodel for the Dutch case.
Before detailing the results of our empirical study, it may be interesting to overview the
results of existing empirical research with respect to the Dutch case. This will be done in
the next section.
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Table 8.1 The mean relative ex-dividend stock price decline in the Netherlands in the








Final, overull O.X I 0.7-1 C'a,h 0.77 0.63
maximum (1.y7 0.9d Choíce I.OX 0.8U
minimum 0.64"~ 0.59T~ Combination O.94~ 0.95
Interim, overall 0.65~~ 0.60~~
maximum Q90 0.88
minimum 0.47 0?6
Note The statistics in this table are collected from Dorsman and Verboven (1990). All tïgures are sample
means of the stoch príce decline in the cum-ex interval, relative to the dividend payment atisociated
with this interval. The close-open figures are determined usine the closine cum-price and the opening
ex-price of the stock. whereas the close-close figures use the closing price, of both the cum- and the
ex-day.
~ Significant from I at the ~"', level.
~ Si~.nificant from 1 at the 19c leve:.
8.3 Prior research with respect to Dutch stock prices
A very limited number of studies exist which investigate the ex-dividend day effect for
Dutch stock prices. In fact, there appear to be only two such studies, which are also closely
related to each other. In his dissertation, Dorsman (1988) investigates several aspects of
dividends and dividend policy with respect to Dutch firms. As a part of this study, he
examines the ex-dividend effect of Dutch stocks for the years 1979-1983. This research was
extended in Dorsman and Verboven (1990), who enlarged this database so that it comprised
the years 1981-1988. Since both studies reach hiQhly similar conclusions, we may
summarize the existing Dutch empirical evidence by detailing the results of the latter study.
Dorsman and Verboven (1990) focus on the prices (not volumes) of Dutch stocks.
They employed two alternative definitions of the cum-ex interval, i.e. ('i) cum-close to ex-
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open, and (ii) cum-close to ex-close. The stock price change from the beginning to the end
of the cum-ex interval was related to the dividend payment, producing the relative ex-
dividend decline a which was described earlier in chapters 2 and 5. The average value of
a over the sample was used as test statistic. Table 8.1 repeats some characterizing results
from the Dorsman and Verboven study. For the overall 1981-198R sample, the following
obsen~ations can be made''~:
(1) the average relative decline for the close-to-open detïnition of the cum-ex
interval appeared to be higher compared to the close-to-close definition;
(2) the average relative decline was significantly less for interim dividends in
comparison with final dividends;
(3) the average relative decline was signitïcantly less than one for cash dividends
(both final and interim dividends), for interim choice dividends and tïnal
combination dividends;
(4) especially for tïnal dividends, the relative decline appeared to be more or less
stationary over the years in the sample;
(5) the magnitude of the so-called 'implied tax bracket', i.e. one minus the average
a-value. was in every year very much less than the top tax bracket of 72~I~
prevailing in the Netherlands;
(6) no relationship between the average relative decline and the dividend yield
could be detected.
Dorsman and Verboven conclude from their study that the relative stock price decline
in the cum-ex interval in the Dutch setting is significantly Iess than one, which is regarde~d
as consistent with the existence of a tax effect. Although they observe that the average
relative decline for the largest sub-sample of final cash dividends (0.77) is roughly equal to
one minus the dividend withholding tax rate, they only infer from this that the market fails
to correct for the divide~nd withholding tax rate over the dividend payment. This conclusion
is strengthened by the tïnding that the average decline is not significantly correlated with
the dividend yield. In their view, the relative ex-dividend day decline of the stock price is
quite invariant over time, not related to the dividend yield, and not stock-specific, and very
frequently in the order of 70 to 85 percent of the dividend.
~~6 Recall that a hi~her value of the relative decline a implies a lower abnormal rate of return AR.
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Although both the studies of Dorsman (1988) and Dorsman and Verboven (1990) do
not derive or discuss the dividend concealing hypothesis, it appears that their prior evidence
is consistent with this hypothesis, according to which investors do not declare dividends for
fiscal purposes, and use the dividend withholding tax rate as 'inevitable' income tax rate.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will present a far more rigorous examination of the ex-
dividend effect in the Netherlands. The next section sets out the test methodology used in
the present analysis.
8.4 Methodology
Many studies with respect to the ex-dividend effect, including Dorsman (1988) and
Dorsman and Verboven (1990), have focused on the relative ex-dividend day decline (a),
which is directly related to the cum-ex interval stock rate of return (R) according to the
relationship given earlier in (20) and repeated as
R- (1-á)d , (119)
where d is the known dividend yield. Besides being the 'output' of our model, we have
explained in chapter 3 that testing the ex-dividend effect using rate of return statistics is
statistically somewhat more intuitive. In the remainder of this section we will derive a test
methodology for the ex-dividend effect in the Dutch case, which is based on the statistical
analysis set out in chapter 3. This will be split into two parts. First, we will focus on the
abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex interval. Subsequently, we will consider the abnormal
rate of return and trading volume over a number of trading days centered around the cum-ex
interval.
8.4.1 Testing the abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex interval
Our examination of the ex-dividend effect considers a sample of K cum-ex interval rate
of return observations, indicated as R~, where k-1,2,...,K. Consistent with the abnormal rate
of return definition in (113), it is assumed that each rate of return observation is generated
by the following model
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R~ - E1R,~~~.A) t E(AR~J t Ë~ .
Ë~- R~- E(R~) , k- 1,2....,K ,
where E(R„~,~) is the 'nornial' part of the expected cum-ex interval rate of return and Ëk is
the error term associated with observation k. The difference between the actual rate of return
and the norn~al rate of return is considered as the abnormal rate of return part, so that we
obtain the re~ression model:
AR~ - R~- E(R,,,~)- E(AR,, } Ë~- yt í-~ . (121)
The risk-tax model suggests that, in the absence of an ex-dividend effect, the expected cum-
ex interval rate of return consists entirely of non-dividend related tenns. Therefore, we can
state the null hypothesis of no ex-dividend effect as'~':
Ht~ : y- 0 . (122)
Let us now discuss the distributional features of the error tenns É~. Under the null
hypothesis, the mean abnormal cum-ex interval abnorma] rate of return is equal to zero for
every observation. The error terms are therefore drawn from populations with zero mean,
but this does not automatically imply that all observations are drawn from iclentical
populations. It is important to know whether the population variances are also identical, in
particular whether 6~ is equal for all k. It should be recalled that ts~ measures the (total)
risk of the stock associated with observation k. The risk-tax model states that ex-dividend
effects, if they exist, are non-random. Consequently, the risk of the stock is not related to
or affected by tax aspects. The risk level of stocks may, of course, be different across stocks
which implies that a~ may indeed be different for each k. This is essentially a problem of
heteroskedasticity. A related problem is that the population variances are unobservable, and
so we have to estimate them. These problems may be addressed in two alternative ways.
First, we could simply ignore the heteroskedasticity problem by assuming that the difference
among population variances is negligible. Alternatively, we could make suitable assumptions
with respect to all variances and apply a oeneralized least squares (GLS) estimating
~~~ Note that this null hypothesis is quite general in the sense that it is designed for the test of ex-dividend
effects from whatever source. On the other hand, we will investigate only whether a possible ex-dividend effect
is consistent with the (risk-Ítax model, which implies that the expected rate of retum in the cum-ex interval is
supposed to be given by tJ 13).
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procedure instead of the basic ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure"„. Although the GLS
approach is certainly more preferable from a theoretical standpoint, data limitations forced
us to do both in our study. More specifically. the cum-ex interval test will be carried out
under the assumption of homoskedasticity and OLS. On the other hand, the GLS approach
will be applied when we look at the cum-ex period in the next sub-section. It should be
noted''", however, that the OLS estimator of y, i.e. the sample mean abnormal rate of return
(denoted as AR), will be less efficient (even in large samples) when heteroskedasticity
exists, but it is unbiased in both small and large samples, which is still a desirable property.
Furthermore, when there is only a constant term in the regression and the sample can be
considered as well-designed, then the heteroskedasticity-related bias in the OLS estimator
of the variance of AR will be negligible"".
A final remark must be made with respect to problems arising from possible
correlations between observations, i.e. either (1) between observations on different trading
days, ancl (2) between observations on the same trading day. Correlations between
consecutive rates of return are indeed the focus of many empirical studies in financial
economics which investigate the extent to which stock rates of return can be predicted fi~om
e.g. historical data and publicly disclosed information'". In our view, the overall result of
these studies does not very much support the idea that stock rates of return are serially
correlated, althouah it may be that they are somehow related from time to time. In
accordance with this, we will assume that no (linear) correlation exists between any pair of
~~x A third way to encompass the heteroskedasticity problem would be to apply a procedure suggestecl hy
White ( 1980), which does not require u pnrticular assumption about the variances. It involves an estimator for the
variance to be used in the test statistic which is slightly different from that obtained from ordinary least syuares
estimation. Unfortunately, when the regression eyuation only contains a constant such as in our test, the White
variance estimator is identical to the ordinary least syuures variance estimator.
'4y See e.g. Kmenta ( I 971, Ch.8 ).
`511 This can be seen as folluws. Let s be the sample variance obtained from the abnormal rate of return
observations. Also, let s'(AR)-s'~K be the OLS estimator of the variance of AR. Both estimators are known as
unbiased and efficient estimators under the assumption of homoskedasticity. In the case of hereroskedasticity, the
bias of the latter variance estimator dirertly depends on the biss of s~. For a regression model involving only a
constant term, it can be shown that EI~'t-[~,6,J~I{. where 6, equals the population variance corresponding with
the k-th observation. When the population variances can reasonably be assumed to be evenly spread around s', then
E(s-1 will be very close to s' so that the bias due to heteroskedasticiry does not im~alidate the OLS variance
estimator. tiote, however, that this result will usually not carry over to a model with a constant term and one (or
morel dependent variables.
~'~ For a review of such studies. see Nijman (19931 and the references contained therein.
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abnormal rate of retum observations associated with different trading days. A more severe
problem is whether the assumption of uncorrelatedness can be maintained for observations
associated with the same trading day. Strictly speaking, our theoretical model involves the
variance-covariance matrix S which explicitly allows for correlations among the rates of
return of stocks in the same cum-ex interval. Two more or less competing approaches have
been advanced in existing studies of the ex-dividend effect, i.e. the event time method and
the calendar time method",. The event time method includes each observation as a separate
observation and assumes that it is uncorrelated with every other observation. The calendar
time method, on the other hand, averages all observations with respect to the same trading
day and treats the daily averages as uncorrelated observations. Despite their theoretical
differences, the results of both methods appear to be virtually the same. This motivated us
to use the event time method and we assumed that daily observations are uncorrelated"'.
Essentially, this means that we assume that the cum-ex interval rate of retum of one
dividend paying stock may be correlated with other stocks, but not with other stocks also
paying out a dividend in the same interval.
In sum, we test for the presence of an ex-dividend effect using the regression model
specified in (121), assuming that all error terms associated with the abnormal rate of retum
observations are drawn from uncorrelated populations with zero mean and identical
variances. This implies that, under the null hypothesis given in (122), the sample mean
abnormal rate of return (i.e. the OLS estimator) is normally distributed in large samples. The
associated z-statistic has a standard normal distribution, i.e.
- ~ - ~R ~- N(~, I ) .
s(~y) s
(123)
where ~( is the OLS-estimator of the mean abnormal rate of retum, s(~) is the OLS-
estimator of the standard deviation of ~, which are given by the sample mean AR and the
sample standard deviation s relative to the square root of the sample size, respectively. This
test statistic can be used not only for the entire sample, but also for relevant sub-samples
such as cash dividends, 19R9 dividends, final or interim dividends. etc., as will be made
clear in later sections.
-'~ Sce Eades, Hess and Kim ( 19841 and Lakonishok and Vermaelen 11986) for a more detailed discussion
of bcxh method~.
~~~ Note also that the clustering of observations on the same trading day may make estimators less eftïcient,
but they remain unbiased.
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8.4.2 Testing standardized abnormal rate of return and volume behavior in the
cum-ex period
It has been stated in chapter 1 that the cum-ex interval is an interval which is part of
a larger interval, the so-called cum-ex period. After having investigated the abnormal rate
of return in the cum-ex interval using the methodology outlined in the preceding sub-section,
we could proceed by examining the abnormal rate of return on other trading days included
in the cum-ex period. The purpose of such an analysis would be to find out whether
abnormal behavior is also present on trading days without a'physical' dividend payment.
although trading activity and stock pricing might be related to the fact that the stock will
soon go ex-dividend ( or has just gone ex-dividend). Similarly, we may investigate trading
volume in the cum-ex period in order to examine days at which volume is higher than usual
(i.e. abnormal). Let us briefly discuss the methodology of both tests below.
First, we should enlarge the sample described in the preceding sub-section in such a
way that it contains daily abnormal rate of return observations of each trading day included
in the cum-ex period. Note that the rate of return over every interval ( i.e. trading day) other
than the cum-ex interval does not include a dividend payment by definition. Next, we will
continue to assume that any pair of abnormal rate of return observations is uncorrelated.
However, we will explicitly address the heteroskedasticity problem by applying a GLS
estimation approach based on standardizing the abnormal rate of return observations.
Denote by AR~, the abnormal rate of return observation over interval t, relative to the
ex-dividend event k, where k-1,2,...,K. Virtually all intervals have the length of one trading
day, i.e. from the close of day t-1 to the close on day t. However, there are two exceptions.
The first is when a weekend occurs between day t-1 and day L The second is the trading
day including the ex-dividend day, which is split (for reasons that become clear later) into
two parts: ( 1) the interval from cum-close to ex-open ( denoted as interval -0), and (2) the
interval from ex-open to ex-close ( interval t0). We defined the ex-dividend period such that
it includes the 13 trading days prior to the cum-ex interval, the two inte~rvals indicated as -
0 and f0, and the 14 trading days following the ex-dividend day. The interval index t can
therefore be expressed as t--13,-12,...,- I,-O,fO,t 1,...,f 14.
It is assumed that the AR~,-observations associated with event k are drawn from a
population with zero mean and variance equal to 6~. This 'event-variance' is estimated by
s~, the determination of which will be explained in section 8.6. We can obtain standurdi~ed
abnormal rate of return observations, denoted as SAR~,, after dividing through each ARk,-




Each standardized observation SAR~, can now be assumed to be drawn from a standard
normal distribution. This allows us to specify the following regression model for the
standardized abnormal rate of return in any interval t:
SAR~~ - E(SAR~,) } uA~ - S~ t uA~ .
The 'extended' null hypothesis is
(125)
H~~ : S, - 0 . (126)
Since all error terms u~, are assumed to be uncorrelated, and normal with zero mean and
variance equal to one, it follows that SAR,, the sample mean of all standardized abnormal
rate of return observations associated with a given interval t, is also normally distributed
with zero mean and variance equal to l~K,, where K, is the number of observations included
in the sample mean. The ussociated z,-statistic is
., - SAR, - Kr . (127)
Let us now turn to trading volume in the cum-ex period. Define TVk~ as the trading
volume (in monetary units) associated with ex-dividend event k in interval t. Without
duplicating the analysis provided earlier, we will make similar assumptions as those used
for the (abnormal) rate of return in the cum-ex period, i.e. all observations are pairwise
uncor-related, and the observations associated with event k are drawn from the same
population. However. (double counted) trading volume is obviously never negative and, for
inactive traded stocks, it may sometimes be zero. Casual empiricism also suggests that
trading volume is skewed to the right. Therefore, trading volume is not very likely to be
normally distributed. Alternatively, it is much more plausible to assume that trading volume
is lo~~~nnrmullt~ distributed. Abnormal volume, ATV~, will therefore be defined as the natural
logarithm of the ratio of actual volume, TV~,, and expected volume associated with event
k. E(TV~~), i.e.
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AT['~ - In ~~ a,
E(TV~,)
(128)
[f there were no dividend-related volume effect, then expected abnormal volume will
be zero. Using similar arguments as in the case of abnonnal rates of return, we will adopt
the assumption that the variance is identical for abnormal volume observations associated
with the same event k, and is eyual to 6~-~. The standardizing procedure outlined above can
now be repeated in order to obtain standardized abnormal volume observations, SATV~,,
using the estimated standard deviation s7A:
A Tl
SATV~~ - "` (1 ~y)
rr~
The regression model for the abnormal volume test is
SATV~,r - E(SATV~,) t x ~- t',~ t x~,
and we use the null hypothesis
(130)
H„ : ~~~- 0 . (131)
The same averaging procedure as in the case of abnormal rates of return can be used Co test
the mean abnormal trading volume associated with a given interval t. The test statistic is
similar to the z,-statistic in (127).
8.~ Data collection and cum-ex interval abnormal rate of return determination
8.~.1 Data collection
Having discussed the test methodology, we will now provide some characteristic
features of the database employed in the prese~nt study. In fact, one of the problems
encountered by us was that no yuickly accessible (electronic) database exists with respect
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to dividend payments by Dutch companies which is sufficiently detailed for our study''~.
Therefore, we had to establish a database by hand and collected all ex-dividend listings
which appeared in the Officiële Prijscour-ant, the daily official publication of the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, in the ex-dividend listing section for the years 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992.
However, we excluded dividends by companies listed as 'buitenlandse fondsen' (shares of
foreign companies) in the Officiële Prijscouraitt. This produced a database consisting of
1082 ex-dividend listings. Unfortunately, 202 listings had to be eliminated for various
reasons:
38 listings appeared to be related to companies which are listed in the Oftïciële
Prijscaurantas non-foreign, but who either have a foreign denomination of stock
prices, and~or who are in fact foreign companies; this frequently occurred for
foreign-based investment companies;
in 118 occasions, the dividend payment was associated with a company for which
there was no meaningful cum- or ex-dividend price (or both); this could be due to
bid- or ask-prices or to trading suspensions in which case there was no official
price at all;
46 listings were eliminated from the sample because they involved a dividend
payment less then NLG 0.50; this was done to avoid estimation errors or biases due
to the fact that stock prices are quoted in multiples of NLG 0.10.
This left us with an initial sample of 880 ex-dividend events, characterized by their ex-
dividend date, for which the following details were recorded from the Offici~le Prijscnururzt:
- the type of dividend: final or close, cash, choice, combination or stock;
- the cash amount involved, and~or the stock details: percentage additional shares,
chargeable to which reserve: share premium, other reserve, or choice between share
premium reserve and other reserve;
~5~ Just to give an example, we needed information about the nature of the part of a choice dividend which
is chareed agaínst the share premium reserve, as opposed to the part chargeable (upon request) to the other
reserves. Such information is not provided by any electronic investor service known to us. As will become clear
in this section, we collected many details about dividend payments, and our database is available for new research.
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- other details about the stock associated with the event, such as whether it is a
member of the list of 'actively traded stocks', whether options are traded with
respect to the stock, whether it is an im~estment fund, and so on;
- the market prices of the stock at the cum-close, the ex-open, and the ex-close;
- in the case of a stock element in the dividend: the opening price at which the stock
dividend was traded in the market at the ex-dividend day.
With this database available, rates of return can be determined for the cum-ex interval.
8.5.2 The abnormal cum-ex interval rate of return
A sample of 880 (-K) rate of return observations in the cum-ex interval, R~, was
obtained after applying the regular rate of return definition (see also eyuation (2)) to each
ex-dividend observation, i.e.
R - PA- P,c} DA
" P ~a
(132)
where P~.k, and P~k denote the stock prices at the beginning and the end of the cum-ex
interval, and Dk denotes the market value of the dividend. Actually, we used two alternative
values for P~~: the ex-close and the ex-open market price of the stock. This produced two
alternative rate of return samples, indicated as the close-close and close-open samples.
In order to obtain abnonnal cum-ex interval rates of return, we have to deduct the
expected non-dividend related rate of return, E(R~~,k), from the realized rate of return. The
risk-tax model equilibrium relationship (1 12) suggests that E(R„~~) should be determined as
E(R,,,r.A) - RrÁ } ~„~.A RA . (133)
where the k-subscripts indicate that the relevant parameter is associated with observation k.
Substituting the market risk premium'` as n,,, ~-E(R,,, ~)-R, ~, we can write the normal rate
of return as a weighted average of the riskless rate of return R;, and the expected market
rate of return E(R,,,~), i.e.
~'~ Recall once again that we have atisumed that the market dividend yield rerm f 1-t)d,,, is negligible.
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E( K,,,,.1) - (1- (3 ~) R~.A t Q, E( R,,,-A~ .
Now let us identify four variants of this specification, i.e.
(i) (3~-0 and R~~-O : E(R~,~~j-0 :
(tt) Rti-O : E(R~,i.~)-1~r.~ ;
(iii) (3~-1 : E(R~,,~)- E(Rm~) :
(iv) estimate (3~ : E(R,,,,~)-(1-(3~)R,~t~3tE(R,,,~) .
1134)
The first variant assumes that the expected non-dividend related rate of return is equal
to zero over the cum-ex interval. The second variant supposes that no risk premium over
the riskless interest rate is included in the cum-ex intervaL The third and fourth variants do
include a risk premium: the difference between these two is that the beta-coefficient is
estimated for each observation in the latter variant, whereas it is set equal to the market
average of one for all observations in the third variant. It seems quite clear that the most
~eneral fourth method will provide superior estimates of the normal cum-ex interval rate of
return. On the other hand, studies such as Michaely (1991 j and Brown and Warner (19R5)
point out that, although the fourth method is theoretically superior, it is also quite difficult
to obtain adequate estimates of the event-specific (3~-parameters. They conclude that when
the sample is well-designed in the sense that it can reasonably be assumed that the (3~-values
are evenly spread around the market average of one, as is typically the case in our study,
there is no significant difference between the average abnormal rate of return statistics
obtained from employing either the third (market adjusted) method or the fourth (market
model adjusted) method.
Given the preceding discussion, we created three different abnormal rate ot return
samples, i.e. two unadjusted sample~ using method (i), and one sample using the market
adjustment method (iii). In the unadjusted samples, the abnormal rate of return is determined
(1) from cum-close to ex-close (indicated as the 'close-close' samplej, and (2j from cum-
close to ex-open (the 'close-open' sample). In the third sample, the abnormal rate of return
from the close-open sample is adjusted by the market rate of retum from rr~m-close to e-r-
open`Sfi. The reason for this is the following. When trading at the Amsterdam Stock
~5~ Note that, by doing so, we are not assuming away the ~risk' element of the risk-[ax model. Besides the
fact that our third sample Jnes adjust for the presence of ríst:, it should be noted that the rish-tax model has a
special prediction for the value of the risk-tax parumeter t. which differs from other models such as the tax model.
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Exchange closes, there continues to be trading at other stock exchanges for some hours. This
holds in particular for the New York Stock Exchange. at which a few major Dutch stocks
are listed. It is possible that information is re~leased after closing in Amsterdam while New
York is still open and, consequently, this information will be reflected in the prices of stocks
listed in New York. Due to this phenomenon, an informal market has emerged in the
Netherland, (the so-called 'avond-handel') at which stocks can be traded for some hours
after the official market is closed. Althouoh this type of trading is usually restricted to the
larger Dutch stocks, it can be used to illustrate that prices of Dutch stocks may be
significantly affected by the overall tendency in the US market after the official Dutch
market has closed'S7. By subtracting the close-open rate of return on the market index, we
are essentially adjusting for this 'night-eftect'. Consequently, the third sample can be
expected to represent more 'pure' abnormal rate of return observations. It should be noted
that no single study known to us includes such a sample in which close-~o-~ipen rates of
return are adjusted for ~m overnight effect.
A remaining problem is how the expected close-open market rate of return should be
estimated. The usual way is to estimate it as the rate of return on a suitable market index
over the same interval. Ideally, we would like the index to have an opening listing, and to
be defined as a so-called 'total return' index which reflects stock price movements cn~d
dividend payments"". Two indices of the Dutch stock market were considered by us.
Although the CBS Tendency Index (TI)'~" is i~n~ a total return index, it is the only index
which has an opening listing. The CBS Total Return Index (TRI)'`'", however, does not have
an opening listing. Therefore, we determined the adjusted close-open sample using the T[.
On the other hand, we did use the TRI in our cum-ex period study, in which the market
adjustment method was employed in the determination of abnormal rates of return for all
intervals other than the cum-ex interval.
~" t`fote d~at stocks eoing ex-dividend at the following trading day are traded cum-drrrde~td in this night
market.
~5x See Dorsman. van der Hil~t and Wijmenga ( 1986) for a detailed exposition of Dutch market indices. the
large role of Royal Dutch, and their use in empirical financíal studies.
~'" In Dutch: the 'Stemmin-sindex Al~emeen'. This index has been replaced by the 'Amsterdam EOE Index'
at January I. 1994.
~~~ In Dutch: the 'Herlxleesing~index Algemeen'. tn contrast to the CBS Tendency Index, the CBS Total
Return lndex is a value weighted index. which implies that the weight of Royal Dutch stock is very large (in the
order of 40~h 1.
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8.5.3 Descriptive statistics for the cum-ex interval samples
Table 8.2 gives an overview of some characterizing features of the ex-dividend events
included in the cum-ex interval study. 1t appears that ex-dividend days are yuite evenly
spread over the years in the sample. More than 80 percent of all events correspond to final
dividend payments, which clearly illustrates that Dutch companies, unlike other - especially
US - companies, have adopted the habit of paying out only once a year. It may also be
interesting to compare the figures of this table with tables 4.1 and 4.2, which provide
corresponding fi;~ures for the years 1981 to 1988. It follows that the percentage of cash
dividends relative to the total number of dividends, has decreased significantly over the last
10 years from more than 80~h to nearly 65~10. Also, it appears that the choice dividend form
has gained more attention in the last years. Together with the combination dividend form.
these two forms are chosen almost without exception by Dutch companies when it comes
to paying dividend in the form of stock: the percentage of 'classical' stock forms is virtually
negligible in the sample. A similar conclusion can be reached for the tax status of the stock
element when this is included in the dividend payment: both the non-taxable (via the share
premium reserve) and the choice status (either via the share premium reserve or via other
reserves, upon investor's choice) are the predominant alternatives employed by Dutch
companies. Collectively, these figures strongly demonstrate the important role that tax
considerations appear to play in designing the dividend form by Dutch companies.
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Table 8.2 also contains some figures about other characteristics of the ex-dividend
events. As an indication of stock liquidiry, we have split up the sample into three categories
according to the associated stock's listing: ( l) active stocks, (2) inactive stocks, and (31
parallel market stocks. The tïrst category defines a list, made up by stock exchange
authorities and revised each year. of over 40 stocks with the highest effective trading
volume. These stocks are also separately yuoted in financial newspapers. The second and
third categories literally are the 'other' Dutch stocks. The parallel markei is an official
market where less restrictive regulations hold with respect to aspects such as the number of
outstanding shares and market capitalization. Parallel market stocks are also separately
yuoted in all popular financial publications, whereas the remaining stocks are usually yuoted
as 'inactive' stocks'". The latter name may, however, be somewhat misleading, since this
relatively large category includes a mixture of stocks, ranging from virtually untraded stocks
to stocks which are about to be 'promoted~ to the category of active stocks. It appears f~rom
the table that the vast majority of events is concerned with stocks from the inactive
category'"'. Besides events associated with active stocks, we have also included an entry
'optionnable''~' stocks in the table, which relates to stocks having options listed at the
European Options Exchange in Amsterdam. The options exchange authorities pursue a
policy of permitting the trading of options only with respect to more intensely traded stocks.
It is therefore obvious that a large overlap exists in the list of active and optionnable
stocks'~~.
~~'~ On the other hand, there is currently tat the end of 1993) a discussion going on in the Netherlands
suggesting the abolishment of the parallel market, such that the inactive and parallel market stocks are yuoted as
one category of stocks.
'fi~ Note that we already excluded ex-dividcnd events associated with srocks that are not traded in the cum-ex
interval.
~~' This term was introduced by Grammatikos (1989).
~~ There are, however, optionnable stocks which are not listed as active stocks, such as Nutricia. Hagemeyer.
Stad Rotterdam and KBB. Active and non-optionnable stcxks include many investment funds like Robeco. Rolinco.
Alrenta. Postbank Beleggingsfonds, etc..
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Table 8.4 Descriptive statistics for the cum-ex interval rate of return samples over 1989-
1992.
Santple sturislrc Close-c lose C(osc~-open Aelju.rted c'Inse-npen
Total number H80 880 tiRO
!vtean 0.0078 0.0057 0.0062
Variance 0.0005 0.0003 O.OW3
Standard deviation 0.0220 0.0174 0.017d
Median 0.0041 0.0031 O.ItO-13
Skewncss 2.8230 4.89R2 5.0-179
Kurtosis 29.6227 73.1376 77.9676
Minimum -0.1486 -0.1378 -0.1379
Maximum 0.2344 0.2500 0.2579
5"'-smallest -0.0431 -0.0347 -0.0340
~"'-lareest 0.1000 0.0693 0.0717
Table 8.3 shows two specitïc frequency distributions obtained from the sample, i.e.
with respect to the month and the day-of-the-week of the ex-dividend events. We also
computed a chi-squared statistic expressing the extent to which the observations are evenly
spread over the months of each year or days of the week. The highly significant value of
this statistic shows there is no even spread: it can be readily verified from this table that
more than 80 percent of all final dividends occur in three months of each year: April, May
and June. Alternatively, and probably related to this, interim dividends are concentrated
(more than 60 percent) in two other months: August and September. Furthermore, it appears
that final ex-dividend days tend to occur more frequently on Thursday and Friday, while
Monday and Friday are typical days at which interim ex-dividend listings are observed. We
will not deny that this kind of event clustering makes our assumption of uncorrelated rate
of return observations more or less questionable. Nevertheless, this assumption will be
maintained throughout our study in order to avoid statistical complications.
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Figure 8.1 Cumulative freyuency distribution of the adjusted close-open cum-ex interval
observations, relative to the standard normal distribution function.
- - - ~YJ ~ ~e
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Having detailed some characteristics of the sample events, we may now turn to the
abnormal cum-ex interval rate of return observations which are determined for each event
in the way discussed previously. Three such samples were established, i.e. the close-close,
the close-open, and the adjusted close-open samples. Table 8.4 lists some descriptive
statistics for all three samples. One of the first things to observe is that the mean abnormal
rate of return is positive for all three samples. However, let us delay the test for significance
of the mean for a short while in order to consider the distribution of the cum-ex interval
abnormal rate of return samples in more detail. First of all, the three distributions seem to
have much the same characteristics. All three samples have a high positive kurtosis'~5. This
indicates that the sample distributions are much more peaked than a normal distribution
would suggest (i.e. 'leptokurtic'). Also, the skewness is positive and relatively large, and the
median is less than the mean, which would suggest that the distributions are skewed to the
right. It may therefore be useful to investigate the sample distribution more thoroughly. This
-'~5 The kurtosís is determined using the 'minus 3' correction for comparison with the normal distribution.
The kurtosis figures for the close-open samples appear to be extremely high. We have also determined the
skewness and kurtosis figures for the standardized adjusted sample which will be discussed in the cum-ex period
study in the next section, and this produced 0.62 (skewness) and 7.78 (kurtosis).
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can be done by considering extreme values such as the maximum, minimum, 5'''-largest and
5'h-smallest entries in table 8.4. Figure 8.1 sketches the cumulative freyuency distribution
of the adjusted close-open abnormal rate of return observations relative to the normal
distribution. In order to obtain a meaningful comparison, we have scaled all observations
with the sample mean and standard deviation, so that the horizontal axis represents standard
nornial units. This `~raph suggests that the sample distribution is indeed very much peaked
and it also contains more extreme values than the normal distribution would suggest. It can
be verified from figure 8.1 that approximately 90 percent of the observations are within the
standard unit interval"'`' of (-1.O;f ].1) which is very close to an interval of two times the
standard deviation around the mean. It also illustrates that much of the probability mass is
centered around the mean. We would attribute the positive skewness feature to the fact that
the positive extreme outliers are larger than the negative extremes so that the mean, which
is more sensitive for this, is somewhat higher than the medi~tn. It hus to be noted, however.
that we do not reyuire the sample distribution to be nonnal: rather, we assume large sample
normality for the sample mean abnormal rate of return.
When comparing the close-elose sample with the two close-open s~unples, it appears
that the close-close sample has both hígher mean and hi~her variance. This should not be
surprising since the close-close rate of return contains an open-close part on top of the
close-open rate of return, adding more noise to the mean rate of return. It can also be
observed from the two close-open samples that the market adjustment for 'night-trading'
does not affect the distributional characteristics very much. This is in line with the
conclusion of Michaely (1991) mentioned above. Collectively. the sample statistics indicate
that the ex-dividend effect occurs overnight, and either the unadjusted or the adjusted close-
open rate of return measures the effect more adequately.
Tables 8.5, H.6 and 8.7 contain the results of significance tests with respect to the
abnonnal rate of return in the cum-ex interval. The top panel of table 8.5 shows the results
for the overall samples. The remaining panels contain similar figures for each year included
in the study. Table 8.6 gives results for a number of sub-samples obtained from the overall
sample, in which aspects such as the final~interim type and dividend form (cash, choice.
combination or stock) are analyzed. Finally, table 8.7 presents the outcomes of some two-
sample meuns tests'''' with respect to the adjusted abnormal rate of return sub-samples.
`~ This corresponds to the abnormal rate of return interval (-.01 12a0.0236).
,~~ Thetie tests investigate whether the means of two samples are eyual, assurnine both samples are drawn
from populations with eyual variances.
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Table 8.~ Cum-ex interval abnormal rate of retua-n statistics in each year.
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tí uh.c Clnse-cln.ve Cln.cr-nperr A~ljusted c(usc-
n~ic~n
O~~eral I
mean H80 0.0078 O.OU57 O.U06?
st. error 0.02?0 0.0174 0.017~3
7 Io.5175 9.717R Io.í702
mean a 0.766-1 0.8300 0.79K9
1989
metm 3?7 0.097 0.005-1 O.OOS3
st. error 0.01 R4 0.0145 Q0145
7 7.8970 5.SK25 5.5398
me.~n a 0.6i70 O.R 17K 0.81 I ~
1990
mean 220 0.0077 O.OOiO 0.0051
tit. error (1.0254 0.014R 0.0147
~ 4.~874 5.0325 5.1314
mean a 0.7586 0.838R 0.8204
1991
me.an 210 0.0074 0.0064 0.006R
st. error 0.0222 U.0197 0.0194
~ -t.H026 4.7304 5.0732
me:~n a (1.7795 0.8131 0.7952
1992
mean 22~ 0.0063 O.OOóO 0.0076
st. error 0.0? 15 O.o203 0.020d
z 4.3677 4.400g ï.i519
mean a O.K73~ n.5~197 0.ir;;;-t
Note The last three columns contain the mean abnormal rute of retum. standard error. and the associated
z-statictic by which the mean ís rested (relative to O). The mean relarive stock price decline ('mean
a') is the mean of the associated a-values, obtained from the relationship AR-(I-a)d, where d
is the dividend yield.
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Table 8.6 Cum-ex interval abnormal rate of return statistics for various categories.
~lribs. Close-close Clnse-npen Adj. close-open
Final mean 735 0.0082 0.0058 0.0061
st. error 0.0232 0.0185 0.0186
z 9.i882 8.4901 R.8794
mean a 0.7822 0.8478 O.R402
Interim mean l45 0.0055 OA049 0.0065
st. error O.OI42 0.0095 0.0084
z 4.6765 6.2294 9.2701
mean a 0.6868 0.7396 0.5898
Active mean 210 0.0073 0.0055 0.0065
st. error 0.0162 0.0098 0.0086
z 6.5425 8.1326 10.9335
mean a.................................................................... ............. 0.7564............................. 0.8001....................... 0.7409.................................
Inactive mean Sï4 0.0076 0.0057 0.0059
st. error 0.022R 0.0202 0.0201
z 7.8364 6.6426 6.9214
mean a................................................................... ............. 0.7832............................. 0.8404....................... 0.8191.................................
Parallel market mean 116 0.0093 0.0061 0.0067
st. enor 0.0264 0.0144 0.0145
z 3.7921 4.i479 4.964R
mean a 0.7096 0.8343 0.8075
Optionnable mean I51 0.0070 O.OOiS 0.0064
st. error 0.0166 0.0101 (LOOOR
z 5.1899 6.6923 9.4772
mean a 0.7572 0.7829 0.7040
Stock, non-taxable mean 163 0.0068 0.0042 0.0039
st. error 0.0185 0.0145 0.0144
z 4.7004 3.6937 3.4492
mean a.................................................................. ............. 0.8164............................. 0.8932....................... 0.8937.................................
Stock,choice mean 141 0.0097 0.0055 0.0057
st. error 0.02I 1 0.0129 0.0125
z 5.4525 5.0497 5.4163
mean a 0.70-16 0.8408 0.8308
Note The last three columns contain the mean abnormal rate of return, standard error, and the associated
z-statistic by which the mean is tested Irelative to 0). The mean relative stock price decline (~mean
a') is the mean of the associated a-values, obtained from the relationship AR-(1-a)d, where d
ís the dividend vield.
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Our cum-ex interval test suegests the presence of an ex-dividend effect since the
abnormal rate of return is significantly positive in the overall sample and in almost every
sub-sample. The figures in table 8.~ also suggest that there do not seem to be substantial
differences between the years included in the samples. This was explicitly tested for the sub-
samples 1989 versus 1990-1992 in table K.7. The test statistic is insignificant which means
that there is no meaningful difference between the mean abnorinal rate of return from these
two sub-samples. Furthermore, table 8.6 investigates the abnormal rate of return for various
other sub-samples, and table 8.7 provides information about the extent to which mean
abnormal rates of return differ for paired sub-samples. It is interesting to observe that the
mean abnornial rate of return seems to be invariant to whether the associated stock is
actively traded, whether options are traded on it, and whether the (cash) dividend is a final
or an interim dividend. Finally, it can be observed that non-taxable stock dividends have a
significantiy lower mean abnormal rate of return than other dividends, although it is still
significantly positive.
Collectively, the cum-ex interval tests provide evidence supporting the implications of
the risk-tax model. The abnormal rate of return is significantly positive, it is not
significantly difterent for 1989, it is significantly less when non-taxable elements are
involved, and it does not seem to vary across observations associated with more frequently
traded stocks and optionnable stocks. These results make a more thorough investigation of
relationships between the abnormal rate of return and several other variables worthwhile.
This will be done in the next sub-section.
8.5.~ Correlations
The previous sub-section revealed evidence of positive abnormal rate of return
behavior in the cum-ex interval. There was also an indication that the abnormality is higher
when more taxable dividend forms are involved. This supports the existence of a tax effect.
and our first results indicate that it is the type of effect suggested by our risk-tax model. ln
order to examine this further, we will direct our attention to a sub-sample for which the
predictions of the model should be clearly visible, i.e. the sub-sample of taxable cash
dividends. Since the previous discussion suggests that a close-open sample provides the
more adequate estimator of the ex-dividend effect, we have carried out our test for the cash
dividend related observations in the adjusted close-ope~n sample.
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According to the risk-tax model, abnormal behavior should be positively correlated
with the dividend yield (see implication [4]). Therefore, we have divided the cash dividend
sample of 559 observations into deciles, where the first decile contains the lowest dividend
yield observations. Table 8.8 lists for each decile the mean and standard error of the
dividend yield and the abnonnal rate of return. It appears that the highest yield decile
contains a wide range of observations since it has a relatively large standard error. The table
also provides infonnation for each decile about the percentage of abnonnal rate of return
observations which is either above or below the grand mean and the grand median. The
decile means tend to be more frequently below the grand mean, whereas the decile medians
alternate around the grand median. This once more illustrates the skewness feature
embedded in the sample distribution discussed earlier. Although the number of observations
in each decile is large enough to rely on tests involving large sample normality, we also
included some nonparametric test statistics in order to make our conclusions somewhat more
robust.
The F-statistic resulting from a one-way analysis of variance with respect to the
abnonnal rate of return observations appears to be highly significant (at the I ~I~ level),
which implies that the hypothesis that the decile means are eyual across deciles should be
rejected. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between the dividend yield and the
abnormal rate of return is significantly positive at the l~o level. Together, these two results
strongly indicate that the abnormal rate of return is positively correlated with the dividend
yield.
The median and Kruskal-Wallis tests'`6~ can be considered as nonparametric
alternatives for the F-test, and both are less sensitive to outliers. The Kruskal-Wallis test,
a generalization of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for more than two groups, considers the
rcrnl~s of the observations in the sample instead of their values. The resulting H-statistic can
be evaluated with the chi-squared distribution. The median test is a sign test examining
whether the medians are different across deciles, and it also yields a chi-squared test
statistic. The values of these two statistics in table 8.8 clearly confirm that the abnormal rate
of return is not constant across deciles. Two additional rank tests are employed to
investigate correlation in the sample without assuming normality. Spearman's rho-statistc
can be used to evaluate the correlation between paired ranks. The monotonic trend test
examines the disarray in the abnormal rate of return ranks. Both tests produce test statistics
which are significant (at least at the S~~o level), again confirming the previously found
~68 For details of the nonparametric tests employed in our study. see e.g. Ferguson (19761.
An Empirica( Test of the E.i-Dn~idend Effect of Dutch Stocks 181
results. Therefore, we find evidence that the abnormal rate of return is positively correlated
with the dividend yield, consistent with the risk-tax model implication [4], and not with the
tax model implication [3].
We have already seen that the mean abnormal rate of return was not significandy
different for 1989. In addition, implication ~5] suggests for the dividend concealing model
that the abnormal rate of return should be around 15 to 25 percent of the dividend yield.
Table 8.8 therefore also contains a column 'AR~d' which relates the mean adjusted abnormal
rate of return to the mean dividend yield in each decile. Although there are differences
among deciles, it appears to us that the figures in the AR~d column indeed tend to
concentrate in the range predicted by the dividend concealing hypothesis'by. Therefore, our
findings support the dividend concealing hypothesis.
We have also argued in implications [3] and [4] that, given the existence of positive
abnormal rates of return, the risk-tax model predicts no specific correlation between the
abnormal rate of return and measures of liquidity andlor transactions costs. The tax model
predicts that some dominant group (which is not tax indifferent) exploits tax incentives to
the maximum extent, given the costs associated with tax-induced trading. Consequently,
abnormal rate of return should be less when effective 'trading' costs are higher.
Kaipoff and Walkling (1988) provide a thorough discussion of the measurement of
transactions costs and liquidity and conclude that these aspects are very difficult to quantify.
Among other things, they suggest that such costs are inversely related to (i) the market value
of the firm's common stock, and (ii) the stock price. If we take these two measures as
proxies of the inverse of transactions costs and~or liquidity, then the tax model would predict
a positive relationship between the abnormal rate of return and either of the proxies,
However, it proved somewhat difficult to obtain market value figures. Instead, we used the
annual trading turnover'~~~ of the associated stock (in monetary units) for the first proxy
which, in our opinion, is quite a good alternative since it essentially measures the same
thing as market value: the trading activity with respect to the stock. In order to prevent
obvious heteroskedasticity problems from employing these (double counted) volumes, we
269 The following roueh calculation may illustrate thit. i'he figures in the AR~d column average at 0?396
with a standard deviation of 0.1560. Suppose that we hypothesize the mean to be 0.2. The t-statistic is then equal
to 0.802L so that this hypothesis should not be rejected.
~~~ These figures were obtained from the Am~terdam Stock Exchunge.
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transformed it by taking the natural logarithm of turnover'̀71. The second proxy was
implemented as the closing cum-dividend price of the associated stock.
Again, we divided the adjusted close-open cash-dividend sample into deciles according
to either of the two proxies. Tables 8.9 and 8.10 summarize the results from similar tests
as those carried out for the dividend yield analysis. The turnover figures in table 8.9 provide
quite convincing results. The F- and H-statistics are not significant, while the median test
suggests a weak correlation ( at the lO~Io ]evel). The correlation statistics, on the other hand,
are all insignificant. Similar results are obtained for the cum-price deciles tests: although the
significant F- and H-statistics indicate differences among deciles, it can be verified that these
are almost entirely due to 'alternating' median differences. Moreover, the correlation tests
are all insignificant. Therefore, we conclude from both tables that no significant correlation
between the abnormal rate of return and either of the transactions~liquidity costs proxies can
be detected. This is evidence consistent with the risk-tax model ( and therefore also with the
dividend concealing model), but not with the tax model. It must, however, be added that this
conclusion heavily relies on the appropriateness of the proxies used in the test. Furthermore,
we have only tested for ( linear) correlation effects.
8.6 Abnormal behavior in the cum-ex period
The research for abnormal effects in the cum-ex interval collectively yielded important
pieces of evidence supporting the dividend concealing model in explaining the ex-dividend
effect in the Dutch setting. In this section, we will extend this research by examining market
behavior in a quite large period around the cum-ex interval. The purpose of this is to detect
whether abnormal rate of return and~or trading volume behavior is restricted to the cum-ex
interval only. This is important since the risk-tax model suggests that tax incentives are
traded off against risk bearing and, consequently, we would not expect investors to hold
dividend-related positions in the stock over a number of trading days unless their risk
tolerance is relatively high. Furthermore, the dividend concealing model predicts that,
especially for taxable dividends, the ex-dividend effect is just a(withholding) tax-related
correction on the stock price, so that no special effect is expected over the days immediately
~~~ Such a transformation is reasonable when, as could be verified in the case of our study, the vaziance
among abnormal rate of return groups increases more or les. linearh- ~~ith the level of turnover. For more details.
see Ferguson U976, p. 235j.
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surroundine the cum-ex intervaL The first sub-section discusses the additional data needed
for the cum-ex period study. The second sub-section discusses the results of this study.
8.6.1 Data collection
Our intention was to investigate a'window' of 28 trading days around and including
the ex-dividend day, which are indicated by the interval (-13,~-14), where day 0 is the ex-
dividend day. Therefore, we collected daily closing prices and trading volumes~~~ associated
with the ex-dividend events included in the cum-ex interval database which was investigated
in the previous section. Unfortunately, it turned out that a relatively large number of events
were associated with stocks that are quite infrequently traded'~;. leading to a substantial
number of zero-volume observations. With the knowledge that such observations may
severely affect the abnormal rate of return and volume statistics'-~~, we employed the
following strategy:
- when a zero trading volume occurred at more than five days in the window, then
the ex-dividend event was excluded from the sample;
- for the remaining observations. we neglected the days at which the zero u-ading
volume occurred.
This seriously reduced our initial sample of 880 ex-dividend events to 561 events.
including 327 cash dividends. For each event in this sample, we determined daily abnormal
rate of return observations by subtracting the rate of return on the CBS Total Return
Index~75 on the corresponding day from the rate of return observation. The ex-dividend day
abnormal rate of return was divided into two parts in order to pronounce abnormal stock
price behavior in the cum-ex interval: (i) the adjusted cum-close to ex-open rate of return.
which is identical to the adjusted close-open rate of return in the cum-ex interval study, and
(ii) the ex-open to ex-close rate of return, adjusted with the rate of return on the CBS
~~~ These data were supplied by the Dutch investor service STOCKDATA.
~73 Note. however. that the tielection pnxedure followed in the cum-ex interval study already excluded
observations with no trading volumc at dayx - I and 0 ( the ex-dividend date).
~~~ For example. the loearithmic volume statistic would by minus infinite tbr a day with zero volume.
`75 See the discussion in the previous section.
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Tendency Index over the corresponding interval. The intervals associated with these two
abnormal rates of return are denoted by '-0' and 't0' respectively. Abnormal volume was
determined by first relating daily volume to 'normal' volume, which was obtained as the
total volume'-76 in the year the event occurred divided by the number of trading days in that
year. Next, we took the natural logarithm of this ratio. The standardizing procedure outlined
in the methodology section of this chapter involves the determination of the standard
deviation associated with the event-related observations. We estimated this by the standard
deviation obtained from the observations in the interval (-13,...,-5,...,f5,...,f 14), and this was
repeated for each event. The reason for excluding the nine-day interval around the ex-
dividend day is to avoid including the abnonnal behavior itself in the standard deviation
e,timator.
8.6.2 Examining abnormal behavior in the cum-ex period
The results of our investigation with respect to the cum-ex period are contained in
tables 8.1 1 through 8.14 and in figures 8.2 through 8.7. Tables 8.1 1 and 8.12 present the
standardized abnormal rate of return and trading volume outcomes for all intervals included
in the window using the total sample of 561 ex-dividend events, and figures 8.2 and 8.3
illustrate these oraphically. It can be seen that the rate of return is significantly abnormal
(i.e. at least at the S~Ic level) in the intervals -3, -I, -0, f0, t2 and f4. Furthermore, the
standardized mean rate of return for interval -0(i.e. from cum-close to ex-open) appears to
be about fow~ times as large as the corresponding results for the ímmediately surrounding
intervals - I(the last cum-day) and f0 (from ex-open to ex-close). This demonstrates that
the ex-dividend day effect in the Dutch setting is very much prominent in the -0 interval.
II may be verified from the trading volume results in table 8.12 and figure 8.3 that, although
standardized volume is abnormal from intervals -3 through t2, the results for intervals -1
and -0 are again very much larger than the other results'~~. Both this price and volume
evidence strongly suggests that virtually all of the Dutch ex-day effect is concentrated in a
`~~ When the number of shares changed in a disproportionate way (due to stock splits and share issues and
so on), we corrected the total volume figures such that they resembled the magnitude of normal daily volume at
the day of the observation.
~~~ Note that the abnormal volume figures are logarithms. The -o abnormal volume of Q65 in table 8.12
should be interpreted so that [rading volume is on averaee 1.92 times as hieh as normal volume.
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very small time interval.
The previous conclusions hold even more in the results for the sub-sample of cash
dividends, given in tables 8.13 and 8.14 and figures 8.4 and 8.5. Whereas trading volume
is significantly abnormal in intervals -3 through t2, the rate of return is only (highly)
significant in the cum-ex interval -0, and (weakly) significant in intervals -9 (negative), -4,
-3, and f8 (positive), but almost six times smaller as in the~ cum-ex intervaL This suggests
that, for (taxable) cash dividends, there is abnormal volume in the days immediately
surrounding the cum-ex interval, but no dividend-related rate of return effecC. Although all
models theoretically predict that the entire ex-dividend volume effect is concentrated in the
cum-ex interval, we may raise the question whether the timing of dividend-related trading
is that tight in practice. It is our belief that timing considerations imply that this trading
activity typically occurs in a.rmall interval around (and including) the cum-ex interval. On
the other hand, the absence of a rate of return effect around the cum-ex interval is
theoretically consistent with all models. But it should be recalled from the di~cussion of tIS
empirical studies in chapter 3 that both volume ancl rates of return were found to be
abnormal for cash dividends in a number of trading days around the cum-ex interval, and
this is generally interpreted as evidence supporting the tax model`~x. In the Dutch setting,
in contrast, the abnormal trading directly outside the cum-ex interval occurs x~rthnut a price
effect. We therefore believe that our findings do not support the tax model.
It is interesting to note that trading volume tends to be significantly less than normal
towards the end of the window, indicating that trading slows down after a period of
excessive volume. We have also separated the total sample into dividends associated with
'active' stocks, and other dividend payments made by inactive and parallel market stocks.
The standardized abnormal rate of return and abnormal volume is illustrated in figures 8.6
and 8.7. The intervals -1 and -0 once more appear to pronounce the ex-effect most but, for
the active-cash sub-sample, there is a significant negative abnormal rate of return in interval
-1 which compensates the interval -0 figure. Upon closer examination, this result appears
to be generated by the interim events in the sample, which have a large negative abnormal
rate of return in interval -1 of -0.74, while it is equal to 0.67 in interval -0.
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Figure 8.6 Standardized abnormal rate of rewrn in the cum-ex period (cash dividends from
active vs. other stocks).
Figure 8J Standardized abnormal trading volume in the cum-ex period (cash dividends
from active vs. other stocks).
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Collectively, the cum-ex period study suggests that, especially for taxable cash
dividends, the ex-dividend effect in the Netherlands is virtually limited to the cum-ex
interval, and it appears to be an overnight effect. The presence of positive abnormal trading
volume in a number of days around this interval also suggests that trading does occur but
does not lead to a tax-induced premium in the stock rate of return. This indicates that the
extra trading activity is not associated with price pressure, as was typically found in US
studies, and we have argued that our findings are not very consistent with the tax model.
8.7 Summary
This chapter has been devoted to an empirical examination of stock behavior around
ex-dividend days for the case of Dutch corporations in the years 1989-1992. After detailing
a number of implications which were derived from our theoretical risk-tax model, we
proposed a test methodology.
Let us summarize the results of this investigation. To begin with, the database showed
a large number of choice and combination dividends, and virtually no stock dividend. This
feature is typical for the case of the Netherlands, and it was argued that tax considerations
are most likely to be accountable for this. Our cum-ex interval study revealed that the
abnormal rate of return is significantly positive in this interval, and this ex-dividend effect
is larger for taxable dividends in comparison with 'less' taxable dividends. This is evidence
supporting the hypothesis that the ex-dividend effect is a(differential) tax effect. We also
found that the abnormal rate of return is positively correlated with the dividend yield, but
is does not seem to be correlated with the proxies we used for transactions costs and~or
liquidity. This is evidence favoring the risk-tax model over the tax model as the explanation
of the ex-dividend effect. Next, we found two specific results indicating that the dividend
concealing model, a special case of the general risk-tax model, may be plausible in the
Dutch setting. First, we found that the mean abnormal rate of return in 1989 did not differ
from that in later years, despite the tax reform which substantially lowered top tax rates
from 1990 onwards. Second, it was demonstrated in the deciles analysis that the abnormal
rate of return is in the order of 15 to 25 percent of the dividend yield, and relatively
invariant across yield deciles, which suggests that the ex-dividend effect is not very much
affected by the level of transactions and~or liquidity costs.
The results of the cum-ex period study include the following: especially for (taxable)
cash dividends, the ex-dividend effect seems to be entirely restricted to the (close-open)
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cum-ex interval (i.e. interval -0). Around this interval, there appears to be abnormal trading
volume but no specific abnormal rate of return behavior. Clearly, this emphasizes that the
ex-dividend effect should be interpreted as a tax etfect. We have also argued, based on a
comparison with the results of US studies, that our findings are most likely not consistent
with the tax model.
Overviewing our empirical study with respect to Dutch stocks, we conclude that the
ex-dividend effect is an overnight (differential) tax effect, but not the tax effect suggested
by the tax modeL In evaluating the general risk-tax model against the dividend concealing
model, every piece of discriminating evidence, however, appears to point in the direction
of the dividend concealing model. The latter model asserts that all taxable investors use the
effective dividend withholding tax rate as the relevant opportunity cost of the dividend. Our
finding that the ex-dividend effect found in the Dutch setting appears to be equal to I S to
25 percent of the dividend yield is consistent with the idea that many taxable Dutch
investors conceal the dividend for fiscal purposes and accept the withholding tax as
'concealing costs'. It should be noted that, if wealthy individual investors use their 'true'
income tax rate as opportunity costs, we can explain our results only by invoking ad hoc
assumptions such as (i) irrational behavior e~xhibited by these investors by using an
unfavorable tax rate as opportunity cost, or (ii) the presence of large, tax-indifferent
(institutional) investors with a relatively high degree of risk tolerance in the cur7r-e.r interi~al.
However, we do not have any reason to believe that the majority of wealthy investors is
irrational. Our discussions with experts in the Dutch practice also have provided no single
clue with respect to the systematic existence of the type of investors hinted at just above.
9 THE EX-DIVIDEND EFFECT IN DUTCH OPTIONS
PRICES
91 Introduction
The preceding chapter has produced a number of empirical results with respect to the
ex-dividend effect in the Dutch setting. This chapter will focus on the prices of Dutch
American-style call and put options in the cum-ex interval. This is an application of the
theoretical options pricing analysis in chapter 7. The price of an option at any point in time
and, therefore, also just before the ex-dividend listing reflects the maximum of either
(premature) exercise or holding the option. This implies that the expected ex-dividend effect
of the stock is 'embedded' in imexercised cum-dividend options prices.
We will first brieFly discuss the results of earlier studies with respect to options prices
in the cum-ex interval. Next, the research methodology employed in order to investigate the
expected ex-dividend effect using options prices is pointed out. It appears that the abnormal
stock rate of return can be measured from options prices without assuming the validity of
the market model for the normal stock rate of return, such as was done in the previous
chapter. On the other hand, we have to assume that the LTB model, discussed in chapter
7, generates correct hedge ratios. It will also be made clear that a cumbersome procedure
is involved in the e~stimation of the volatility parameter implied by options prices. An
important issue is whether these will be more accurately estimated when obtained from
either call or put series, or from both simultaneously. Having resolved this issue, we discuss
the results of the abnormal stock rate of return embedded in options prices.
9.2 Prior studies investigating options and the ex-dividend day
A very small number of studies exists in which options pricing is examined with
respect to the ex-dividend day. In fact, only four such empirical studies are known to us,
i.e. Kalay and Subrahmanyam (1984), Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1986). Kaplanis (1986)
and Dorsman and Verboven (1994). We will discuss these studies right now.
Among the first to examine the relationship of stock and options pricing behavior in
the cum-ex interval were Kalay and Subrahmanyam (1984). The intuition underlying their
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study is the following. If the market correctly anticipates the ex-dividend effect
corresponding with stocks paying out dividends, then there should be no reason to expect
a systematic discontinuity in the pricing of options which are left unexercised in the cum-ex
interval. Stated differently, it is hypothesized that, given informationally efficient capital
markets, the option rate of return in the cum-ex interval should not be significantly different
from that in any arbitrary interval (of the same length) outside the cum-ex interval. They
test this hypothesis with respect to US American-style call options prices over the period
April 1979 and June 1980, for which daily standardized abnormal rate of return observations
are determined, which are grouped into two sub-samples ot (i) ex-dividend day observations,
and (ii) 'random day' observations. In line with their hypothesis, Kalay and Subrahmanyam
find no significant differences between abnormal rates of return for out-of-the-money
options in both sub-samples~7y. The in-the-money options included in their study reveal
deviating behavior in the cum-ex interval, but this seems to be generated by the class of
options in this sub-sample which are exercised prior to the ex-listing. Therefore, Kalay and
Subrahmanyam's study concludes that call options 'surviving' early exercise at the cum-
instant appear to experience rates of return in the cum-ex interval which are not
systematically different from those in similar íntervals outside the cum-ex interval.
The study of Barone-Adesi and Whaley (19R6) is based on a related intuition. If the
market correctly anticipates the ex-dividend effect associated with a dividend payment
scheduled in the future, it should already be retlected in options prices a number of weeks
before the actual ex-dividend day. Assuming the validity of an advanced option pricing
model~~~, the authors suggest that the relative ex-dividend day stock price decline as
expected by the market (i.e. E(á)) can be inferred from options prices at a considerable
number of weeks before the cum-ex intervaL This 'implicit a' is estima[ed from a database
of US American-style call options prices in the first three months of 1978 and 1979. Their
conclusions are that the expected a-value is not specific for the stock paying the dividend,
it is stationary from year to year, and its average value is not significantly different from
one. The latter is consistent with other empirical evidence of the US situation after
transactions costs became negotiable (in 1975), such as Kalay (1982), Eades, Hess and Kim
(1984) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), which all use data from years similar to that
~79
Out-of-the-money options are obvious examples of non-exercised options in the cum-ex interval.
`g~ The model used in their study is the RGW-model. developed by Roll (1977), Geske (1979) and Whaley
(1981). A disadvantage of this model is i[s virtual inapplicability with respect to American-style put options. The
LTB model discussed in chapter 7 does not suffer from this.
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of Barone-Adesi and Whaley.
In contrast to the previous two studies, Kaplanis (1986) and Dorsman and Verboven
(1994) use non-US data. The research by Costas Kaplanis considers the UK situation and
uses a very direct test methodology. Similar to Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1984). he focuses
on detemiining an estimator of the ex-ante value of a which is imbedded in option prices.
However, his methodology involves measuring the expected a-value using option prices on
the last cum-dividend day instead of a number of weeks before the ex-dividend day as in
the study of Barone-Adesi and Whaley. By identifying instantaneously riskless hedge
portfolios in the way described in chapter 7, he develops a methodology by which the
relative stock price decline can be estimated from the actual cum- and ex-dividend options
prices'`xl. While Kaplanis investigates UK American-style call options from 1979 to 1984,
Dorsman and Verboven (1994) also use this methodology in order to investigate Dutch
American-style call options in the years 1987-1990. Both studies reveal that the expected
a-value is significantly less than one: 0.56 in the UK situation and 0.76 in the Dutch case.
Kaplanis also finds evidence of a significant positive correlation between the expected
relative decline and the dividend yield, a result which could not be detected by Dorsman and
Verboven. The latter is also supported by our stock price study'K'` in chapter 8.
The empirical study in this chapter uses a modified version of the Kaplanis
methodology. Unlike Kaplanis (1986) and Dorsman and Verboven (1994), we estimate the
abnormal rate of return on the stock (from options prices) instead of the relative decline.
More important, we investigate both (American-style) call ancl put options contingent on the
same stock going ex-dividend. This has not been done before, and it will be seen that
investigating the ex-dividend from call options in isolation can lead to serious over- or
underestimation of the abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex interval (and thus also of the
relative stock price decline). Since our study is directed to American-style options, we use
the LTB model discussed in chapter 7.
~~t We will provide details of this methodology in later sections of this chapter.
`~~ See the 'AR~d' column in table K.B, from which it was concluded that the abnormal rate of remrn relative
to the dividend vield is to a lar~e extent invariant across deciles. Since ARId-1-a, this also holds for a.
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9.3 Empirical examination of Uutch call and put options prices in the cum-ex interval
The previous chapter provided interesting empirical evidence with respect to the ex-
dividend effect of Dutch stocks. In particular, it was revealed that the abnormal rate of
return is on average significantly positive in the cum-ex interval.
The options pricing discussion of chapter 7 yields at least two implications that may
be used to uncover further empirical evidence with respect to the ex-dividend effect ín the
Dutch setting. The first is that, under the assumptions maintained throughout the theoretical
part of our study, the ex-dividend stock price decline associated with the known dividend
payment is rationally anticipated by investors in the capita] market, including the options
market. Chapter 7 suggests that rational holders of American-style call or put options value
the option by the maximum of exercising immediately or holding the option for at least
another (small) interval. The expected cum-ex interval stock price decline is very relevant
for the 'holding value' of the option since it is part of the future stock price movement. On
the other hand, it does nnt affect the 'exercise value' of the option before the cum-ex
interval, since this simply involves relating the current (cum-dividend) stock price to the
exercise price. This implies that the prices of American-style call and put options should
ret7ect an estimate of the e.~pected stock price decline, and therefore also of the expected
ex-dividend effect in the cum-ex interval. However, we must be careful in concluding that
options prices provide an opportunity to re-examine the ex-dividend effect. This is because,
if the stock and options pricing models developed in this study were exactly true, then it is
not possible to obtain an improrecl estimate for a property of the stock (i.e. the ex-dividend
effect) from the price of a contract contingent on the price of this stock. But we do not
know whether our theoretical models hold, so we can use options prices in order to
alternatively estimate the ex-dividend effect. Our hypothesis is, of course, that option, prices
retlect the same ex-dividend effect as the underlying stock prices.
The second implication from the analysis in chapter 6 is that. especially in the Dutch
case, dividend avoiding strategies may be attractive for heavily taxed investors in order to
reduce or even eliminate the adverse conseyuences of differential income taxation. This
would imply that the volwne of options trading around the cum-ex interval is larger than
normal, especially for stocks with relatively high dividend yields.
Although the second implication certainly reveals an interesting research topic, we have
not examined it for the Dutch case. Two reasons for this may be advanced. First, although
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the recent commotion with respect to the dividend payments by Royal Dutch~~; sug.̀~ests
that investors massively resort. at least for this stock,-to dividend avoiding usin~~ deep-in-
the-money put options, there is no fully convincing argument why investors would not use
synthetic stock strategies involviniti put cuicl call options. Moreover. our analysis in chapter
6 reveals that the latter strategies are usually cheaper in tenns of transactions costs.
Therefore, we feel that examining deep-in-the-money put options in isolation may provide
only partial answers. More precisely, when no significant overall abnormal price or volume
behavior is detected for such options, this may not be used as evidence indicating that
investors are not generally engaged in dividend avoiding strate;: ies using options, since they
have other alternatives in the options market'`~~. A meaningful analysis ot this phenomenon
would involve a number of exercise prices of call and put options, and over a number of
trading days before and after the cum-ex interval, which requires an amount of data not
available to us. The second reason is that, even if we did have sufficient data, we would still
face the problem that it is very difficult to determine nornial behavior of options trading
volumes, which is necessary to obtain abnormal behavior`x5
Similar data limitations as those mentioned just beforé also restricted our analysis of
the expected stock rate of return embedded in options prices to the cum-ex interval itself.
This will be the primary focus of the options test in this study, and it will be further
explained in the remainder of this chapter.
9.3.1 Methodology
The examination of the ex-dividend effect using cum-ex interval options prices is based
on the methodology developed in the study of Kaplanis (1986), which investigates British
call option prices in the cum-ex interval. This methoctology is also applied by Dorsman and
Verboven (1994) to Dutch call options prices. The present analysis, however, departs from
~83 See chapter 6.
~A~ This remains true despite the enormous deep-in-the-nwney put options trading volume which has been
noticed around recent ex-dividend days of Royal Dutch stock. Investors may use other strategies for other stocks,
or may not use any strategies at all.
~~5 We cannot simply rely on the average trading volume over some interval as an estimator of normal
volume. This is because trading volume is typically wbstantial ~ahen the option is at-the-money, and yuickly tends
to be lower otherwise. In our opinion. this type of 'leverage' makes the average volume over a preceding period
relatively meaninoless as an estimator of normal volume.
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that of Kaplanis in a number of ways. The Kaplanis study focuses on the expected relative
stock price decline, whereas we will consider the abnormal rate of return on the stock,
which was also the essential statistic in the stock price analysis of chapter 8. However, this
is no principal difference since we have recalled many times that these two are directly
related. A more important difference is that we investigate both call urrd put options prices,
whereas Kaplanis only examines call options. Furthermore, instead of using the Black and
Scholes option pricing model for European-style call options as Kaplanis does, we employ
the LTB option pricing model to American-style call and put options'-~6.
The research methodology may be introduced using the discrete-time approach upon
which the LTB model is based. Suppose that the current moment coincides with the
beginning of the cum-ex interval, which is the first of the N sub-intervals up to the maturity
date of an American-style call or put option on the dividend paying stock'`~~. In accordance
with earlier analysis, we use the notation Pi for the current (cum-dividend) price of the
option, where j may either be equal to c(call) or p(put). The value of such an option can
be determined by taking the maximum of either exercising directly or holding the option for
another sub-intervaL In this case, the latter implies leaving the option unexercised for at
least until the stock is listed as ex-dividend. Let us consider only those options for which
direct exercise is not optimal, i.e. which will be held until the end of the cum-ex interval.
We also maintain all other assumptions needed to derive the LTB option pricing model. This
implies, among other things, that (i) the stock market is in eyuilibrium so that investors have
rational expectations about the ex-dividend stock price, and (ii) that the risk neutral
valuation may be applied with respect to the option price. so that the expected stock rate of
return assuming risk neutrality should be used in order to value the option. Since exercising
is not optimal, we can relate the cum-dividend price of the option to its expected'`ss ex-
dividend price, denoted by E(Pi), in the following way:
~~6 Note that Kuplanis explicitly investigates call options which do nor experience another dividend (besides
the 'current' dividend) during the remainder of their maturitieti. This enable, him to treat the ralls as European-
style. A substantial number of our options. on the other hand, rlu experience another dividend. On top of that, the
dividend-adjusted Black and Scholes model is not very suitable for American-style put options, even without
dividend payments.
~87 It is also assumed for ease of demonstration tha[ there is no further dividend in the option's maturity.
Note that, as was hinted at in the previous footnote, we actually employed a version of the LTB model including
multiple dividends during the remaining maturity of the option.
`~g Note that, when the ri,klesti hedge property holds, the expected npriar price is eyual in 'all' worlds, i.e.
it is not re~tricted to a ritik neutral ~~orld.
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E(P -)P; - r
]tR~. (135)
where Rf denotes, as before, the riskless interest rate defined over the length of the cum-ex
interval. Recal] from the expected rate of return definition ~iven in (3) that the cum-dividend
and expected ex-dividend stock priceti, indicated by P and E(P) respectively, ~tre related by
F(P)- P~lt E(R)j- D , (136)
where E(R) is the expected stock rate of return in the cum-ex interval. When R denotes the
realized stock rate of return in the cum-ex interval, we may write the ditference between
the actual and the expected ex-dividend stock price as
P- F.(P)- P[R- F.(R)] - P.AR . (137)
where, as before, AR is defined as the abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex interval or the
ex-dividend effect.
When a call or put option is left unexercised at the start of the cum-ex interval, the
framework used in our analysis suggests that the option price should necessarily reflect the
current stock price, net of the present value of the expected ex-dividend stock price
decline~sy, or P-. Furthermore, the sensitívity of the option price with respect to small
changes in the underlying stock price was defined as the 'hedge ratio' in chapter 6, and it
will be indicated by the symbol 4. The relevant stock price for the determination of the
hedge ratio is the 'net' stock price P-. Therefore, we may define the cum-divicíend hedge
ratio more tipecifically as'~tt
~gy This property was derived in chapter 6.
290 The error from neglecting the dixount factor in determining the hedge ratio may be measured by the
option's 'gamma', which denotes the second derivative of the option price with respect to the stock price Isee e.g.
Hull (1993, p. 310)1. Since ItRt will normally be very close to one, the error will virtually alwuys be negligible.






Since both the net stock price and the option price at the cum-instant differ from their






Our options pricing framework suggests that the ex-dividend option price can only differ
from its expected value when the actual ex-dividend stock price is different from its
expectation. This motivates the following linear relationship'`yl
P;- E(P;)- 4~P- E(P)~ . (140)
Finally, combining equations (13~), (137) and ( 140), we obtain




This is a very important relationship since it offers a unique alternative opportunity to
estimate the abnormal rate of return in the cum-ex interval. More precisely, when a test of
the abnormal stock rate of return embedded in options prices yields results which are similar
to the stock price tests discussed in the previous chapter, this would provide very important
additional evidence supporting the validity of the risk-tax model for the Dutch setting. Even
more important, equation (141) enables us to measure the stock's abnormal rate of return
or the ex-dividend effect x~ithout relying on assumptions such as the validity of a specific
version of the market model as was employed in our stock price study. Moreover, it should
29t Kaplanis suggests that this equation should hold for any (call) option. However, it is based on two (more
or less reasonable) assumptions, i.e. (il that the cum-dividend hedge ratio 4 may be determined using the expected
ex-dividend stock price EIP1, and (ii) that the deviation from the expected ex-dividend stock price. P-E(P), is
always small.
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be noted that there is no specific need to predict options prices using an options pricing
model. On the other hand, we do need such a model in order to determine the hedge ratio
of the option.
The abnormal rate of return equation (141) will be the focus of additional tests with
respect to the ex-dividend effect. A straightforward extension of the arguments presented
in chapter 8 suggests the null hypothesis that, on average, the ex-dividend option price will
be correcCly anticipated by investors. This. in turn, implies that the expected rate of return
on the stock is also correct on average and, consequently, the average cum-ex interval
abnormal rate of return on the stock would be zero under the null hypothesis. Since we are
effectively conducting a control test with respect to the cum-ex interval abnormal rate of
return, it should be no surprise that we continue to use a z-statistic similar to that in (123),
which was employed in the test of the ex-dividend effect in stock prices, and which is based
2on large-sample normality .
9.3.2 Data collection
In order to evaluate the cum-ex interval abnormal rate of return conclusions given in
the previous chapter, we test the abnormal rate of return expression (141) using a cross-
sectional database of Dutch call and put options prices over the same research period 1989-
1992. However, the availability of many options series with different exercise prices and
maturities urges to make data collection choices. Options traded on the European Options
Exchange in Amsterdam nonnally have initial maturities of 3, 6, and 9 months~y3. An
intuitive argument to investigate the shortest maturity series is that the prices of these
options may reflect the ex-dividend effect more sharply. On the other hand, it appeared that
many such options expire very soon after the ex-dividend date'̀y`t. We therefore decided to
concentrate on the next-shortest maturity or 'middle-maturity' options, which expire at more
`92
See chapter 8 for the cross-sectional distribution assumptions reyuired to emptoy the z-statistic. Potential
problems of clustering will be discussed in the next sub-sections.
293 ~e European Options Exchange also provides for trading in long-term call and put options with respect
to some of the major Dutch stocks. These options have initial maturities up to 5 years. For more details, see Veld
(19921 or Veld and Verboven (1992).
294 This was particularly true for ex-dividend dates in the first half of the expiration months Aprit, July, and
October.
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than 3 but less than 6 months after the ex-dividend date.
From the total number of 880 ex-dividend events included in the stock price study over
1989-1992 detailed in the previous chapter, 127 events were associated with stocks having
options traded at the European Options Exchange in the cum-ex interval'`95. For each of
these events, we registered all middle-maturity exercise prices which were listed in the
Officiële Prijscourunt with respect to the dividend-paying stock. We will use the tenn
'event-series' to refer to each of the 1605 American-style call and put series which were
identified. Subseyuently, we (manually) collected the following data for each event-series:
the type of option: call or put;
the exercise price and expiration date;
the closing bid and ask prices of the option at the last cum-dividend and the ex-
dividend day; the average of these two was recorded as the market price of the
option~y~ at the closing of each day:
the option's opening ex-dividend price, if available;
the open interest with respect to the particular event-series at the end of the last
cum-dividend and the ex-dividend day.
A number of event-series corresponded to deep out-of-the-money call or put options,
which are typically characterized by low option prices. Since the price quotations at the
European Options ExchanQe are made in multiples of NLG 0.10 and are (obviously)
bounded below by zero, low option prices may appear to be insensitive to changes in the
stock price due to rounding. Therefore, we eliminated 139 event-series for which the
average of the closing bid and ask prices at the ex-dividend day were less than NLG 0.60.
Furthermore, there was zero open interest at the end of the ex-dividend day for 109 of the
remaining event-series, which were also eliminated from the initial event-tieries sample.
This left a sample of 1357 event-series: 808 call and 549 put series. Our analysis
suggests, however, that we should consider only those options series which may reasonably
be expected to remain unexercised in the cum-ex intervaL This is no problem for the put
series since the last cum-dividend instant is one of the very few instants at which premature
295 The 127 dividend payments were made by 31 different companies.
Zyb The idea of treating the average of the bid-ask quotes as the prevailing market price of the option ís very
intuitive. In determining ISD-values for Dutch call options. Kemna (1987) also employs this average as the 'best'
market price of [he option.
The Er-Diridertd Effect in Dutch Options Prices 205
exercise is not rational~y~. In contrast, this instant is the crucial instant for the possible
premature exercise of call options. We included only those call event-series for which the
closing cum-dividend option price, P~, met the followina condition:
- PV(X) ;
P-- P- D- PV(D-) ,
(14~)
where PV(X) is the present value of the exercise price over the option's maturity, PV(Dt)
is the present value of future dividends in the maturity of the option'~R, and all present
value calculations involve the riskless interest rate. The right-hand side of the inequality is
identical to the so-called 'European-style lower bound' when the expected relative ex-
dividend stock price decline is assumed to be equal to one for all dividends~yy. Since PV(X)
is less than X for any positive riskless interest rate, this boundary is more restrictive than
the corresponding boundary when X is substituted for PV(X). By requiring the call price to
be higher than the European lower bound, we implicitly re~yuire the holding value to exceed
the exercise value for the cum-ex interval. This ruled out another 38 call series frotm the
event-series sample, le~aving a final database of 1319 event-series. Table 9.1 summarizes the
characteristics of the remaining event-series sample.
297 It is obvious that the put holder expects to be betrer off by waiting for the end of the cum-ex interval
at which the dividend is separated from the stock price. Of course, it may be true that, due to unexpected market
movements, the e.c-posr realized ex-dividend stock price is substantially higher than the e.a-anre expected price. In
that case, it seems that the put holder would have been better off from exercising at the cum-instant. This is.
however, an ad-hoc argument based on irrutionul exercise behavior. [n contrast, rurionul market behavior assumes
that some pricing model based on risk aversion is used by investors to set equilibrium stock prices in any interval
including the cum-ex interval. Our risk-tax model is such a modeL Conseyuendy, options prices are also set using
the rcrtionull~~ expected ex-dividend stock price. For more details, see Cox and Rubinstein (1985, pp. 245-252).
29R There appeared to be one (and only one) 'extra~ dividend payment for a considerable number of series
included in the sample.
~yy See e.g. Hull 11993, p. 1661.
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Table 9.1 Summary description of the event-series sample 1989-1992.
Chapter 9
Number of ex-dividend events 1?7
Number of different companies 31
Total number of event-series 13I9
Call options (non-exercised) 661
Put options 6~8
.4verage maturity 0.42 years
Number of event-series with open-ex price
available 776
Call options Inon-exercised) 431
Put optiona 345
Percentage in-the-money~
Freyuency (number of Cumulative freyuency
event-series) (relative to totall
less than -25~ir 16 1.129r
-?59~ Io -I S~Ir 75 6.90~ic
-15~I~ to -S~Ir 337 32.45oIc
-~9r to -I~c 18~ 46.23~1c
-1 ~ir to I 9~ 88 52.92~i~
I~l~ to 5~ï~ l71 65.88~ic
5~7c to IS~~c 311 89.46~i~
15~4 to 25rIc 92 96.4490
more than 259c 47 Ioo.009r
Note The in-the-money percentage is determined as the option's exercise value at the closing of the last
cum-dividend day relative to the closing cum-dividend stock price. A negative percentage means that
the option is out-of-the-money.
The E.r-Diriclencl Effèct in Dntc~h Optinns Price.r 207
Closing cum-dividend stock prices were taken directly from the data-set employed in
the stock price study. For the riskless interest rate in the option's maturity we chose the 6
months AIBOR yuotation~tx) prevailing at the closing of the last cum-dividend date, which
could be obtained from Datastream. The final parameter to be determined is the hedge ratio
~ fior each of the event-series. This requires a somewhat more elaborate treatment which is
provided in the next sub-section.
9.3.3 Determination of the implied volatility and the hedge ratio
The hedge ratio is a ceteris pnr-ihns expression measuring the sensitivity of the option
price to small changes in the underlying stock's price. In other words, this requires an
understanding of how (changes in) the stock price affect the prices of options. It may be
clear without much further analysis that the value of the call option hedge ratio is always
between zero and one~e1. Similarly, the put option hedge ratio is always between minus one
and zero. It is assumed that the LTB model generates correct hedge ratios. This model
requires a number of input parameters. Besides the current stock price, these include the
exercise price of the option, the option's maturity, the riskless interest rate, the dividend
payments and ex-dividend dates in the remaining maturity, and the standard deviation of the
instantaneous stock rate of return or volatility. Only the last parameter in this list is not yet
available in our database~02. Some methods exist in order to obtain an estimate of the
volatility parameter. Studies by Beckers (1981), Van der Hilst ( I989) and Veld (1992) have
revealed that the so-called 'weighted implied volatility method' usually provides a better
estimate for the volatility of the stock than the volatility estimated from historical stock
price data. Applied to our analysis, this method suggests the following procedure to estimate
the stock volatility for every ex-dividend event:
~~) AIBOR is an abbreviation for Amsterdam Inter Bank Offered Rate.
;t)) The boundaries are included as limiting cases. This property may be easily demonstrated when the effect
of the increased stock price on every boundary condition relevant for the option is analyzed. For a discussion. see
e.g. Cox and Rubinstein 11985. Ch.S).
~
' ~` Dividend information is, of course. available in the database employed in chapter 8.
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select all relevant event-series which are associated with the particular ex-dividend
event-,
determine for every event-series the value of the volatility parameter which equates
the model price to the market price of the option; this value is called the 'implied
volatility' or 'implied standard deviation' (ISD);
deterrnine the sensitivity of the (model) option price for changes in the [SD-value;
the volatility estimate for the ex-dividend event is obtained as the average of the
[SD-values, weighted by their sensitivities.
Some comments can be made with respect to this procedure. To begin with, there is
some ambiguity about what should be meant by 'all relevant event-series'. The very
majority of existing empirical literature implements the ISD-procedure by considering only
t~cil! options prices~o'. Veld and Verboven (1992, 1993) point out that this may produce
incorrect ISD-estimates. Their argument is based on the intuition that when some option
pricing model is assumed valid in order to derive ISD-estimates, it should first be checked
whether the model generates correct prices with respect to a!! contingent contracts for which
it is supposecl to hold. A good illustration of this may be Che central theme in Veld and
Verboven (1993 ). It starts from the observation that option pricing models such as the model
of Black and Scholes and the LTB model offer solutions for a number of contracts
contingent on the stock's price, including call and put options. An important thing to note
in this context is that the ISD-procedure is used to estimate the volatility parameter, i.e. a
characteristic of the stnck price movement in the maturity interval. Thus, if the assumptions
underlying the option pricing models are adequate, there should be no systematic departure
between the ISD-estimates obtained from either call or put options using a correspondin;~
set of input parameters. Upon examination of Dutch call and put options, Veld and
Verboven (1993 j find that put option ISD-values are significantly higher than the
corresponding call option values~tl`t. This result demonstrates that (i) the diffusion process
of the stock price implicit in these option models is not adequate, and (ii) that estimating
ISD-values from call options only may seriously underestimate the volatility of the stock.
~tl; See e.g. Beckers (1981) and Rubinstein (19R51.
;~ Veld and Verboven (199?) and Veld (1992) compare the ISD-values of stock warrants and long term call
options traded in the Dutch capital markeL and observe that warrant ISD's are much higher. They conclude from
this that warrants and (long ternil call options, despite their resemblance, are not seen as perfect substitutes by
investors.
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Rather than waitin~ for the development of a valid option pricing model, we decided to
include the call ~~~cl the put option event-series, identified with respect to the ex-dividend
event, and calculated an ISD-value for each of the 1319 series.
The second comment refers to the input parameters in the estimating procedure.
especially to the 'current' market price of the stock and the option. Our research
methodology suggests that we should estimate the hedge-ratio at the cum-instant, corrected
for the expected ex-dividend effect in the cum-ex interval, which is adeyuately approximated
by (139). Our theoretical framework also suggests that it is reasonable to use the realized
ex-dividend stock and options prices as rationally expected prices in the ISD and hedge ratio
determination~tl'. Whereas the database employed in the stock price study of chapter R
contains opening prices for the stock at the ex-dividend day, table 9.1 indicates that it was
not possible to obtain an opening option price for each ex-dividend event. Furthet7rtore. in
the cases where such price~ could be obtained, we might ask whether there is much
synchronicity between both the stock and option price quotations. This motivated us to
calculate three different ISD-values for each of the 1319 event-series in the sample: ( I)
based on opening ex-dividend prices for both the stock and the options (if available), (2) on
opening stock prices and ex-day closing options prices, and (3) on ex-day closing prices for
both the stock and the options~tl~.
Next, we used the LTB model to derive ISD-values for each eve~nt-series~ft~. For a
number of series, however, the numerical search method did not generate a meaningful
result, in which case there was no ISD-value available for that series~tlx. The sensitivity of
the model price at the calculated ISD-level was also determined with this model. As noted
above, the ISD and sensitivity calculations were repeated three time~ using different stock
305 Obviously, our test procedure relies on the validity of the theoretical framework, which includes both a
stock and an option pricing model. This may, however, be less restrictive for the determination of the expected
hedge ratio, since this sensitivity measure includes potential misspecification only at the margin.
306 Recall that we have defined the average bid-ask quote to be the market price of the option at the closing
of am~ tradine dav.
~~~ All calculations in this entire study were carried out on a personal computer using the spreadsheet
program Excel 4.0, which offers the possibility of creating custom functions that may be employed as an integrated
part of the spreadsheet. In order to generare an increased calculation speed for the ISD and sensitivity
determination, we programmed the LTB model in Pascal language. The compiled Pascal program was dynamically
linked to Excel so that it could be used like any other spreadsheet function.
~~S Usually. this occurti when the market price of the option happens to be so low [hat even the smallest
positive volatility level yields a higher model price.
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and option price input parameters. Finally, [SD-estimates were determined for each ex-
dividend event as a weighted average of the [SD-values available for that event. using the
sensitivities as weights. This ISD was used in the hedge ratio calculations~tly. Based on the
preceding arguments, we initially decided to apply seven alternative weighing procedures
(producing seven different ISD-estimates). The following illustration summarizes this (the
included procedures are marked with a.~-symbol):
Relevant event-series
Stock and option ex-
dividend prices
---------------------
Open stock urtd optinn
(open-opeal
Operr stnc~k, c lnse
uptinn (n~~ert-clnsc I






~ i r i ri i
------------~-------------~-----------~
~tly Beckers (19R I) and Van der Hilst (1989) note that the sensitivities (weights) of at-the-money and slightly
out-of-the-mone~ options are usually high in comparison with those of other series. Their weiehts may even be
,o hi~h that the acrrtge is dominated by the ISD-values of these options.
Tlte E.r-Diriderrc! Effect i~~ Dutch Ohti~ms Prices
Table 9.2 Paired two-sample test results for different weighted ISD-procedures.
?ll
iii ~'~
c~~rl ~~h~~,~-t'1~,.,t~ N~,t „h~~,~-~l~„~~ c~~lr ~'t,~.,~~-~'l,~s~- Pnt ~1~,~~-~~r~„~~
Sample mean 11.2038 0.2359 0.1976 0?305
Sample variance 0.0064 0.0042 0.0046 O.OOd2
Paired observatium' 12U 121
Pearson correlation coeff.
t-statistic~~~ 0.6514 O.R724
Sign. level ( two-taill -5.6743 -It1J7R7
0.0000 0.0000
131 1-})
Curnbiirecl open- Cnmbinecl Cumbinee! Cun~bine~! open-
clnse rlnse-clus~ npert-open closr
Sample mean 0?22ï 0.2153 0.219R 0.230~
Sample variance 0.0042 0.0041 0.0056 0.004R
Paired observations~ I 19 R 3
Pearson correlation coeff.
t-statistic~~ Q9643 0.9584
Sign. level ( two-tail) 4.5696 -4SSId
O.00(1(1 0.0000
This is the total number of ex-dividend events for which a pnir of [SD-estimates could be
determined.
The t-statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the mean difference over all paired observations
is eyuaJ to zero.
The summary table with the J-marks lists the input stock and options price data used
for the ISD-calculation in the rows. The columns state for each row which series were
employed in determining the weighted average ISD, i.e. both the call and the put series, or
the call and put series in isolation. We require, however, that at least two call and two put
ISD-values exist for any particular ex-dividend event, so that the average is not entirely
made up of one call and~or one put ISD-value. This condition appeared to be very restrictive
for the open-open variants, since ISD-estimates could only be obtained for 83 ex-dividend
events (out of 127). Therefore, we decided not to separate this variant further into call and
put [SD-estimates.
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It is interesting to check whether the ISD-estimates for various weighing variants
produce similar outcomes. Table 9.2 summarizes some representative results of paired two-
samples tests with respect to different pairs of weighing schemes. The first two panels use
matched pairs of separately calculated call and put ISD-values, either using the opening
stock price (panel 1) or the closing stock price ( panel2) at the ex-dividend day. The t-values
indicate that the mean call ISD-value in the event-sample is significantly lower than the
mean put ISD-value, which confirms the findings of Veld and Verboven ( 1993) mentioned
before~~tt. The two panels also indicate that the difference between call and put ISD-values
is slightly less when the opening ex-price is used for the stock. Panels 3 and 4 consider
combined weighing schemes for different price input data. There appears to be a significant
difference between the means of the ISD-estimates. On the other hand, the high value of the
correlation coefficient suggest that the combined ISD-estimates in each two-sample
comparison are very much correlated.
The results presented in table 9.2 yield a quite clear but troublesome conclusion: ISD-
estimates are significantly different for call and put options, and even the combined ISD-
estimate differs significantly when determined using the opening or closing stock price on
the ex-dividend day. We have earlier expressed our argument that the option pricing model
is assumed valid for both call and put options and, therefore, the estimation procedure
should not simply be directed to one option class. Therefore, we decided to detennine the
hedge ratio ( and also the abnormal rate of return) using the combined wei~hing variants.
As noted before, we only included ex-dividend events for which at least two call-ISD's
and two put-[SD's could be determined. This reduced the number of event-series and events
in the following way:
nperl-open i~arrant: 618 event-series available, spread over 83 ex-dividend events;
open-close t~ariant: 1280 event-series (636 calls and 644 puts), spread over 120 ex-
dividend events;
close-close rariant: 1286 event-series (639 calls and 647 puts), spread over 121 ex-
dividend events;
Hedge ratios and abnormal rates of return can now be determined and tested for the
three variants. This is detailed in the next sub-section.
310 Veld and Verboven (1993) use Dutch price data over 1985 and 1986. However, they investigate 'pre-
intervals' and 'post-intervals~ relative to the cum-ex interval. so that they e~plicitiy ignore the cum-ex interval.
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9.3.~3 Abnormal stock rate of return in the cum-ex interval implied b~ options prices
The calculation procedures detailed in the preceding sub-sections may now be
employed to obtain empirical results for the average abnormal stock rate of return as it is
implied by (or embedded in) the prices of Dutch American-style call and put options. We
can~ied out two such studies. The first considers abnonnal rate of return observations
obtained at the event-series level which are averaged. The second recognizes potential
clustering problems due to the fact that many event-series observations are associated with
one event. We will discuss both studies below.
First of all, we detennined the abnormal rate of return given in (141) for the total
number of event-series for the open-open, open-close, and close-close variants, and tested
the mean. Table 9.3 summarizes the test results. As shown in the top panel of the table, the
abnormal rate of return is significantly higher than zero for all three variants when the
combined ISD-variants are used to determinc the hedge ratio. Furthermore, the mean
abnormal rate of retum and especially the mean relative stock price decline (mean a)
implied by the abnormal rate of return are in the same order of magnitude as those reported
in the stock price study in chapter 8. This is important additional evidence, since the current
methodology directly estimates the abnonnal rate of return without the market model as was
used in the stock price study.
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Sample mean 0.0051 0.0043 0.0049
St. error 0.0151 0.0187 0.0190
Observations 618 I 280 1?86
i-statistic 8.4107 8?993 9.1778
Sign.level Q000 0.0(10 0.000
Mean a~ 0.8187 0.8405 0.8189
Call Put
ope~,-rlose close-close open-close close-cln.ce
Sample mean 0.0On9 0.0006 0.0077 0.0091
St. error 0.0161 0.0157 0.0204 0.0210
Observations 636 639 644 647
z-statistic 1.4823 0.9228 9.5630 11.0462
Sign. level ~U.05 ~U.OS O,fl(x)U 0.p0ptl
Vlean a~ 0.971-1 ~i~~~ ~' ~ ~ ti.r,i;'
The mean relative stock price decline 1'mean cr' i is the mean of the a-values assocíated with the
abnormal rates of return, obtained from the relationship AR-( I-ald, whcre d is the dividend yield.
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Sample mexn U.0050 0.(N)40 0.OU4K
St. error 0.010O 0.01-i9 0.01-19
Observations 83 I 20 121
z-statistic 4.5542 2.9~1i 3.5680
Síen.level O.o(lU 0.(x)0 O.o(N)
Mean a~ l).8172t O.R455 O.R14?
Call Put
open-cln,ce' ~'lns~~-~'l~st~ upen-cln.~'t' c'lnse-~'lase
Sample mean 0.0008 0.(X)o6 0.0073 0.009?
St. error 0.0143 0.(11~0 0.0176 0.0176
Observations 120 I? 1 I'(1 I Z I
z-statistic 0.6135 0.4726 4.52~12 5.7302i
Sien. level ~O.Oi ~O.US O.o(H)0 0.0000
n~~;t~, ~,~ n.~wy~) a~~~~~:~ o.~zor, o.e~~o
l h~ me~tn relative stock price decline (' mean a') is the mean of the a-values associated with the
uhn~,rmal rate, of return, obtained from the rela[ionship AR-(I-a)d, where d is the dividend yield.
We have also split the combined abnormal rate of return sample into two suh-samples.
using the distinction whether the observation is associated with a call or a put series~l I. For
both the open-close and close-close variants. the bottom panel of table 9.~ indicates that the
stock rate of return in the call sub-sample is not si~nificantly abnormal, while it is
significantly positive for the put sub-sample. Associated conclusions hold for the mean
relative stock price decline. An explanation for this may be found in the role of the ISD-
estimate in the hedee ratio value. We argued before that the combined weighing procedure
tends to average over the lower call-ISD's and the higher put-ISD's. Other thin~~s eyual, this
jl I Note that the hedee ratio imolved is determined with the rum6inecl ISD-estimates.
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would imply a higher hedge ratio~l' for call options (i.e. more positive), and also a lower
abnormal rate of return (i.e. more towards zero). For put options, the effect is opposite: a
lower volatility level causes the hedge ratio to be higher (i.e. less negative), so that the
abnormal rate of return is increased. This demonstrates that, when the option pricing model
is assumed valid, we should not simply rely on volatilities from either call or put options~ I~.
An obvious disadvantage of the study detailed just before is that many abnormal rate
of return observations are associated with one event. This type of clustering may cause the
reported standard error of the mean to be different from the true standard error so that the
reported z-statistic may be inaccurate. In order to alleviate this problem, we have detennined
erent-nhserrutinns by averaging the abnormal rate of return observations of all event-series
associated with one ex-dividend event. Subseyuently, we conducted a second test
considerina these event-observations~14. The results of this additional test are given in table
9.4. The abnormal rate of return figures appear to be virtually the same as in the former test.
The reported standard errors~15 are, however, lower than the corresponding figures in table
9.3, indicating that the abnormal rate of retum test using event-observations produces
stronger results than the event-series test.
In sum, we conclude from our analysis that, on average, the abnormal rate of return
embedded in the prices of Dutch call and put options is highly comparable to the figure
found in the stock price study in chapter 8. The mean relative stock price decline resulting
from the overall study is around 80 to 85 percent, which is consistent with the
corresponding figure in the preceding chapter. Since the methodology employed in the
options test allows for a different and less restrictive determination of the mean abnormal
cum-ex interval stock rate of return, the results of the present chapter may be regarded as
important additional evidence supporting the conclusions of chapter 8. Note also that, since
,
- I- This follows from the condition thut both call and put options huve higher values for increased volatilitv
levels. whether American-style or European-style. For a discussion of [his arbitraee condition. see e.g. Cox and
Rubinstein ( 1985. Ch.S).
~ I~ This can also be illustrated by the results of the call option study of Dorsman and Verboven (199d). They
employ call ISD-estimates and call options prices (over 1987-I990). Their average relative stock price dedine of
0.76 may therefore either be an over- or an underestímation of the true relative decline. We believe that our call
uncl put options examínation provides much more reliable results.
;t4
Note that we maintain the assumption, employed in chapter R. that ex-dividend ere~ir observations are
serially uncorrelated.
~I~ Note that the standard errors in tables 9.; and 9.-t are detemiined ati the ~ample ,,tandard error divided
by rhe square root of the sample size.
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options prices appear to include the same stoc~k pr-ice ex-dividend etfect, we can conclude
that options prices themselves do nnt exhibit an ex-dividend effect: the last cum-dividend
option price is simply contingent on the ex-dividend stock price expected by the stoek
market, and the latrer obviously includes the ex-divicíend effect.
9.-1 Summarv
This chapter focused on empirical aspects of options pricing in the cum-ex interval.
It was argued that there appear to be only a few studies which have investi~ated the ex-
dividend effect using options prices, but no study considers call and put options
simultaneously. We have carried out such a study with respect to Dutch American-style call
and put options in the years I 989- l99?.
The research methodology employed in the options test enahlcs uti to estimate the
mean cum-ex interval abnormal stock rate of return directly from options prices, i.e. without
having to specify an estimator for the normul rate of return on the stock in the cum-ex
interval. This methodology uses the property, discussed in chapter 6, that the stock return
in any interval may be replicuted by creating an appropriate hedge portfolio and,
consequently, the stock rate of return. The 'transfonning' parameter is the hedge ratio,
which is assumed to be correctly generated by the LTB model. ]t should be noted that we
'only' reyuire the LTB model to produce correct hedge ratios. The methodology relating the
current and expected ex-dividend options prices is entirely based on arbitrage arguments,
which are extremely general.
It has been made clear that the investiQation is not very easy to do. Besides the data
collection work and the culculations, we had to find a proper procedure by which the
volatility of the stock can be determined. Since we consider call and put options, it is not
very plausible to use call options prices only when creating an implied standard deviation
or ISD. We argued that it is more appropriate to rely on a'combined' ISD-estimate which
uses both call and put options series.
The empirical tests with respect to both event-series observations and event-
observations show that the cum-ex interval abnon-nal stock rate of return is significantly
positive, and the associated mean relative stock price decline is around 80 to 85 percent.
This result is consistent with corresponding results obtained from the stock price study in
chapter 8. Therefore, they strongly confirm the conclusions of the empirical stock price
study with respect to the ex-dividend effect in the Dutch setting.
10 THE EX-DIVIDEND EFFECT IN THE DUTCH
SETTING: EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study considers many aspects of stock and options pricing in the cum-ex interval,
which happens to be an issue which has received much attention in the Dutch financial press
in 1993. The objective of the current research is twofold. First, it provides a consistent
theoretical framework providing insight in how differential tax and risk incentives affect the
rate of return on a dividend paying stock in the cum-ex interval. The equilibrium result of
this risk-tax model is a necessary ingredient for the pricing of options, in particular for the
LTB option model used in this study. The second objective is to conduct an empirical test
for the presence of a significant ex-dividend effect in the cum-ex interval rate of return of
Dutch stocks and, if so, whether this effect can be explained by the risk-tax model. In the
remainder, we will evaluate our main findings and discuss some implications.
In order to gain more insight in the Dutch setting, we have first investigated a number
of relevant institutional features. From several discussions we concluded that, although
Dutch institutional investors have huge amounts of invested capital, these investors are not
expected to be active in the cum-ex interval either because they (i) are very risk averse. (ii)
are tax-indifferent, or (iii) face legal, administrative, or informal barriers when engaging in
dividend-related trading in the cum-ex interval. On the other hand, individual investors in
the Netherlands appear to have a rather large tax ince~ntive to avoid the receipt of a(taxable)
dividend, since capital gains received by these investors are not taxed in the Netherlands.
We also illustrated that many Dutch companies are very creative in designing dividend
forms enabline shareholders to receive the dividend avoidin~ much (or all) of the taxation
associated with it. The choice and combination dividend forms, which can be complex
dividends involving cash amounts and~or stock dividends have become increasingly popular
among Dutch companies. The stock dividend element is untaxed, since it is virtually always
chargeable against the share premium reserve. The Dutch tax setting is also characterized
by a special withholding tax on (taxable) dividends, which should be withdrawn before the
dividend is paid out by the company.
Our empirical test reveals the following. On average, before-tax stock rates of return
in the cum-ex interval appear to contain a significant positive premium, which is referred
to as the 'ex-dividend effect' or 'abnormal rate of return'. We also demonstrated that this
abnormal rate of return is positively correlated with the dividend yield. Moreover, the ratio
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of the abnormal rate of return and the dividend yield appears to be invariant across deciles
and is in the order of IS to 25 percent. The latter suggests that the ex-dividend stock price
decline relative to the dividend is not related to the dividend yield on the stock. We also
investigated whether the abnormal rate of return is correlated with two proxies for
transactions costs and~or liyuidity, and we were not able to discover a significant
relationship.
Next, we conducted a test with respect to a broader window of 28 trading days around
the cum-ex intervaL This revealed the interesting conclusion that, for the important sample
of taxable cash dividends, the abnormal rate of return appears to be restricted to the very
narrowly defined interval from cum-close to ex-open (i.e. interval -o), whereas trading
volume appears to be abnormal in a much larger number of intervats (i.e. from -3 to f2).
This suggests that, although there is significantly higher trading volume around the cum-ex
interval, this does nnr involve an abnormal stock price effect outside the cum-ex interval in
the sense that the stock rate of return is 'normal' in these intervals.
Finally, we used Dutch American-style call and put options prices in order to carry out
a control test with respect to our stock price results. Given fair pricing for options, their
prices should reflect the expected abnormal rate of return on the srnck in the cum-ex
interval. Besides this, the option test methodology is very general since it 'only' assumes
that options prices are rationally set and that hedae ratios are generated by some model (we
use the LTB model). One advantaQe of this is that we do not have to estimate the normal
stock rate of return via some variant of the market model. A disadvantage is that a relatively
cumbersome procedure is involved in order to estimate the stock's volatility. Anyway, our
options test confinns the result found earlier that the cum-ex interval stock rate of return is
on avera~e signific~uitly positive. More important, we find that the stock ex-dividend effect
embedded in options prices is in the same order of ma~nitude as in the stock price test.
The ex-dividend effect for the Dutch settin~~ appears to be different from that of US
studies. The body of existina US evidence has produced the insight that high yielding,
liquid, and optionnable stocks are typical candidates for large-scale dividend capture tradin~,
as is suggested by the tax model. This behavior is even persistent after the 1986 US tax
refonn which eliminated the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains, and is found
whether the dividend is taxable or not. The large body of 'other' stocks appears to be much
less subject to such trading, and the ex-dividend effect for these stocks is not very clear. The
evidence for the Dutch case. on the other hand, is not very much consistent with the tax
model. Virtually all our empirical tïndings appear to be consistent with the risk-tax model.
This implies that risk uncl tax factors are relevant for investors trading in the cum-ex
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interval, such that the aggregate risk-tax parameter (t) is dominated by the of degree risk-
adjusted cash (dis)preference of individual im~estors and~or foreign investors. Two empirical
findings of our study are particularly interesting, i.e. that (i) the ex-dividend effect is about
IS to 25 percent of the dividend yield which happens to be eyual to the effective
withholding tax rate on taxable dividends, and (ií) that no significant abnornial rate of return
behavior is observed for taxable dividends directly around the (narrow) cum-ex interval so
that 'fair' or 'normal' pricing is observed directly outside the cum-ex interval.
In sum, our empirical results reveal that the ex-dividend effect is a tax effect. The
cum-ex interval rate of return therefore reflects the risk-tax status of the investors trading
in this interval. Our findings suggest that the risk-tax parameter is very much less than the
income tax differential relevant for Dutch individual investors. One explanation of this could
be that some group of tax-indifferent and less risk-averse investors exists which is large
enough to make the weighted average risk-tax parameter in the order found by us. However,
our discussions with specialists provided no single clue for the .tirsteniu~ic presence of such
investors in the cum-ex interval. Another explanation, suggested by the dividend concealing
model developed in this study, is that the market avera~e risk-tax parameter indeed reilects
the risk-tax status of the group of wealthy individual investors, but their marginal tax iate
is very much lower than their top income tax bracket would suggesL This is based on
behavior, presumed in the Dutch financial press, that Dutch individual and foreign investors
accept the effective withholding tax burden and conceal the dividend payment further, so
that the ex-dividend effect retlects the effective withholdins tax iate. As a conseyuence, the
risk-tax parameter retlects the before-tax rate of return premium required by investors in
order to compensate for the effective tax rate on dividends.
Let us also investigate some implications from possible fiscal policy measures in the
Netherlands, given that the dividend concealing model indeed holds true. First of all, the
model predicts that lowering or even eliminating the dividend withholding tax rate will
reduce the ex-dividend effect. Since the differential between the 'effective' dividend tax rate
and the (zero) capital gains rate is lower, the abnormal rate of return will also be lower, and
the relative decline will go more towards one. The opposite effect would result in the case
of increasing the withholding tax rate. Second, the introduction of a capital gains taxation
for individual investors would not be very effective when concealing behavior is common
practice among investors, especially since the Dutch share transfer system makes it difficult
to trace back the gains and losses from specific trades. This may be one reason why the
introduction of capital gains taxation lacks virtually any attention in Dutch politics.
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A related issue which was amply discussed in our study is that the adverse effects of
differential taxation can be redressed at the individual investor level when options are traded
on dividend paying stocks, since option-based strategies essentially involve (untaxed) capital
gains. We have also stressed that this only holds for the part of the tax rate differential
which is not already included in options prices. More specifically, the dividend concealing
model suggests that the market includes the effective withholding tax rate in the equilibrium
rate of return in the cum-ex interval, so that only the additional tax rate differential can be
redressed. However, we should ask whether this is meaningful when investors are
characterized by concealing behavior, since the rate of return earned from dividend avoiding
will theoretically be eyuu! to that earned from holding the stock and concealing. On the
other hand, dividend avoiding may even be an inferior alternative since it involves
transactions costs. It could be argued that dividend avoiding provides a way to express
'honest' behavior instead of concealing behavior. We must add to this that Dutch courts
have disapproved some dividend avoidance strategies by characterizing the resulting capital
gains as ordinary income. The conclusion would then be that the Dutch stock market sees
through all of this and, on average, prices stocks such that holding and avoiding is not
different at the margin. Furthem~ore, it appears to us that the dividend avoiding strategies
are especially beneficial to market makers, which are known to be the initiators of the recent
massive Royal Dutch deals. It was even demonstrated by us that using synthetic stock based
dividend avoiding strategies involving call and put options are usually less expensive in
temis of transactions costs.
A final remark can be made with respect to the relevance of our study for the dividend
policy issue hinted at in the first chapter. We believe that our findings support the view that
the dividend policies of Dutch companies entail two effects: an information effect and a tax-
related ex-dividend effect. Therefore, dividend payments seem to matter for investors only
at a few moments. Upon announcement of une~pected dividend policy changes, stock prices
will adjust to the information about future cash flows provided by the news. The tax aspects
of Dutch dividends are depending on the dividend form proposed by the company. Given
knowledge about this, the market includes an ex-dividend effect in the cum-ex interval stock
rate of retum, which incorporates risk and tax aspects.
5ummary (in Dutchl
Vanaf de ex-dividend dag wordt het aandeel ex-dividend verhandeld. Een eerste
inschatting zou kunnen zijn dat de eerste ex-dividend notering van het aandeel gelijk is aan
de laatste cum-dividend notering verminderd met het dividend. Verschillende empirische
studies in vooral de VS laten zien dat dit doorgaans niet geldt. Het bestaan van verschillende
belastingtarieven voor contante inkomsten en vermogenswinsten, zoals dat in Nederland
normaliter ook het geval is, zou daarvoor een oorzaak kunnen zijn. Deze studie richt zich
op het zogenaamde "ex-dividend effect" in aandeelrendementen.
In de studie wordt een theoretisch model afgeleid waannee het mogelijk is een beter
inzicht in het ex-dividend gedrag van aandelen te krijgen. Dit zogenaamde 'risico-belasting'
(risk-tax) model heeft als belangrijkste kenmerk dat het aandeelrendement in het "cum-ex
interval" athankelijk is van twee factoren, namelijk (i) de mate van risico-aversie van de
beleggers, en (ii) hun (differentiële) belastingstatus. De Nederlandse situatie kenmerkt zich
door de enorme vermogens die zijn belegd door institutionele beleggers zoals
pensioenfondsen, verzekeringsmaatschappijen en beleggingsinstellingen. Daarnaast zijn als
belangrijke categorieën te noemen de (rijkere) particuliere beleggers en de buitenlandse
beleggers. Uit gesprekken met functionarissen van institutionele beleggers is opgemaakt dat
deze beleggers in het cum-ex interval worden gekenmerkt door zaken als hoge risico-aversie,
belasting-indifferentie, en gehinderd door legale, administratieve of informele barrières. Om
deze redenen achten wij niet hen, maar de particulieren en buitenlanders de relevante
beleggerscategorieën in het cum-ex interval, te meer daar zeker de eerstgenoemden een
belangrijk belastingmotief hebben in het onbelast zijn van koerswinsten. Nederlandse
ondernemingen lijken hier op in te spelen door het indrukwekkende scala aan (soms
complexe) dividendvonnen dat door hen wordt gehanteerd. Een belangrijk instrument daarbij
is het onbelaste agio-stock dividend. Overigens is het in Nederland voor ondernemingen
verplicht om bij de uitkering van belastbare dividenden dividendbelasting in te houden,
welke een voorheffing is op de inkomsten- of vennootschapsbelasting.
Het empirische onderzoek toont onder andere aan dat het vóór-belasting rendement in
het cum-ex interval een significant positieve premie boven het 'norniale' rendement bevat.
Deze premie blijkt positief gecorreleerd te zijn met het dividendrendement, maar niet met
een tweetal maatstaven voor de mate waarin zich 'handelsbelemmeringen" (transactiekosten
en~of een gebrek aan liquiditeit) voordoen. Ook blijkt de verhouding van de premie en het
dividendrendement niet gevoelig te zijn voor de hoogte van het dividendrendement. hetgeen
er op wijst dat de relatieve ex-dividend koersdaling van het aandeel niet athankelijk is van
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de mate waarin het fonds dividend uitkeert. Bovendien is het ex-dividend effect (de premie)
in de orde van grootte van l5 tot 25 procent van het dividendrendement.
Na uitbreiding van het onderzoek tot een periode van 28 handelsdagen rondom het ex-
dividend ~;aan blijken de conclusies alleen maar te worden aangescherpt. De belangrijke
steekproef van aandelen met (belaste) contante uitkeringen laat zien dat het aandeel-
rendement in de directe om~eving van het (zeer nauw gedefinieerde) cum-ex interval niet
significant afwijkt van de verwachting, terwijl dit wél voor handelsvolumes geldt.
De prijzen van Nederlandse call en put opties worden eveneens aan een onderzoek
onderworpen. Met behulp van optie-literatuur wordt een test-methode ontwikkeld die het
mogelijk maakt dat het ex-dividend effect van het onderliggende aandeel wordt geschat uit
de prijzen van opties. Deze methode heeft bovendien als voordeel dat het normale
rendement niet behoeft te worden r;eschat, zoals dat wel het geval is in het aandelen-
onderzoek. Hier staat tegenover dat de bepaling van de volatility van het aandeel een relatief
omslachtige procedure vereist. De controle-test levert uiteindelijk resultaten op die het eerder
voor uandeelrendementen waargenomen ex-dividend effect bevestigen.
Het door ons gevonden empirisch bewijsmateriaal rechtvaardigt naar onze mening de
conclusie dat het ex-dividend effect in de Nederlandse situatie moet worden opgevat als een
belastingeffect. In tegenstelling tot in de Verenigde Staten gevonden resultaten, waar net als
in Nederland een zogenaamd "klassiek" stelsel van inkomstenbelastingheffing wordt
gehanteerd, lijkt in de Nederlandse situatie echter geen sprake te zijn van grootschalige en
systematische effecten die een arbitrage-karakter hebben. Onze resultaten zijn consistent met
de hypothese dat aan het ex-dividend effect zowel een risico- als een belasting-aspect ten
grondslag ligt. De hierhoven reeds genoemde orde van grootte van het effect weerspiegelt
bovendien niet de belastingstatus van rijkere particuliere beleggers. Eén verklaring hiervoor
zou kunnen zijn dat het effect een balans aangeeft tussen de belasting factoren van
particulieren enerzijds en die van belasting-indifferente instituties anderzijds. Echter, de
hierboven reeds gememoreerde gesprekken met vertegenwoordigers van institutionele
beleggers en met in de beurspraktijk werkzame mensen hebben ons de stellige indruk
gegeven dat in Nederland institutionele beleggers juist niet systematisch handelen in het
cum-ex interval. Een andere verklaring voor het in Nederland gevonden ex-dividend effect
is af te leiden uit het zogenaamde "verzwijg-model" (dividend concealing model), hetgeen
een speciale versie is van het risico-belasting model. Het verzwijg-model gaat uit van de
gedragsveronderstelling dat beleggers de effectieve dividend-voorheffingsvoet als de
relevante inkomstenbelastingvoet hanteren, aangezien zij het ontvangen dividend verzwijgen
voor de inkomstenbelasting. In deze gedachte neemt de voorheffingsvoet feitelijk de positie
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in van het eigenlijke (hogere) marginule belastinQtarief van elk van de beleggers. Als gevolg
hiervan zal in de evenwichtssituatie het vóór-belasting rendement in het cum-ex interval een
premie bevatten die het differentiële belastingtarief (de voorheffingsvoet voor dividend
versus het nultarief voor vermotienswinst) retlecteert.
In onze studie is eveneens aandacht besteed aan de dividend-ontwijkingsstrategieën die
met name met betrekking tot het aandeel Koninklijke Olie zijn ontplooid. Indien het
verzwijg-model opgaat, dan is met dergelijke strategieën hooguit hetzelfde te bereiken als
met het simpelweg verzwijgen van het dividend, aangezien de aandeelprijs reeds voor de
voorheffingsvoet is gecorrigeerd. Een verschil is dat ontwijkingsstrategieën gepaard gaan
met transactiekosten, waardoor de conclusie zou kunnen worden gerechtvaardigd dat het niet
toevallig is dat juist commissionairs in plaats van particuliere beleggers de initiatoren zijn
van dergelijke strategieën. Bovendien heeft ons onderzoek laten zien dat ontwijkings-
strategieën die gebruik maken van zogenaamde "synthetische aandelen" (met behulp van at-
the-money call eri put opties) veelal goedkoper zijn, in termen van transactiekosten, dan de
feitelijk gehanteerde strategieën welke gebruik maken van deep-in-the-money put opties.
Overigens is niet alleen het verzwijgen van ontvangen belastbare dividenden een in fiscaal
opzicht ontoelaatbare praktijk, maar is uit tiscale jurisprudentie op te maken dat de uit
bepaalde dividend-ontwijkingsstrategieën voortvloeiende vermogenswinsten met niet geringe
kans als contante inkomsten kunnen worden aangemerkt.
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